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Introduction
Andrew W. Neal
This introduction begins by discussing the meaning and scope 
of ‘security’ in the context of the national independence of 
small states. It then summarises the main points of contention 
over security in the debate about Scottish independence during 
the 2014 referendum, including issues of intelligence sharing, 
border control, policing, resilience planning, cybersecurity, and 
economic security. It considers the security experiences of some 
other small European countries, and also the implications of 
developments since 2014, particularly the Brexit vote. The final 
section discusses the ESRC seminar series from which this book 
was produced, and the organisation and content of the chapters.
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Questions about ‘security’ provide a lens that brings issues of national 
independence into sharp focus. In the first instance, security concerns 
the ability of a state to protect its inhabitants from danger. The idea 
that security is the first responsibility of government has long been a 
political mantra. But choosing strategies to ensure a country’s effective 
security often entails a tension between the protection of its citizens 
and their individual freedom. Ensuring that citizens are safe from the 
excesses of state power, for example through guarantees of privacy and 
human rights, becomes central to the security debate. Such issues are 
interwoven with the country’s particular style of politics and democracy. 
Seen in such a light, we must ask what exactly it is that needs to be 
‘secured’. In the context of national independence, the answer often goes 
beyond basic survival; it involves values, culture, prosperity, and the 
place of a state and its people in the world.
The chapters in this book reflect upon the security questions raised 
by the prospect of Scottish independence from the United Kingdom. 
Despite a victory for the No side in the 2014 referendum, these questions 
have not gone away. The vote did not settle the issue of independence 
for a generation as Unionists hoped it would. The Scottish National 
Party (SNP) went on to win a landslide of Scottish Westminster seats at 
the 2015 General Election and remained the governing party of Scotland 
in the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections. At the time of writing, after the 
UK’s vote to leave the European Union in June 2016, the Scottish First 
Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, is touting independence as a way to keep 
Scotland in the EU. There is every chance that Scotland may revisit the 
question of independence, and thus inevitably the question of Scottish 
national security, sooner rather than later.
Elsewhere, separatism within other EU member states is still firmly 
on the agenda, most notably in Spain. And the UK’s decision to leave 
the EU — otherwise known as Brexit — may be the beginning of a major 
regional, institutional, and geopolitical shakeup. It could have a domino 
effect, prompting other member states to demand their independence 
from the EU too. In all cases, independence is not so much an answer 
but a series of further questions. Independence from what, and to do 
what? What ‘security’ would such independence bring? And could 
a small, newly independent state fare better against forces that even 
the biggest and most ‘secure’ states seem unable to control, such as 
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migration, capital flows, and new technologies of communication and 
social organisation? 
There are many current crises that make the true ‘independence’ of 
states uncertain. The financial crisis of 2008 has ongoing implications 
for the financial independence of small states such as Iceland and 
Greece, as it would for Scotland if it were to become independent, with 
lingering issues of budgetary deficit and national debt. Terrorist attacks 
in continental Europe and the Middle East raise questions about the 
permeability of borders, the effectiveness of international security 
cooperation, and the intelligence and counter-terrorist capabilities of 
states, small and large. For example, the police and intelligence services 
of Belgium — a binational state, the unity of which is consequently 
sometimes strained — were heavily criticised in the wake of the Brussels 
airport attack of 22 March 2016.1 So too were the French services in a 
high-level review of their responses to the Bataclan attacks.2 
The issue of security crystallises these questions. Could a newly 
independent state prevent such challenges from becoming existential 
crises? What help would it need, and could it expect, from elsewhere? 
The Scottish independence referendum, its politics and debates, and the 
successes and failures of its campaigns, bring these issues into sharp 
relief. Although the experience of the 2014 referendum is now history, 
the lessons it offers remain current. The debate over Scotland’s future 
continues, and the Scottish experience provides a salient example for 
other parts of the world that face constitutional challenge and upheaval. 
Security in small nations
Security has always been a policy area of special importance, and the 
events of 11 September 2001 elevated it even higher on government 
agendas. The perceived threat level in many parts of the world has not 
since abated. Threats are seen as greater and more numerous in all too 
many cases. 
1  Jack Moore, ‘Brussels Attacks: Belgian Intelligence Services “Overwhelmed and 
Outnumbered” by Jihadis’, Newsweek, 22 March 2016, http://europe.newsweek.com/
belgiums-security-services-overwhelmed-and-outnumbered-jihadi-threat-439490
2  Sébastien Pietrasanta, Au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en 
œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015 (Paris: Assemblée 
Nationale, 2016), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r3922-t1.pdf
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In the intervening decade and a half, the meaning and application 
of ‘security’ have not remained the same. Security was traditionally 
understood as the domain of high politics, commanders-in-chief, 
militaries, foreign policy, intelligence agencies, and special branches 
of police. In many countries this legacy has now been supplemented 
by comprehensive national security strategies; ‘whole of government’ 
approaches; national risk assessments encompassing every area of social, 
political, and economic life; and new forms of security governance 
covering such diverse areas as cyber, health, environment, energy, and 
food. The issue of security now encompasses more than the threats a 
country faces. Security — and the management of insecurities — has 
become an extensive governmental activity involving multiple 
departments and agencies, both within and across states.3 
Any examination of state security requires us to consider not only 
practices of government, but also matters of politics. Liberal democratic 
governments do not legislate without the public justification of 
policies and decisions. Ideally, such governments would face 
constant scrutiny by parliaments, the media, experts, and an engaged 
public. Historically, however, security has often been shielded from 
the public eye, confined to the opaque domains of the military and 
secret intelligence. The wider political class was traditionally kept 
at arm’s length from security governance through mechanisms of 
official secrecy and limited democratic oversight. Despite increased 
transparency since the end of the Cold War — for example, the varying 
degrees of intelligence oversight reform in many countries, including 
the UK — these obscuring mechanisms still exist. Nevertheless, despite 
on-going forms of secrecy, the expansion of the meaning and practice 
of security resulted in broader political examination in recent years. 
For example, the security of energy supplies, food, health, and the 
cyber domain do not arouse the same jealous protection of sovereign 
prerogative as secret intelligence does, and so allows greater scrutiny, 
deliberation, and contestation. 
But exposing security to more political debate and oversight poses 
problems of ethics and responsibility, which the Scottish referendum 
3  Didier Bigo, ‘Internal and External Aspects of Security’, European Security, 15, 4 
(2006), 385–404; Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration, toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27: 1 (2002), 63–92.
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exposed. To what extent should security be politicised? Should its 
existential importance elevate it above partisanship, as was traditionally 
the case in the British system?4 The opportunities for sensationalism 
that are provided by public security discourse pose a challenge to 
this tradition. It is difficult for democratic deliberation on security to 
proceed in an informed, balanced, and rational way when faced with 
the rhetorical temptations of scaremongering and scapegoating. When 
dealing with the uncertainties of unknown futures, the politics of fear 
can be all too effective (as the No campaign in the Scottish referendum 
showed in a more general sense). Another way to look at this is that it is 
difficult to oppose policies that claim to increase our security when so 
much of the necessary information is kept secret by the state. It remains 
the case that, despite the expansion of the meaning and practice of 
security, at its core it remains a deeply institutionalised part of state 
authority, arguably the raison d’être of the state itself. 
In contrast to these entrenched national security traditions, the politics 
of national independence are the politics of the new. Proponents call for 
novel ways of organising social, political, and economic life, free from 
the structures and constraints of old practices. The Scottish referendum 
created the opportunity to re-examine the workings of every part of 
the modern state, including its security apparatus. How much exists 
for historical path-dependent reasons, rather than by design? Would a 
new beginning offer the chance to create better ways of doing things? 
For example, the number and structure of the intelligence agencies in 
a given country is often the product of historical circumstance. While 
many small European countries have police and military-based agencies, 
the UK has separate civilian-based domestic, foreign, and signals 
(communications and cyberspace) intelligence services (MI5, MI6, and 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)). 
In its proposals for an independent Scotland, the Scottish Government 
produced a comparatively radical idea for a single integrated intelligence 
agency (for further discussion see Chapter 5 in the present volume). If 
ened, this may have posed problems, such as the concentration of powers 
of state intrusion in a single agency, but it could also have been a more 
4  H. Bochel, A. Defty, and J. Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the 
Intelligence Services (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 27.
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efficient way to tackle security issues in a world where the lines between 
domestic, foreign, and signals domains are increasingly blurred. 
Yet old structures and constraints cannot be made to disappear 
overnight, even if constitutional relationships change. Embarking 
on a new path entails a continuing negotiation with the old. Physical 
geography is fixed, and imbalances in power and resources remain. And 
while much is fluid in twenty-first century security governance, many 
of its edifices remain entrenched. Military restructuring, for example, 
can take decades, especially if new equipment is to be procured or 
bases are to be moved. These changes can have major implications 
for local and national economies, and are thoroughly political for the 
constituencies and interests involved. This was a prominent issue 
in the politics of Scottish independence, most obviously with the 
potential relocation of Trident, but also with the future of the Royal 
Air Force bases on the east coast of Scotland and naval shipbuilding on 
the Clyde and Forth. The longevity of security apparatuses applies not 
just to military hardware, but also to security knowledge, authority, 
and relationships. For example, a newly independent state could 
indeed create a new intelligence agency, but what depth of experience 
and knowledge would it have? What sources of intelligence could it 
access? What cooperative arrangements would it have with allies? And 
what recognition would it receive domestically and internationally as 
a credible security authority? 
This project
The chapters in this book are the product of a seminar series called 
‘Security in Scotland, with or without constitutional change’, hosted 
by the University of Edinburgh in partnership with the Universities of 
St Andrews and Namur, Belgium. The seminars ran from 2013 to 2015 
and were funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) under the umbrella of the wider ‘Future of the UK and Scotland’ 
research programme. The seminars began a year before the referendum 
and concluded a year afterwards. Our main aim was to inform public 
debate on the security issues posed by Scottish independence. We did 
this by publishing a number of reports, which went on to feature in the 
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national press.5 We also aimed to create a new Scotland-based forum for 
security research and policy dialogue, which we did by creating a new 
research centre at the University of Edinburgh: the Centre for Security 
Research or CeSeR. The seminars brought together academic experts, 
parliamentarians from Westminster and Holyrood, civil servants from 
the Scottish and UK services, and police, security, and intelligence 
practitioners, some serving, some retired. The seminars were closed-
door events, held under the Chatham House Rule (meaning no public 
identification of the speakers or attribution of what they said). This rule 
is never ideal in terms of public dialogue and transparency, but it is 
often the only basis under which it is possible to have frank discussions 
with professionals who occupy sensitive or formally impartial positions 
(for further discussion of the dilemmas of public security discourse, see 
Chapter 8 in this volume). 
The chapters included in this volume represent a core selection 
of the issues that were covered. Note that we make a distinction 
between ‘security’ and ‘defence’, and although the two are connected, 
we concentrate primarily on the former. We take security to denote 
the broadening subject discussed above, while defence relates more 
to military matters such as troop levels, hardware, bases, broad 
geostrategic issues, and indeed Trident. Note that the Scottish and 
UK Governments both made this distinction in their pre-referendum 
publications, with the Scottish Government White Paper Scotland’s 
Future presenting separate chapters on ‘International Relations 
and Defence’ and ‘Justice, Security and Home Affairs’, and the UK 
Government publishing separate Scotland Analysis papers on ‘Security’ 
and ‘Defence’. We do, however, discuss foreign policy and alliances in 
our first two chapters. The book aims to reflect on the issues of broadest 
relevance beyond the immediate demands of the Scottish context, 
while also being able to inform any future Scottish independence 
debate. Much was discussed in the seminars that is too specialised 
or contextual for wider debates about security, such as the internal 
5  The Reports from this seminar series can be found on the title page on the Open Book 
Publishers website, http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/524#resources. 
They can also be found on the website of the Centre on Constitutional Change, 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/tags/security-defence
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workings of the Scottish police and resilience apparatus (which entails 
responding to, and recovering from, civil emergencies), or the place 
of Scotland in the UK National Security Strategy (constitutionally 
speaking, national security is an area ‘reserved’ to Westminster, but the 
broad scope of the security risks and challenges currently envisaged 
by the UK NSS entails roles and responsibilities for many levels of 
government, including the Scottish Government). The seminars also 
covered much that cannot be included for simple reasons of space; 
for example, we would need another volume to include all the expert 
analysis we invited from other small countries and territories such as 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Faroe 
Islands. This introduction will instead touch on some of this, Chapter 
2 discusses Nordic comparisons in depth, and Chapter 5 discusses 
Norwegian and Belgian intelligence arrangements. 
The book focuses on three core themes, presented in three sections, 
which can be seen as three levels of analysis. They are: (1) small states 
and security, (2) democratic accountability and oversight, and (3) 
security, politics, and public debate. 
The first concerns the international relations of small states, and the 
possibilities and limits of independence. The two chapters here discuss 
the foreign policy of small states (Chapter 1, by Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel 
Kenealy) and their alliances (Chapter 2, by Baldur Thorhallsson and 
Alyson J. K. Bailes) through the prism of Scotland. 
The second section concerns what are, broadly speaking, 
constitutional questions of the relationship between democracy, 
security, and, particularly, intelligence and surveillance. These fraught 
issues are active and topical in many contexts, including the UK, EU, US, 
and many small states, particularly since the leaks by Edward Snowden. 
The first chapter in this section examines the competing meanings and 
interpretations of security in different national contexts (Chapter 3, 
by Charles D. Raab); the second considers lessons from Westminster 
on the reform of parliamentary intelligence oversight (Chapter 4, 
by Hugh Bochel and Andrew Defty); while the third analyses the 
politics, practicalities, and implications of the pre-referendum Scottish 
Government proposals for intelligence oversight in an independent 
Scotland (Chapter 5, by Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris).
The third section concerns micro-level analysis of the political cut-
and-thrust of the referendum campaigns, and the ways in which security 
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issues were presented and constructed by the competing sides and the 
media. The first chapter in this section examines the extent and depth 
of public debate on intelligence in the campaigns (Chapter 6, by Sandy 
Hardie); the second assesses how the media handled the issues (Chapter 
7, by Eamonn P. O’Neill), while the third considers the ethical dilemmas 
involved in political debate on security (Chapter 8, by Andrew W. Neal). 
The context
The enquiries and discussions in our seminars illuminated much about 
the modern-day business of security governance. While the temptation 
in public debate and much of academic scholarship is to look directly 
at key security decisions made at the highest state level, the practice 
of security governance is in fact a complex and multi-layered affair. In 
focusing on Scotland — a partially autonomous region and constituent 
nation of the United Kingdom with devolved government — it becomes 
clear that security is not the concern of central government alone, 
despite national security being a ‘reserved area’ under the terms of the 
1998 Scotland Act.6 This multi-level complexity is true of developments 
in security governance in other comparable countries too. One effect 
of the expansion of the concept of security into a more encompassing 
risk-based concern is that many more partners and agencies become 
involved. Beyond the traditional intelligence services, branches of the 
military, and police forces, security governance increasingly involves 
local and regional government, private security companies offering 
personnel and specialised technical services, critical infrastructure 
providers such as water, power, and transport companies, and local 
stakeholders such as businesses and community groups. 
This kind of complex security governance poses a number of 
challenges. In the first instance, effective means must be found for 
agencies to communicate and work together. For example, as mentioned 
above, a lack of cross-agency coordination and communication in 
counter-terrorism has attracted criticism in Belgium and France during 
the last twelve months. Further afield, and with a very different kind 
of threat, the devastating effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans 
6  UK Government, Scotland Act 1998 (London: HMSO, 1998), http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/pdfs/ukpga_19980046_en.pdf
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demonstrated the consequences of inept contingency planning and 
emergency response, and a lack of investment in resilient infrastructure. 
Addressing these needs can be difficult. For example, many countries 
have institutional barriers between intelligence agencies and police 
forces. Sometimes this is by design, in order to prevent the emergence 
of monolithic centralised security apparatuses (an important concern in 
countries that have experienced totalitarian forms of government). In 
other cases the reasons may be more to do with ‘turf wars’ or historical 
contingencies; for example, the Nordic countries have more centralised 
models of policing than the Netherlands or the UK, which have 
stronger traditions of local autonomy. Despite fears about the growth of 
security states, there remain many examples of disjointed surveillance, 
intelligence, and security governance. 
In the UK, these multi-level arrangements are not necessarily directly 
managed from the centre. The Scottish Government has invested much 
time and effort to pursue its own distinctive way of doing things in 
certain aspects of security governance, such as with its policing and 
resilience planning. The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act created a statutory 
duty for local government to plan and prepare for emergencies and the 
Scottish Government has taken this a step further. It claims to be ‘world 
leading’ in developing a high degree of integration and interoperability 
between its emergency responders, and has also created its own 
‘horizon scanning’ capabilities.7 It has created unitary police and fire 
services for Scotland, which depart from the localised arrangements 
that existed before and go against a longstanding British tradition of 
suspicion towards large-scale, centralised, and potentially repressive 
police forces — a suspicion which can be traced back to the creation 
of the Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel in the nineteenth century.
Scotland’s efforts in security governance, and particularly in 
resilience planning, have gone well in the sense that there have been 
few major failures (although problems arising from the implementation 
of police centralisation led to the resignation of the Police Scotland 
Chief Constable Sir Stephen House in 2015). Severe winter weather 
7  Scottish Government, Preparing Scotland: Scottish Guidance on Resilience, Philosophy, 




caused major traffic disruptions in 2010 and focused government 
minds on developing resilience capabilities further. Compare this to 
the Netherlands, where efforts to create a national police force were 
resisted by local mayors and police unions, and eventually had to be 
pushed through by the central government.8 Scotland’s efforts in these 
areas have probably benefited from having a relatively small, non-
hierarchical, and centralised form of devolved government. 
Beyond this internal focus, multilevel interagency cooperation in 
the UK-Scotland security relationship has gone well too. For example, 
the security operation at the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games was 
widely hailed as a success. It featured complex coordination between 
Scottish and UK agencies, including multiple police forces, the military, 
and the security services, as well as several private security providers. 
This of course raises the question of what would replace the capabilities 
provided by this cooperation in the event of Scottish independence.
The fact that the SNP Scottish Government has invested in resilience 
and interagency interoperability is not separable from the politics of 
independence. Making Scotland more capable and state-like may ease 
any future transition to independence. It is also performative in the way 
it makes Scotland appear more state-like. A similar example is its foreign 
aid programme in Africa, which is not normally something that sub-state 
regional governments do, and which makes the idea of independence 
less of an imaginative leap. However, the political significance of these 
investments does not diminish the immediate practical importance of 
resilience capabilities in Scotland, which has more extreme weather and 
terrain than the wider UK, and a more unevenly distributed population, 
both of which pose particular challenges to communities and critical 
infrastructure. It is notable that these areas of resilience investment are 
in non-traditional aspects of security governance, where the meaning of 
‘security’ is broader than national security. 
In the more traditional areas of national security and intelligence, 
Scotland is still reliant on the UK. For example, in our seminars it was 
shown that the specialist crime division of Police Scotland, which lists 
counter-terrorism among its tasks, depends on support from MI5 on 
8  Jan Terpstra and Nicholas R. Fyfe, ‘Mind the Implementation Gap? Police Reform 
and Local Policing in the Netherlands and Scotland’, Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, 15, 5 (2015), pp. 527–44 (pp. 532–34).
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a daily basis. Similarly, in cybersecurity, despite hosting a successful 
IT sector, Scotland depends on high-level cyber defences provided by 
GCHQ and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. 
Small states can and do provide for their own security in the cyber 
domain (Finland is a world leader, for example), but these capabilities 
cannot be created overnight. This is especially important in knowledge-
based economies, where industrial espionage and intellectual property 
theft could dent the attractiveness of a country to businesses and foreign 
investors. Note that the first objective of the 2011–2015 UK cyber security 
strategy was to make the UK the ‘one of the most secure places in the 
world to do business online’, and it is not clear how an independent 
Scotland could compete on those terms.9
Geography and the legacy of traditional security structures may be 
difficult to change, but they are not completely hard facts that remove 
choice and interpretation from government and politics. They represent 
a context of historical and geographical experience that policymakers 
and populations can approach in different ways. For example, Finland’s 
international and security outlook has been inseparable from its 
proximity to Russia. This has shaped its foreign policy, with neutrality 
in the Cold War followed by a gradual edging towards NATO since 
the 1990s. Although Finland’s geostrategic position may be seen 
as a constraint, this has also been the source of a strong tradition of 
security independence and its doctrine of ‘total defence’.10 This is a 
comprehensive national security model that reaches deep into Finnish 
social, political, and economic life, featuring, for example, conscription 
and public/private partnerships for national infrastructure protection. 
Similarly, any vision for Scotland’s future security would be 
profoundly shaped by its history in the United Kingdom. This has no 
doubt produced political differences within Scotland, and between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK. The politicisation of Trident is the 
obvious example of cleavage, with a decades-old Scottish hostility to 
the presence of a nuclear base on the Clyde dovetailing with Scottish 
9  Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy Protecting and Promoting the UK in 
a Digital World (London, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf
10  R. E. J. Penttila, Finland’s Search for Security through Defence, 1944–89 (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991), p. 89.
 13Introduction
separatism. The Iraq war also contributed to a sense of alienation from 
political institutions throughout the UK. Scottish Nationalist politicians 
have been able to channel this alienation into the idea of an alternative, 
independent Scottish future. Yet Scotland’s history in the UK also shapes 
aspects of its international outlook. For example, while SNP policy is 
to remove Trident from Scottish territory, in 2012 the party reversed 
its thirty-year-old policy of opposition to NATO, which is ultimately 
a nuclear defence alliance. In contrast, the radical left parts of the pro-
independence Yes campaign, which included the Scottish Green Party 
and the Scottish Socialist Party, remain committed at the time of writing 
to unilateral nuclear disarmament and Scotland’s exit from NATO.11
Similarly, the vision of independence produced by the SNP Scottish 
Government in its 2013 White Paper did not represent a radical break 
from UK foreign policy traditions. Although it proposed stronger 
constitutional safeguards on executive war powers and better human 
rights protections (no doubt a reaction to the politics of the Iraq War and 
the wider ‘war on terror’), it did not suggest a retreat from international 
affairs, nor anything resembling the post-Cold-War quasi-neutrality 
of Finland or Ireland. Following the Irish example in particular could 
have made some sense, given the smallness of the two countries, their 
connections to the UK, their relatively limited resources, and perhaps 
even small-scale parallels such as the presence of sectarian divisions 
and organised crime as internal security priorities. However, the 
limited ‘Irish model’ of security and international relations did not even 
enter the debate. The ‘Nordic model’ was more often cited, particularly 
the Danish model of international engagement (Thorhallsson and 
Bailes discuss small states and alliances in detail in Chapter 2). Despite 
more radical views on the left of Scottish politics, the SNP remains 
internationalist, Atlanticist, and Europeanist in outlook. Although its 
immediate policies depart from the misadventures of UK foreign policy 
of the past fifteen years, they do not depart from older British traditions 
of international engagement. The proposals by the Scottish Government 
in 2013 for an independent Scotland to claim a bigger regional maritime 
role could even have created greater tension with Russia, particularly 
11  [N.a.], ‘Who We Are’, No to NATO Scotland Coalition (2016), http://notonato 
scotland.org.uk/index.html%3Fpage_id=201.html
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given Arctic climate change and the possibility of increased northern 
shipping and resource extraction. 
One major division to emerge between Scotland the rest of the 
UK concerns the EU and immigration. In the Brexit referendum, the 
Scottish electorate voted more strongly in favour of remaining in the EU 
than the rest of the country, with a 62/38 pro-remain split rather than 
the 48/52 of the UK overall. While at the time of writing it is difficult to 
envisage how Brexit will play out for the UK and Scotland, the issue 
has magnified existing political differences. Majority opinion among 
Scottish politicians has long been against restrictive UK immigration 
policy, and indeed the 2013 White Paper called for higher levels of 
immigration in a future independent Scotland.12 Despite this, Scottish 
public attitudes to immigration are not so different from those of the 
wider UK population: a 2015 YouGov poll suggested that 49% of Scots 
wanted to see less immigration, exactly the same proportion as in the rest 
of Britain.13 Based on data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, The 
Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford states that ‘Existing 
evidence clearly shows high levels of opposition to immigration in the 
UK’.14 Yet in the wake of the Brexit referendum, Scottish politicians of all 
parties have been vocal in trying to reassure resident EU nationals that 
they remain welcome in Scotland. 
How an immigration policy that diverges from that of the remaining 
UK could work in practice is difficult to imagine. If an independent 
Scotland remained in the EU while the UK left, this would presumably 
necessitate some kind of border control to prevent non-UK citizens 
crossing from Scotland into England via an open border. Given the extent 
to which freedom of movement in the EU has been politicised and even 
securitised — for example, former UKIP leader Nigel Farage blamed 
freedom of movement for the apparent ease with which ISIS militants 
12 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/0043 
9021.pdf
13 Scott MacNab, ‘Immigration: Scots “No More Tolerant Than English”’, 
Scotsman, 28 July 2015, http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/immigration- 
scots-no-more-tolerant-than-english-1-3714620
14 Scott Blinder and William L. Allen, UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall 




and weapons made their way to France and Belgium before the attacks 
in November 2015 and March 2016 — this could prove controversial.15 
More prosaically, because Scotland trades far more with the rest of the 
UK than with the EU and the rest of the world (perhaps more than twice 
as much, although the figures are not firm),16 a hard border would have 
negative effects on Scotland’s economy if it hindered the movement of 
goods, services and people within Great Britain. 
The Brexit vote, and the renewed prospect of Scottish independence 
as a response, revived some of the thorniest issues from the 2014 
referendum, raising questions that would be fundamental to Scottish 
statehood: what currency would an independent Scotland use? Would 
it be too risky for the Scottish economy to rely on oil and gas revenues 
(which have declined significantly since 2014)? At the same time, the 
Brexit vote has made Scotland appear more state-like, with First Minister 
Nicola Sturgeon active in ‘paradiplomacy’ to the EU, looking for a way 
for Scotland to remain a member or achieve some kind of special status.
In the pre-referendum Brexit debate there was some discussion of the 
security benefits of EU membership, with prominent former members 
of the UK intelligence community vocal in their views. Sir John Sawers, 
former head of MI6, argued that EU systems for sharing information on, 
for example, the movement of suspect individuals, were an increasingly 
important part of security governance.17 Brexit could mean UK exclusion 
from shaping the development of such systems, although not necessarily 
from the sharing of information itself. In other areas of EU security the 
UK had already excluded itself before the EU referendum, playing no 
formal part in the EU external borders agency Frontex or its successor, 
the recently approved European Border and Coast Guard Agency. In 
contrast, the European Arrest Warrant has been used extensively in 
UK law enforcement. The Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism 
think tank, produced a comprehensive report on this question based on 
15  Stone, Jon, ‘Nigel Farage Says the EU Has Allowed the “Free Movement of 
Kalashnikov Rifles and Jihadists”’, Independent, 17 November 2015, http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-says-the-eu-has-allowed-the-
free-movement-of-kalashnivov-rifles-and-jihadists-a6737501.html
16  [N.a.], ‘Does Scotland Export Twice as Much to England as It Does to the Rest of 
the World?’ (2012), https://fullfact.org/economy/does-scotland-export-twice-much-
england-it-does-rest-world; Blinder and Allen (2016).
17  ‘Row as Ex-Intelligence Chiefs Say EU Membership Protects UK Security’, BBC 
News, 8 May 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36239741
16 Andrew W. Neal
interviews with twenty high profile security experts including senior 
British politicians. They concluded that Brexit would not preclude 
security cooperation between the UK and the EU, and that much of 
the UK’s international security cooperation — particularly intelligence 
sharing — ‘will continue to predominantly take place bilaterally and 
with the Five Eyes alliance’.18 Brexit will not affect the UK’s place in 
NATO, and may even increase its commitment to the alliance. In many 
ways the debate about Brexit and security is inconclusive, in part 
because there is no EU security ‘model’ but rather a complex patchwork 
of agreements and information-sharing arrangements that include EU 
member states and non-member states.19
What Brexit means for the national security of an independent 
Scotland is therefore not clear either. Given that most UK security 
governance does not depend on the EU, the UK would appear to be a 
more important security partner to Scotland than the EU or the rest of 
its members. Yet there is no guarantee that an independent Scotland 
either inside or outside the EU would become the ‘sixth eye’ of the Five 
Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement between the UK, US, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. Arguably it would be in the interests of the 
remaining UK to have close security cooperation with an independent 
Scotland, as suggested by the Scottish Government White Paper, but 
there are obstacles here. For example, sharing US intelligence with 
Scotland would not be in the gift of the UK because of the ‘control 
principle’, which prevents intelligence sharing with third parties (for 
detailed analysis, see Chapters 5 and 7 in this volume). There would 
also be oversight issues for Holyrood if the UK intelligence services 
continued to operate in Scotland. 
These questions about a future security relationship between 
an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK are to an extent 
unanswerable. They depend on future political positions, relationships, 
and good will that the various ‘sides’ do not wish to reveal now or cannot 
know in the present. On the one hand, any concession from Unionists 
18  Maajid Nawaz and Julia Ebner, ‘The EU and Terrorism: Is Britain Safer in or Out?’ 
(London: Quilliam, 2016), http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam- 
releases-report-on-the-eu-and-terrorism-is-britain-safer-in-or-out/
19  Mapping this field has been a long-running task of Didier Bigo and his colleagues. 
See D. Bigo and E. Guild, Europe’s 21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty 
(Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010). 
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to the idea of future security cooperation would be a concession to the 
viability of Scottish independence itself, and so politically unpalatable. 
On the other hand, the Nationalist interest in projecting reassurance 
and optimism about security issues might compromise the credibility 
of their arguments. It is for these reasons that the future of security 
cooperation between the UK and Scotland in the event of independence 
is as much a political question as an analytical one, and this is reflected 
in the focus of this book.
Conclusion
Security in a Small Nation offers a range of expert analysis on these 
issues. The perspectives of the authors reflect a variety of specialisms, 
including foreign policy, surveillance and privacy issues, parliamentary 
intelligence oversight, media, and the politics of security. We hope 
the analysis presented here will inform the ongoing debate about the 
future of Scotland, the UK, and the EU, and also shed new light on some 
deeper questions about security and statehood. The issue of Scottish 
independence remains a focal point for fundamental questions about 
the future of nation states and the relationship between democracy and 
security.
18 Andrew W. Neal
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1. Perspectives on Small State Security 
in the Scottish Independence Debate1
Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy
During the Scottish independence referendum campaign, 
considerable attention was paid, by Scotland’s political leaders, 
its voters, and actors in the international community, to the 
question of what an independent Scotland’s foreign policy might 
look like. An independent Scotland would quickly find itself 
in a world that puts many constraints on states’ international 
aspirations. But as a sovereign state, Scotland would have the 
opportunity to shape the role it would play on the world stage. 
This chapter examines the debate over an independent Scottish 
foreign policy during the independence campaign. We describe 
the type of foreign policy that was projected by the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) Government in Scotland and the reaction to 
that projection by actors opposed to independence. We argue that 
the underlying difference in the two sides was the perspective on 
small state foreign and security policy and that this difference 
resonates with long-standing academic debates about small 
states, and their insecurities, in world politics.
1  This paper is a fuller version of J. Kaarbo and D. Kenealy, ‘What Kind of 
International Role and Influence Would an Independent Scotland Have?’, in 
Scotland’s Decision: 16 Questions to Think About for the Referendum on 18 September, 
ed. by C. Jeffery and R. Perman (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd, 2014), pp. 42–45. In the 
empirical section on Scotland, this paper draws extensively from R. Beasley, J. 
Kaarbo, and H. Solomon-Strauss, ‘To Be or Not to Be a State? Role Contestation in 
the Debate over Scottish Independence’, in Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, 
and International Relations, ed. by Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo (Abingdon 
and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 140–56; R. Beasley and J. Kaarbo, ‘Casting 
for a Sovereign Role: Socialising an Aspirant State in the Scottish Independence 
Referendum’, European Journal of International Relations (2017), 1–25.
© 2017 J. Kaarbo and D. Kenealy, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.01
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On 18 September 2014, voters in Scotland had the opportunity to 
separate from the United Kingdom and become an independent nation 
state. During the referendum campaign, considerable attention was 
paid to the question of what an independent Scotland’s foreign policy 
might look like by Scotland’s political leaders, its voters, and actors 
in the international community. As the world’s newest state, what 
would it want to do, what could it do, and what kind of influence could 
Scotland have in international relations? In the end these questions were 
academic, as voters delivered a No vote. Yet the debate was instructive, 
shedding considerable light on how people think about the security 
needs and foreign policy potential of small states. With the possibility 
of a second referendum in the not too distant future, which was made 
more likely after the June 2016 referendum vote for the UK to leave the 
EU, these issues have not been left in the past.
Whilst many policy areas (such as health, education, and criminal 
justice) are already under Scottish authority, independence and 
sovereignty would bring new responsibilities and opportunities. The 
leaders of an independent Scotland, and Scottish citizens, would have 
to design and support a foreign policy for their country, and decide 
how best to gain influence, secure their interests, and promote Scottish 
values in the international system. An independent Scotland would 
quickly find itself in a world that puts many constraints on states’ 
international aspirations, but as a sovereign country, Scotland would 
have the opportunity to shape the role it would play on the world stage. 
This chapter examines the debate over an independent Scottish 
foreign policy during the independence campaign (dating from the 
announcement of the Edinburgh Agreement in 2011 to the September 
2014 referendum). We describe the type of foreign policy that was 
projected by the Scottish National Party government in Scotland (the 
main advocate of independence)2 and the reaction to that projection by 
actors opposed to independence within Scotland, and by external actors, 
including the UK government and international figures. We argue that 
the underlying difference between the two sides lay in their perspectives 
2  Although we recognise that there were other actors and non-SNP voters involved 
in the campaign for independence, we focus here on the SNP leadership as the 
main advocate for independence. We also note that not all of the SNP membership 
agreed with all of the foreign policies advocated by SNP leaders. 
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on small state foreign and security policy, and that this difference 
resonates with long-standing academic debates about small states, 
and their insecurities, in world politics. By connecting the empirical 
debate in the Scottish case to the theoretical debate, we aim to clarify 
avenues for future research on small states. We also aim to highlight 
the implications of scholarly research for foreign policy questions faced 
by small states and sub-state actors aspiring to sovereign statehood in 
Scotland and elsewhere.
The Yes vision of independent Scottish 
foreign and security policy
According to evidence of public opinion, issues of foreign policy and 
security were not the primary concerns of voters during the referendum.3 
Yet the SNP articulated foreign policy based arguments in their effort to 
persuade voters to support the campaign for independence. The White 
Paper Scotland’s Future set out the Scottish Government’s vision of an 
independent Scotland’s international role and influence.4 That vision 
combines continuity with change. Continuity would be provided 
by on-going membership in a variety of international organisations, 
perhaps most prominent amongst them NATO and the EU. But there 
would also be the possibility of change as an independent Scotland 
would be free to pursue a set of values and interests somewhat distinct 
from those of the UK. A neat way of summarising states’ visions of their 
international role is to think of four foreign policy pillars: protection, 
profits, principles, and pride.5 
The SNP, articulated in the Scottish Government publication 
Scotland’s Future, proposed Scottish membership of NATO and a 
3  Andrew Black, ‘Scottish Independence: What’s Going on in Scotland?’, BBC 
News, 9 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland- 
politics-26550736; Sean Anderson, ‘Scottish Independence: Which Issues 
Have Led the Twitter Debate in 2014?’, Guardian, 8 July 2014, https://www.
theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/jul/08/scottish-independence-referendum- 
twitter-analysis-topics-debate-2014 
4  Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/0043 
9021.pdf
5  We used this formulation previously in Kaarbo and Kenealy (2014).
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Scottish defence force as cornerstones of ‘protection’.6 In October 2012, 
SNP party members at the annual conference voted 426 to 332 to change 
its 30-year-old opposition to NATO.7 The approved resolution allowed 
for an independent Scotland’s membership in the alliance, provided 
that Scotland would not host nuclear weapons. Scotland would earn 
‘profit’ (i.e. secure its prosperity and grow its economy) and thrive 
in the global political economy, according to the Yes campaign, by 
adopting liberal, pro-trade foreign economic policies. Central to the 
‘profit’ pillar was continued membership of the EU. The message across 
these pillars — ‘protection’ and ‘profit’ — was, to a large extent, one of 
continuity. An independent Scotland would continue to be embedded 
in a range of alliances and institutions geared to provide security and 
prosperity.
Independence, however, would also allow for change. In the area 
of ‘principles’, ethics, and values, the Yes campaign proposed a highly 
aspirational policy, contrasting with its characterisation of past and 
present UK foreign policy. The Scottish Government, in Scotland’s Future, 
stressed the ‘different international priorities’ that an independent 
Scotland would pursue, seen ‘most clearly in matters of war and peace 
and in our relationship with the EU’.8 The Yes side asserted that if 
Scotland had been independent, it would not have participated in the 
unpopular invasion of Iraq in 2003, as the UK did.9 First Minister Alex 
Salmond presented an independent Scotland as one that would be less 
militarised than the UK, and argued that this referendum represented 
a chance for the Scottish people to change Scotland’s international 
relations. In a union with the UK, he remarked, ‘We cannot stop illegal 
wars. […] We cannot stop countless billions being wasted on weapons 
6  NATO represents a sticking point given that the Scottish Greens, who support 
independence and thus form part of the broader Yes campaign, oppose NATO 
membership for an independent Scotland. The Radical Independence Campaign, 
founded during the referendum campaign, were also opposed.
7 [N.a.], ‘SNP Members Vote to Ditch the Party’s Anti-Nato Policy’, BBC News, 19 
October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19993694 
8  Scotland’s Future, p. 209. 
9  Bagehot, ‘Interviewing Alex Salmond, the Man Who Wants to Break up Britain’, 
Economist, 12 January 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2012/01/
independence-debate-scotland-0 
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of mass destruction’.10 The SNP also proposed that an independent 
Scotland would have a ‘triple lock’ on military deployments, requiring 
all military action to be in accordance with the UN Charter, agreed by 
the Scottish Government, and approved by the Scottish parliament.11 
The pledge to rid an independent Scotland of nuclear weapons 
was partly grounded in principle. The SNP’s arguments against 
nuclear weapons were threefold: that they are a useless deterrent 
against the kind of security threats faced by a modern Scotland; that 
they are a considerable waste of money that could be better used to 
support policies that advance Scotland’s social values; and that they 
are immoral weapons of war. According to Scotland’s Future, ‘Trident 
is an affront to basic decency with its indiscriminate and inhumane 
destructive power’.12 Salmond further clarified this anti-nuclear, moral 
role for an independent Scotland, committing in the much-watched 
second televised debate to ‘a policy that removes nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction because they are a phenomenal waste of 
money as well as being totally morally wrong’.13
Scotland’s Future described an independent Scotland as a ‘champion for 
international justice and peace’, committed to the values of ‘international 
development, human rights, climate change, and climate justice’.14 
Scottish defence forces would be used, in addition to national defence, 
to support international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions 
undertaken under the auspices of the UN and in support of international 
law. Scotland would also contribute in a targeted way to NATO and EU 
missions. The vision was thus one of Scotland as a good global citizen, 
a civilian power, with a ‘do no harm’ principle — especially towards 
developing countries — firmly embedded in its international role.15 
Finally, ‘pride’ has a place in most states’ foreign policies. Pride 
involves the projection of a positive self-image by a country and 
Scotland’s Future painted a picture of ‘an outward facing nation, 
exporting goods, people, and ideas around the world […] [with a] 
10  C-SPAN, ‘Scottish Independence Debate’, Washington DC, 25 August 2014, https://
www.c-span.org/video/?321045-1/scottish-independence-debate, time point: 3:18.
11  Scotland’s Future, p. 251. 
12  Ibid., p. 232.
13  C-SPAN, 25 August 2014, time point: 1:07:43. 
14  Scotland’s Future, p. 210 and 225.
15  Ibid., p. 231.
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proud military tradition’.16 For a party with ‘national’ in its name, there 
was little nationalism or negative xenophobic expressions of pride in 
the SNP’s descriptions of its projected independent foreign policy.
How would an independent Scotland achieve this foreign policy? 
Nicola Sturgeon, and others campaigning for a Yes vote, argued that 
small states could ‘punch above their weight’ and have influence 
disproportionate to their size.17 Yes campaigners pointed out that most 
states in the world are small and that some small states can play an 
active role in international organisations, often hosting headquarters 
and offices and placing their citizens in key leadership positions. By 
adopting ‘small but smart’ strategies, such as niche diplomacy and 
economic comparative advantages, small states can be effective and 
influential. Such notions were reflected in Scotland’s Future, where small 
states were presented as lacking large, threatening capabilities and 
therefore as more credible interlocutors and facilitators.18 The SNP often 
invoked wealthy, successful Nordic examples of influential small states 
and noted that independence ‘does not seem to have done Australia 
any harm’.19 The SNP leader made similar comparisons to US and Irish 
independence from Britain.20 
The No vision of a weak independent Scotland 
The No side in the referendum debate — principally the cross-party 
Better Together campaign — argued that Scotland would be stronger as 
a part of the UK than it would be on its own. The argument is captured 
in the phrase, often used in official UK Government analysis, ‘[a] strong 
16  Ibid., p. 207.
17  N. Sturgeon evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Considerations 
for the UK and Scotland in the Event of Scotland Becoming an Independent Country, 
Sixth Report of Session 2012–2013 (London: HMSO, 2013), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf
18  Scotland’s Future, p. 217. 
19  Jonathan Pearlman, ‘Australians Divided over Scottish Referendum’, Telegraph, 
16 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaand 
thepacific/australia/11098800/Australians-divided-over-Scottish-referendum.html 
20  Alex Salmond, ‘Why an Independent Scotland Deserves U.S. Support’, Washington 
Post, 7 December 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-an-
independent-scotland-deserves-us-support/2012/12/07/694ba79a-3a4a-11e2-8a97-
363b0f9a0ab3_story.html
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voice in the world’.21 Given that the UK is a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, one of the largest members of the EU, and 
already an experienced participant in other influential international 
organisations, Scotland’s interests, according to those campaigning 
against independence, are better advanced through these existing 
channels and institutions and as part of a larger state. Their messages 
stressed how much larger in terms of sheer numbers and expenditure 
the UK diplomatic service, economy, armed forces, and intelligence 
services are in comparison to their hypothetical independent Scottish 
counterparts.22 
The No campaign repeatedly pointed out the difficulties and 
uncertainties that an independent Scotland would face, and the obstacles 
that could thwart the Yes campaign’s foreign policy aspirations. They 
warned that the EU might not grant the same opt-outs and special terms 
(for example on the euro, the Schengen area, and the budget rebate) to 
an independent Scotland as are possessed by the UK.23 They stressed 
that the NATO alliance may not accept Scotland as a member if Scotland 
refuses to house the UK nuclear deterrent on its soil.24 They questioned 
SNP assertions about its rights to UK diplomatic assets, such as embassies 
and consulates.25 In short, according to the No side, uncertainty was 
pervasive and risks abounded. Not for nothing was the moniker ‘Project 
Fear’ developed for the No campaign. For example, Alistair Darling (the 
political leader of Better Together) made the argument in the public 
debates that independence was, fundamentally, a risky decision: ‘The 
21  HM Government, Scotland Analysis — Cm. 8554: Devolution and the Implications of 
Scottish Independence (London: HMSO, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79407/Report_excluding_annexes_
Independan...__2_.pdf 
22  See, e.g., HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8714: Defence (London: 
HMSO, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/248654/Scotland_analysis_Defence_paper-FINAL.pdf; HM 
Government, Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8741: Security (London: HMSO, 2013), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253500/
Scotland_analysis_security.pdf; HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8765: EU 
and International Issues (London: HMSO, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271794/2901475_HMG_Scotland_
EUandInternational_acc2.pdf
23  HM Government (2013), Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8765: EU and International Issues, p. 7. 
24  Ibid., p. 62.
25  Ibid., p. 43.
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basic difference between Mr. Salmond and me, his priority is to create a 
separate state, no matter what the risk and what the cost’.26
Where the Yes side argued that Scotland deserved its own seat at 
the table, Better Together argued that independence would not offer 
Scotland a chance to have its own voice because it would be too small 
to make a difference. Independence would simply leave Scotland 
unrepresented.27 During the televised debates, Darling compared an 
independent Scotland to Iceland, Ireland and Panama in terms of what 
it could expect in, and from, the international system.28
The UK Government was a key player in the Scottish independence 
debate, including the discussions over what an independent Scottish 
foreign policy could do. As noted by Walker, 
The UK government, for its part, instructed each affected department 
in Whitehall to carry out an assessment of the costs of every kind that 
would fall on Scotland should it leave the Union. The result was the 
published series of ‘Scotland Analysis Papers’ [including papers on EU 
and international issues, security, and defence]. In addition, various 
select committees of the UK parliament issued their own reports, […] 
emphasising the costs to Scotland and denying or downplaying benefits 
that might accrue from independence.29 
For example, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that an 
‘independent Scottish state would have to start afresh in terms of its 
formal alliances, and links with every other sovereign state’.30 
The EU was a particularly contentious issue. The Yes campaign, 
and the Scottish Government, was keen to argue that an independent 
Scotland would remain a member and play a full and positive role in 
the Union. In stark contrast, the UK Government published its own legal 
advice, stating that an independent Scotland would immediately be 
26  C-SPAN, 25 August 2014, time point: 50:34.
27  Nicholas Watt, Libby Brooks, and Patrick Wintour, ‘Scottish Independence 
Would Be Disastrous for All UK, Warns John Major’, Guardian, 10 September 
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/10/scottish-independence- 
referendum-trident-defence-uk-john-major
28  C-SPAN, 25 August 2014, time point: 8:48 and 50:34.
29  William Walker, ‘International Reactions to the Scottish Referendum’, International 
Affairs, 90, 4 (2014), 743–59 (p. 748). See, for example, Foreign Affairs Committee 
(2013). 
30  HM Government (2013), Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8765: EU and International Issues, p. 5. 
Cited in Walker (2014), p. 749.
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outside the EU (and the UN).31 David Lidington, the UK’s Minister for 
Europe, stated that ‘I’ve been sat around the EU table for the last three 
years for many discussions about EU enlargement. It is the complexity, 
the time-consuming nature of those negotiations that the people of 
Scotland ought to bear in mind. It isn’t straightforward’.32 Once again 
the implicit message was one of risk and uncertainty.
EU officials and other member states also quickly cast doubt on 
the automatic nature of Scottish membership, thereby drawing into 
question the ability of Scotland to define a post-independence role as an 
actor within the EU for itself.33 In December 2012 Jose Manuel Barroso, 
the President of the European Commission, declared that any new state 
would have to apply for EU membership, despite the SNP’s previous 
claim that an independent Scotland would be able to renegotiate its terms 
of membership from inside the EU.34 Spain also used EU membership as 
a way to cast uncertainty on an independent Scotland’s role. On the eve 
of the vote, the Spanish Foreign Minister reiterated Spain’s opinion that 
EU membership would not be automatic and would require unanimous 
support from EU member states.35 ‘An independent Scotland would be 
forced to wait at least five years to join the EU and would then have to 
sign up to the euro, the Spanish government […] warned’.36 
However, not all EU actors shared this perspective. Graham Avery, a 
former European Commission senior official and a specialist in the area 
31  Severin Carrell, ‘David Cameron Tries to Put the Brakes on Alex Salmond’, 
Guardian, 11 February 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/feb/11/
david-cameron-scotland-independence-legal-advice
32  Foreign and Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon William Hague, ‘Prospects 
of EU Membership for a Newly Independent Scotland’, Gov.uk, 16 January 
2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prospects-of-eu-membership-for-a- 
newly-independent-scotland
33  Daniel Kenealy, ‘How Do You Solve a Problem Like Scotland? A Proposal Regarding 
“Internal Enlargement”’, Journal of European Integration, 36, 6 (2014), 585–600 (pp. 
587–89).
34  [N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence: EC’s Barroso Says New States Need “Apply 
to Join EU”’, BBC News, 10 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20664907
35  Martin Roberts, ‘Spain Says Scottish Independence Would Be a “Catastrophe”’, 
Telegraph, 17 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
spain/11101650/Spain-says-Scottish-independence-would-be-a-catastrophe.html
36  Simon Johnson, ‘Spanish Warn Independent Scotland Would Get Euro Not Pound’, 
Telegraph, 16 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-
independence/11099167/Spanish-warn-independent-Scotland-would-get-euro-not-
pound.html
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of enlargement, indicated that the UK Government’s position — that 
Scotland could not easily negotiate EU membership — was ‘perplexing’ 
and ‘absurd’, indicating that Scottish voters should dismiss tactics 
suggesting Scotland would face a challenging process in acquiring 
EU membership.37 Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy, the European 
Council president, asserted that the EU treaties would not apply to 
newly independent parts of existing member states.38 Avery described 
this as ‘not the whole truth’.39 Other EU member states also weighed 
in, with Czech president Vaclav Klaus and Joelle Garriaud-Maylam, 
a senior French senator specialising in foreign policy, challenging 
Barroso’s position, stating that such threats ‘are not credible’ and that 
an independent Scotland ‘would stay in the European Union’.40
Beyond the debate about Scotland’s ability to join the EU, there 
were several efforts by the UK Government to portray an independent 
Scotland as a ‘small state’ that would suffer economically from its 
weakness. There were, for example, efforts to highlight Scotland’s more 
limited capacity to exploit its North Sea oil resources than would be 
the case with support from ‘the broad shoulders of one of the top 10 
economies in the world […]’, clearly suggesting Scotland required the 
comparative strength of the UK to effectively manage its most important 
economic resource.41 
The question of an independent Scotland’s currency, which relates 
to its foreign economic policy and its ability to provide for its defence, 
was crucial in the independence debate. There was much debate 
about whether Scotland would be able to keep the Pound Sterling, as 
was argued by the SNP.42 George Osborne, the UK Chancellor of the 
37 [N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence: Scotland Could Join EU in 18 Months, Says 




40  David Leask, ‘“Independence Would Not Bar Scotland from EU Membership”’, 
Herald, 1 March 2014, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13148291._Independ 
ence_would_not_bar_Scotland_from_EU_membership
41  Stephen Castle and Stanley Reed, ‘Scottish Oil and Gas an Issue in Vote on 
Independence’, New York Times, 24 February 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/25/world/europe/scot-oil-and-gas-an-issue-in-vote-on-independence.html 
42  This was another bone of contention within the broader Yes campaign. The Scottish 
Greens were keen to explore new currency options for Scotland, other than the 
pound or the euro, a view echoed by many on the left wing of the Yes campaign. 
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Exchequer, indicated that there would essentially be no chance of 
sharing the pound, with the other major UK political parties (Labour 
and Liberal Democrats) articulating the same position.43 This resulted 
in a back-and-forth with Salmond providing a set of facts countering 
Osborne’s position and accusing the UK Government of ‘bullying’.44 
Other external actors also weighed in on an independent Scotland’s 
foreign policy. NATO, for example, indicated that an independent 
Scotland would have to apply as a new state and that membership 
would require unanimous agreement of all twenty-eight states in the 
alliance.45 The United States also intervened in this debate. As Walker 
put it,
Within the US government, there was concern that its most dependable 
and influential ally would be diminished by Scotland’s departure. In 
addition, the UK and by extension NATO might be weakened if the 
referendum resulted in a reduction of military capabilities — including 
nuclear capabilities—and greater reluctance to deploy military forces 
abroad.46
Uncharacteristically, ‘President Barack Obama made an 11th-hour 
appeal for Scots to vote no, saying he hopes Britain “remains strong, 
robust and united” and that “The UK is an extraordinary partner for 
America and a force for good in an unstable world”’.47
Other leaders also warned of the dangers of a new small state. The 
Scotsman newspaper reported: ‘One of the more controversial moments 
of the referendum debate saw Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott 
43  Andrew Sparrow, ‘George Osborne’s Speech on Scottish Independence: 
Politics Live Blog’, Guardian, 13 February 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/blog/2014/feb/13/george-osbornes-speech-on-scottish-independence- 
politics-live-blog
44  Andrew Black and Aiden James, ‘Scottish Independence: Currency Union Block 
Could Hurt Firms, Says Alex Salmond’, BBC News, 17 February 2014, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26220638 
45  Severin Carrell, ‘Nato Rejects Alex Salmond Claim over Scottish Membership’, 
Guardian, 10 April 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/10/
nato-alex-salmond-scottish-membership
46  Walker (2014), p. 747.
47  Raf Sanchez, ‘Barack Obama Tells Scotland: Stay United’, Telegraph, 17 September 
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11103256/
Barack-Obama-tells-Scotland-stay-united.html
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state that the world “would not be helped” by Scottish independence’.48 
Abbott also remarked: ‘I am a firm friend of the United Kingdom and I 
want it to remain the United Kingdom, not the disunited Kingdom. It is 
a matter for Scotland, obviously, but as a friend of the United Kingdom 
that is my view’.49 Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt warned 
that independence for Scotland could create a ‘Balkanisation’ of the 
British Isles and he ‘suggested that a Yes vote could have a knock-on 
effect on Northern Ireland as well as destabilising the UK’.50 Ireland 
expressed similar concerns and the head of Shell Oil also warned of the 
risks and uncertainties of independence.51
Small states in world politics: the debate in 
International Relations scholarship
The debate between the Yes and No campaigns on the influence a 
small state can have in the world is familiar to scholars of International 
Relations (IR). Many theoretical perspectives view the international 
system as dominated by great powers. Weak states are Lilliputians in 
Gulliver’s world52 and ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must’.53 While legally independent, small states, according 
to these perspectives, are so dependent on others, both in terms of 
economics and security, that they really cannot pursue an independent 
foreign policy. Smaller economies are vulnerable to instability in global 
financial and trade markets and to economic pressures by others. 
Small states are dependent on military alliances in the face of security 
48  [N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence: Global Reaction’, Scotsman, 16 September 2014, 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-independence-global-reaction- 
1-3543135
49  [N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence: How the World Has Reacted’, Telegraph, 18 
September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11102506/Scottish-
independence-How-the-world-has-reacted.html
50  [N.a.], Scotsman, 16 September 2014, http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/
independence-may-lead-to-britain-s-balkanisation-1-3432564
51  Severin Carrell, ‘Shell Boss Warns against Scottish Independence’, Guardian, 6 
March 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/06/shell-chief- 
warns-against-scottish-independence
52  Robert O. Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, 
International Organization, 23, 2 (1969), pp. 291–310 (pp. 291–310).
53  Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972 [431 
BC]), p. 402.
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threats and may need to compromise their goals or values in return 
for protection. The bottom line, for those viewing international politics 
through the lens of big states making big decisions, is this: small states 
are rule-takers, not rule-makers.
The two theories that have most dominated IR scholarship — realism 
and liberalism — both tend to focus on bigger, more powerful states. 
Realism — both ‘classical’ and ‘neo’ — sees international politics as a 
realm of power. Realism, as a broad approach, is often considered a 
theory that supports the primacy of great power politics. Whilst Hans 
Morgenthau, in his classic text Politics Among Nations, made space to 
discuss the strategies that smaller states might adopt, his understanding 
of the balance of power and his vision of international politics as 
driven by ‘interest defined in terms of power’ leaves little room for 
small states.54 Employing the analogy of firms in the market, Waltz 
suggests that when all firms are not of equal size it makes sense to focus 
on the larger firms or, in this case, larger states.55 More recent realist 
scholarship has continued to emphasise that, insofar as the anarchy of 
international politics can be mitigated, great powers and larger states 
are responsible for it, with smaller states passively receiving such ‘order’ 
as can be attained.56
The newest variant of liberalism — associated with scholars such as 
Andrew Moravcsik — has likewise stressed the importance of power in 
international politics. Larger states are able to set the agenda, with small 
states reduced to trying to secure ‘side payments’ through international 
54  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th 
edn. (New York: Knopf, 1985 [1948]).
55  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA and London: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chapter 5.
56  W. Wohlforth, ‘Realism’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. by 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
pp. 131–49. According to Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, ‘Small States in 
the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19, 4 (2006), 651–68 (p. 656), which is written 
from a classical realist perspective, ‘Olav Knudsen identifies six key variables that 
are central to preserving the autonomy of smaller states: strategic significance of 
geographic location, degree of tension between the leading powers, phase of power 
cycle for nearest great power, historical record of relations between small state 
and nearest great power, the policies of other great powers and the existence of 
multilateral frameworks of security cooperation’.
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negotiations and bargaining.57 Whilst this new liberalism has stressed 
the importance of non-state actors, and takes the formation of, and 
variation in, state preferences seriously, the predominant focus is on 
the bigger powers. For example, in Moravcsik’s study of the history of 
European integration the emphasis is most heavily placed on France, 
West Germany, and Britain as the shapers of the process.58 One of 
the founders of the modern liberal approach to IR, Robert Keohane, 
remarked that small states were ‘system ineffectual’, meaning that they 
have to adjust to an international system that is shaped and influenced 
by other, larger states.59  
Other theoretical traditions of IR similarly devote more time and 
attention to larger states, or great powers, than they do to small states. 
The English School, for example, is concerned with the construction, 
maintenance, and erosion of different international societies. The 
overarching framework for understanding international society — one 
that has continued to animate the English School — gives primacy to the 
most powerful states within any given international society, although 
Martin Wight, one of the founders of the school, devoted a chapter of his 
book Power Politics to ‘minor powers’.60 Constructivism shifts the focus 
away from material forms of power in order to consider softer forms 
of power and ideational power, which has opened up the possibility 
of considering how smaller states might be successful in creating and 
promoting new norms. Despite this, a constructivist understanding 
of how an international system is formed and maintained still places 
emphasis on more powerful states. 
An opposing view to these traditional IR theoretical perspectives 
argues that small states may not be as constrained as structural 
approaches imply and, supported by a long-standing and growing body 
of research, it demonstrates that they may indeed punch above their 
weight.61 Handel, for example, finds that ‘the economic predicament 
57  See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community’, International Organization, 
45, 1 (1991), 19–56 (pp. 19–57).
58  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).
59  Keohane (1969), pp. 291–310.
60  Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Chatham House, 1978), Chapter 5.
61  An exhaustive presentation of the vast literature on small states is beyond the 
space limits of this chapter. For a review of the small state area of research, see 
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of the [economically] weak states may not be so severe as traditional 
economic theory would suggest’.62 Research on small states challenges 
the assumption of structural approaches that fewer capabilities (often 
the operational definition of small states) necessarily translates into less 
influence. It suggests that the possession of power (capabilities) is not 
synonymous with the exercise of power (influence).63 This is true, of 
course for big states as well: power as capability does not necessarily 
mean power as influence; not all big states get what they want. Small 
states may not be able to act autonomously but, in a world characterised 
increasingly by interdependence, this is often a characteristic of large 
states too. No states, large or small, are completely self-determining and 
in control of the effects of their own, and others’, actions.
The work on small states problematises the category of ‘small state’ 
and challenges static, deterministic, capabilities-based definitions. 
Small-state scholarship now generally adopts the position that ‘rather 
than continue the search for universal characteristics of small states 
and their behaviour, the ‘small state’ concept is best used as a ‘focusing 
device’ for highlighting the characteristic security problems and 
foreign policy dilemmas of the weaker actors in asymmetric power 
relationships’.64 Work on small state security, following developments 
in security studies more generally, has expanded conceptions of security 
to include survival, economic, societal and environmental security (see 
Thorhallsson and Bailes, Chapter 2).65 Small states are no longer seen 
I. B. Neumann and S. Gstöhl, ‘Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?’, in 
Small States in International Relations, ed. by J. Beyer et al. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2006), pp. 3–36; Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, The 
Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Laurent Goetschel, ‘Introduction to Special Issue: 
Bound to Be Peaceful? The Changing Approach of Western European Small States 
to Peace’, Swiss Political Science Review, 19, 3 (2013), 259–78. See also the annotated 
bibliography by J. Beyer, ‘Annotated Bibliography’, in Small States in International 
Relations, ed. by J. Beyer et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 
293–318.
62  See Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 
1981); also the summary of Handel’s argument in Neumann and Gstöhl (2006). 
63  Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006).
64  Clive Archer, Alyson J. K. Bailes, and Anders Wivel, ‘Setting the Scene: Small 
States and International Security’, in Small States and International Security: Europe 
and Beyond, ed. by C. Archer, A. J. Bailes, and A. Wivel (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 2014), pp. 3–25 (p. 9).
65  See, for example, Archer, Bailes, and Wivel (2014).
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as dependent; rather they seek shelter in international institutions that 
they in turn support to create security communities.66
Research indicates that small states can also have influence 
disproportional to their size. Small states can play an active role in 
international organisations, often hosting headquarters and offices 
and placing their citizens into key leadership positions. International 
institutions provide diplomatic space, information networks, and a 
place to coordinate collective action; leadership allows small states 
to shape the agenda of regional and global organisations, as norm 
entrepreneurs, meaning that they can, acting alone or in concert with 
other small states, challenge existing ideas and understandings that 
govern international politics and thus ultimately change behaviours 
and outcomes.67 Small states can also carve out niche roles, champion 
specific issues, and broker agreements, as they often enjoy more 
credibility and neutrality than larger states because of their small size. 
Indeed, ‘small states are more efficient as mediators because they can 
never expect to be successful in pushing their national interests the way 
large countries can’.68 
The history of international relations reveals many examples of 
small states playing important roles (consider Norway’s influence in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1990s, or Costa Rica’s influence in 
the Central American conflicts of the 1980s). Small states can use their 
power, and particularly their soft power, in smart ways to advance their 
interests and exert influence.69 In economics too, small states can find 
and then exploit highly profitable niches and smaller economies may be 
66  Alyson J. K. Bailes, J.-M. Rickli, and Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Small States, Survival, 
and Strategy’, in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel (2014), pp. 26–45; see also Efraim 
Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, The National Security of Small States in a Changing World 
(London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1997); and Jean-Marc Rickli, ‘European Small 
States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21, 3 (2008), 307–25.
67  On norm entrepreneurs, see Christine Ingebritsen, The Nordic States and European 
Unity (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).
68  Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006); Rikard Bengtsson, Ole Elgström, and Jonas Tallberg, 
‘Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries’, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 27, 3 (2004), 311–34. 
69  On soft power, see, for example, Alan Chong, ‘Singapore and the Soft Power 
Experience’, in The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, ed. 
by Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
pp. 65–80. 
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able to adapt more easily to changing economic conditions.70 There may 
be other benefits to being small, according to the notion that ‘small is 
beautiful’. Smallness, for example, ‘may be a factor that reduces rather 
than multiplies security headaches. It eliminates the need to make a 
pretence of self-sufficient defence or even to create military forces it all. 
It dampens expectations of a significant outgoing contribution to global 
goods like peacekeeping and, rather, creates a supposition of importing 
help in natural and accidental emergencies’.71 Generally, this research 
indicates that ‘small states are neither per se power-brokers nor are they 
per se political dwarfs in international negotiations’.72
This area of research has also identified typical and effective 
strategies that small states use. These include prioritisation, framing and 
reframing, attempts to use normative power and soft power, and the 
use of opportunity structures such as chairing negotiations or serving 
as president of an international organisation.73 Some research on small 
states has concentrated on the effects of size-related obstacles to influence, 
such as fewer administrative, financial and economic resources and 
capacities, and on the conditions that affect small-state success and 
influence.74 Conditions for success include features of the institutional 
environment (such as the number of other actors and weighted voting 
vs majority voting), issue types (redistributive vs regulative), and policy 
areas.75 There is some disagreement on these conditions, however. With 
regard to policy areas, for example, Thorhallsson and Wivel maintain 
the more conventional expectation that ‘the influence of small states is 
smaller on security policy than on other policy areas’,76 while in the 
special issue in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, edited 
by Diana Panke, the realist expectation that small states will have no 
influence in security issues was not confirmed across the case studies.77 
70  P. J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1985).
71  Archer, Bailes, and Wivel (2014), p. 18.
72  Diana Panke, ‘Small States in Multilateral Negotiations. What Have We Learned?’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25, 3 (2012), pp. 387–98.
73  See, for example, Panke (2012); Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006). 
74  See, for example, Panke (2012).
75  See, for example, ibid.; Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006).
76  Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006), p. 659.
77  See Panke (2012).
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Not surprisingly, when the assumption that capabilities determine 
influence is relaxed, the explanations of small states’ foreign policy 
look very similar to the explanations of great power and middle power 
foreign policy. In other words, a vast range of factors, from structural 
conditions and external threats, to mutually constructed identities, to 
domestic politics and the psychological aspects of decision making are 
relevant to understand the foreign policies that small states pursue. 
Generally, small state research has challenged the more structural 
explanations and explored other, more agent-based accounts. This is 
certainly consistent with the turn in international relations theory more 
generally to incorporate domestic and decision-making factors.78 
Gstöhl and Ingebritsen, for example, separately argue that, despite 
an economic interest to be open to regional integration, Scandinavia and 
other small European countries vary in this respect, and this variance can 
be explained by domestic political constraints.79 Other research focuses 
more on elite beliefs. Keohane argued that state leaders’ perceptions of 
their country’s role in the world better account for states’ orientations 
toward international institutions than capabilities, and even more than 
the perception of need for security protection.80 Thorhallson points to 
elite self-perceptions, among other factors, as a key element to explain 
Iceland’s change in foreign policy from a ‘system-ineffectual’ state to 
a ‘system-affecting’ state.81 Reiter finds that small states ‘learn’ from 
past experiences of success and failure and adapt their foreign policies 
according to these lessons learned, and not to variations in external 
threat, as realist perspectives would suggest.82 
78  Juliet Kaarbo, ‘A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn 
in IR Theory’, International Studies Review, 17, 2 (2015), 189–216.
79  Sieglinde Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process 
of Integration (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Ingebritsen (1998); and 
for a domestic political analysis see Miriam Fendius Elman, ‘The Foreign Policies 
of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 25, 02 (1995), 171–217.
80  Keohane (1969).
81  Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Can Small States Choose Their Own Size? The Case of a 
Nordic State — Iceland’, in The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability 
and Resilience, ed. by Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 119–42.
82  Dan Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the 
Past’, World Politics, 46, 4 (1994), 490–526.
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Overall, the research on small states has come to a position similar to 
the rest of IR theory. According to Thorhallsson and Wivel, for example, 
‘only by examining the interaction of materialist and idealist factors 
at different levels (regional, national and global) will we get a better 
understanding of the strategy of small states’.83 They also argue that 
‘we need to better understand how to combine materialist variables, 
such as power, with the observation that power affects foreign policy 
only through the interpretations of policy-makers’.84 This last point is 
perfectly consistent with a foreign policy analysis perspective, but still 
often ignored by other IR theories, even when they incorporate domestic 
politics and decision-making factors.85
The Scottish Government, at the time of the independence 
referendum, wished to see Scotland become the newest small state in 
the international system. But, throughout the referendum, Scotland was 
not a small state. Rather it was a sub-state actor, a constituent part of a 
sovereign nation state: the United Kingdom. The growing literature on 
so-called paradiplomacy86 — that is the diplomacy, or external relations, 
of sub-states — has generally focused on efforts by sub-state actors to 
secure economic gain through missions and activities designed to secure 
foreign trade and investment, or to promote cultural distinctiveness on 
the global stage (itself also often indirectly economic in nature, designed 
to boost tourism and exports through enhanced visibility and brand 
differentiation). Most case studies of sub-state diplomacy are of regions 
that either do not aspire to be states or are, unlike Scotland in 2014, not 
on the cusp of becoming a state. 
This case study illustrates that, for states that are newly emerging 
after independence, there exists a set of challenges additional to the 
general ones faced by small states. Had it become independent, Scotland 
would have had to negotiate in an environment in which its parent state, 
83  Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006), p. 665.
84  Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006).
85  Kaarbo (2015). 
86  Examples include Samuel Lucas McMillan, The Involvement of State Governments 
in US Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); David Criekemans, 
Regional Sub-State Diplomacy Today (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); 
Noé Cornago, ‘On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, 5, 1–2 (2010), 11–36; A. Lecours, ‘Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the 
Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions’, International Negotiation, 7, 1 
(2002), 91–114.
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the UK, would have been seeking to preserve its standing and prestige 
in the international system. This adds another layer of complexity and 
the dynamic that persisted between the emerging state (in this case, 
Scotland) and the state from which it was emerging (in this case, the 
UK) would have the potential to curb the ambitions of the new state. 
This is an issue that scholars of paradiplomacy ought to explore further 
given the possibility of a second Scottish independence referendum and 
the ongoing situation in Catalonia.
Conclusion
The two sides of the debate, about how an independent Scotland might 
fare in the international system given its small size, unfortunately talked 
over each other. Perhaps this is not surprising in a political campaign, as 
they often polarise issues and present a black-white picture to voters. It 
was interesting to note that the two sides would often point to different 
small states as examples. The Yes campaign, and particularly the SNP 
leadership, consistently invoked the Nordic states as good examples of 
small states in the international system.87 In official publications — such 
as the UK Government’s Scotland Analysis papers — the No side built 
up arguments about why Scotland would struggle to emulate the 
Nordic states. However, in more casual settings — such as in television 
appearances and debates — Iceland was invoked as an example of a 
state that ended up battered by global economic forces. Similarly, when 
Alex Salmond suggested that an independent Scotland could use the 
pound even without the agreement of the UK, the No campaign were 
quick to liken Scotland, negatively, to Panama, which uses the US 
dollar in a similar way. It is interesting to note that the SNP shifted the 
emphasis they placed on specific small states over a number of years. 
In 2006 Alex Salmond labelled Ireland, Iceland and Norway the ‘arc 
of prosperity’, arguing that an independent Scotland could join such 
an arc.88 Following the impact of the financial crisis, the references to 
Iceland and Ireland became less frequent, with Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark more commonly invoked.
87  Scotland’s Future, p. 477.
88  [N.a.], ‘Salmond Sees Scots in “Arc of Prosperity”’, Scotsman, 12 August 2006, http://
www.scotsman.com/news/salmond-sees-scots-in-arc-of-prosperity-1-1130200
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Overall, in the Scottish debate, the No side reflected the long-held 
perspective in the study of international relations that small states are 
ineffectual and vulnerable. The Yes side articulated the most positive 
side of the ‘small is beautiful’ perspective in small-state research. The 
truth of how effective and independent Scotland would be probably 
lies somewhere in the middle. Small states can secure their interests 
and advance their ideals, but this is not automatic; not all small states 
are effective in overcoming their disadvantages. The credibility that is 
key to small states’ influence takes time to develop, and is dependent 
on how others see them. It takes planning, the selection of appropriate 
policies, the commitment of necessary resources, and the exercise of 
dynamic leadership for any state, small or large, to deliver a successful 
foreign policy. The right policies also need the right resources to support 
them, not only financial resources (a diplomatic network is not cheap) 
but also human capital. Diplomatic services require the appropriate 
experience and knowledge and that requires significant and strategic 
investment. While the foreign policy of democratic states is certainly 
affected by the public, it is leaders who steer sovereign ships. Leaders 
that are interested in foreign affairs and skilled at playing a two-level 
game of domestic and international politics can significantly enhance 
any state’s potential.
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2. Do Small States Need ‘Alliance Shelter’? 
Scotland and the Nordic Nations
Baldur Thorhallsson and Alyson J. K. Bailes1
The aim of this chapter is to examine how Scotland as a potential 
independent state would prosper based on the existing small 
state literature and lessons of the Nordic states. The chapter 
argues that, as any other small entity, Scotland, as an independent 
small state, would need external shelter in multiple dimensions. 
We have found that four entities — NATO, the EU, the remnant 
UK, and the US — are best suited to meeting Scotland’s needs for 
economic, societal, and political shelter including hard and soft 
security. However, these solutions would incur costs different 
from, and not necessarily lesser than, those carried by Scotland 
within the present union. An independent Scotland would have 
to weigh the cost/benefit balance of full shelter provided by these 
four entities and consider important opt-outs secured by the 
Nordic states. The Nordic states themselves cannot provide an 
alternative for any key dimension of shelter but the lessons of 
varied Nordic experience, and softer kinds of shelter to be found 
within Nordic cooperation, could provide valuable lubrication 
for the transitional process and a supportive pillar for Scotland’s 
accommodation to independent existence in the world. 
1  We are grateful to Sverrir Steinsson for his exceptional research assistance 
and comments. The chapter draws extensively on Alyson J. K. Bailes, Baldur 
Thorhallsson, and Rachael Lorna Johnstone, ‘Scotland as an Independent Small 
State: Where Would It Seek Shelter?’, Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration, 
9, 1 (2013), 1–20; Alyson J. K. Bailes, ‘Small States and Security: Does Size Still 
Matter?’, in Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, ed. 
by H. Baldersheim and M. Keating (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2015), pp. 23–41. 
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How do small states survive and prosper in the international system? 
This is a debate that resurfaced with the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014. For some, an independent Scotland would be too 
small to remain viable as a prosperous state. Others argued that an 
independent Scotland could be prosperous but that it would need to 
stay in, or join, the EU.2 Nordic models and experiences were frequently 
mentioned in this debate3 and used to demonstrate that small societies 
can be prosperous on their own.4 However, with important exceptions,5 
the discourse on Scotland’s smallness has not yet received much 
attention in the small-state literature. This chapter seeks to draw lessons 
from the academic research on small states, and particularly research 
on the Nordic states, which may be applied to an independent Scotland. 
How Scotland compares with the Nordics in some key indicators is 
shown in Table 1.
Based on the existing literature and the lessons from the Nordic 
states, we argue that Scotland as an independent small state would 
need external shelter in multiple dimensions. We identify four 
entities — NATO, the EU, the US, and rUK — that seem most suited to 
meeting Scotland’s needs for economic, societal, and political shelter. 
However, these solutions would incur costs different from, and not 
necessarily lesser than, those carried by the Scottish people within 
their present union. Costs associated with memberships (or full shelter 
2  Jo E. Murkens, Scotland’s Place in Europe (London: Constitution Unit, University 
College London, 2001); Scottish National Party, ‘Senior EU Official Backs Benefits 
of Small States’, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20141202110524/http://www.
snp.org/media-centre/news/2012/dec/senior-eu-official-backs-benefits-small-states 
[last saved to the Wayback Machine 2 December 2014].
3  E.g. P. Hanlon and F. U. Karki, ‘Health, Culture and Society: A Scottish-Nordic 
Conversation’, in Radical Scotland: Arguments for Self-Determination, ed. by Gerry 
Hassan and Rosie Ilett (Edinburgh: Luath Press Ltd, 2011), pp. 85–101.
4  A. Salmond, ‘Scotland’s Place in the World. Hugo Young Memorial Lecture’, 
London, 25 January 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/jan/25/alex- 
salmond-hugo-young-lecture
5  E.g. Michael Keating, ‘The Political Economy of Self-Determination’, in Radical 
Scotland: Arguments for Self-Determination, ed. by G. Hassan and R. Ilett (Edinburgh: 
Luath Press Ltd, 2011), pp. 40–48; D. Donald and A. Hutton, ‘Economic Self-
Determination: Towards a Political Economy of Scottish Citizenship’, in Radical 
Scotland: Arguments for Self-Determination, ed. by G. Hassan and R. Ilett (Edinburgh: 
Luath Press Ltd, 2011), pp. 49–62.
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in the terminology of the literature) of the EU and NATO have led to 
important opt-outs by the Nordic states, and an independent Scotland 
would have to weigh the cost/benefit balance no less carefully. Here we 
shall look at the main shelter options and their likely price tags, while 
also asking what the Nordic nations themselves might be able to offer. 













Sweden 9690 450,295 42,874 1.2 15,300 200,000
Denmark 5640 43,094 43,094 1.3 17,200 53,500
Finland 5464 338,145 39,160 1.4 22,200 354,000
Scotland 5254 78,772 39,642 (UK 2.2) (UK 169,150) (UK 78,100)
Norway 5136 323,802 66,135 1.4 25,800 45,940
Iceland 328 103,000 36,483 None None None
Greenland 56 2,166,086  - None None None
Faroe Islands 48 1393  - None None None
Alliance shelter theory
Generally, the International Relations (IR) literature argues that small 
states need a protecting power. Realists, with their emphasis on ‘hard’ 
power competition, usually find that small states survive by relying on 
the mercy of powerful states or by joining military alliances. A small state 
can either align itself with the most powerful state in its environment 
6  Population information from World Bank, ‘Countries and Economies’ (2015), http://
data.worldbank.org/country; territory from [N.a.], CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2015), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ GDP information 
from 2012 (in International Dollars) from the Scottish Government (GDP includes a 
proportionate allocation of UK oil/gas revenues); military expenditure from SIPRI, 
‘Military Expenditure Database’ (2015), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/
milex/milex_database; armed forces from the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015).
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(bandwagoning) or join coalitions against that state (balancing).7 Liberal 
international relations scholars, who emphasise cooperation especially 
in economic affairs, likewise argue that small states depend on a larger 
power. They need access to large markets, and must find ways to 
constrain more powerful states peacefully. Small states consequently 
cherish regional and international organisations as means for restraining 
powerful states through norms and rules, while promoting peace and 
trade.8 Constructivist scholars have also emphasised small states’ need 
for social status, which implies recognition by great powers.9 There is not 
much disagreement among IR scholars about small states’ dependence 
on large states, international organisations and international norms for 
their survival and prosperity.
Building on these insights, we propose a framework that takes 
account of the different dimensions of small states’ vulnerabilities, and 
the different solutions available for small states seeking to alleviate 
them. We may initially conceptualise these vulnerabilities as being 
political, economic, and societal.10
i) Political Shelter. The framework divides political shelter into three 
distinct categories. First, the most obvious way in which small 
7  G. Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962); R. E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); P. W. Schroeder, ‘Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power 
and Tools of Management’, in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. 
by K. E. Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227–62; Stephen M. 
Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); G. H. Snyder, 
Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
8  R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 
‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security, 20, 1 (1995), 39–51; G. 
J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Baldur Thorhallsson 
and Anders Wivel, ‘Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and 
What Would We Like to Know?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19, 4 
(2006), 651–68; D. Panke, Small States in the European Union: Coping with Structural 
Disadvantages (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010). 
9  Carsten Holbraad, ‘The Role of Middle Powers’, Cooperation and Conflict, 6, 2 (1971), 
77–90; B. de Carvalho and I. B. Neumann, Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest 
for International Standing (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014).
10  Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Domestic Buffer Versus External Shelter: Viability of Small 
States in the New Globalised Economy’, European Political Science, 10, 3 (2011), 
324–36; Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Iceland’s External Affairs in the Middle Ages: The 
Shelter of Norwegian Sea Power’, Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration, 8, 1 
(2012), 5–37.
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states are vulnerable is in their lack of hard power. With smaller 
populations, less absolute wealth and less territory, small states 
lack the self-sufficiency, resources and strategic depth needed 
to defend themselves, including the maintenance of adequate 
armed forces. Second, small states are also vulnerable when it 
comes to diplomatic power. With a smaller base for taxation, 
small states lack administrative capacity.11 A smaller civil service 
makes it harder for small states to run their societies effectively, 
and a smaller diplomatic corps makes it more difficult for them 
to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Third, small 
states can be sheltered by the norms and rules of the international 
system. To summarise, small states consequently depend on 
larger states or organisations for both military and diplomatic 
backing. International organisations have particular benefits in 
reducing inequality between states, providing information and 
cutting the transaction costs of diplomacy. 
ii) Economic Shelter. Small domestic markets and concentrated 
production make small states acutely dependent on international 
trade. With relatively few, or no, natural resources and without the 
economies of scale to produce a wide range of goods, small states 
rely on importing vital goods and exporting the few products 
in which they have comparative advantages. This external 
dependence also means that small state economies fluctuate 
more than larger economies, as prices for commodities rise and 
fall, and international economic crises hit them harder than many 
other states.12 Small states consequently depend on open trading 
relationships with larger economies, and promote free trade and 
economic integration for the goods and services in which they 
have comparative advantage.13 In this setting, economic shelter 
may come from a state and/or an organisation in the form of direct 
economic assistance and investment, a currency union, beneficial 
loans, favourable market access, a common market and so forth.
11  Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and 
Conceptual Perspectives’, European Integration, 28, 1 (2006), 7–31 (p. 19).
12  Handel (1981); P. J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and 
the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1984); 
Katzenstein (1985). 
13  A. Alesina and E. Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
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iii) Societal Shelter. Innovation and ideas are usually associated with 
large populations and free exchanges. Small states risk cultural, 
educational and technological stagnation without the free flow 
of people, goods and ideas.14 Isolation prevents states, especially 
when small, from keeping pace with development and adopting 
best practices. Individuals from small states also cherish the 
ability to tap into broader cultural and ideological currents. Small 
states, like any others, are not solely concerned with material 
well-being but seek ontological security for their sense of self 
and identity; they rely especially on predictability and order to 
ensure this.15 They want to feel good about their position in the 
world and have their standing recognised by others.16 
We may consequently expect that small states will seek economic, 
political and societal shelter, and that their prosperity will be strongly 
linked to the nature and depth of shelter they can find. Such shelter 
does not, of course, come without costs. Shelter providers may impose 
conditions on smaller states in exchange for the shelter, reducing the 
small partner’s freedom of manoeuvre and choice.17 The need to align 
with undesirable large states or organisations may be costly in normative 
terms, as the minor partner ends by acting in ways inconsistent with 
its national identity and preferred image. Participation in regional 
and international organisations may also stretch the administrative 
resources of small states.18 Nonetheless, there is plenty of important and 
inexpensive shelter available for small states — at least in Europe.
14  S. Rokkan, D. W. Urwin, and European Consortium for Political Research, Economy, 
Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries (London: Sage, 1983).
15  Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, 
International Security, 23, 1 (1998), 171–200; Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security 
in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal 
of International Relations, 12, 3 (2006), 341–70; B. J. Steele, Ontological Security in 
International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (Abingdon and London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2008); Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Ontological (in)Security and State Denial of Historical 
Crimes: Turkey and Japan’, International Relations, 24, 1 (2010), 3–23.
16  de Carvalho and Neumann (2014).
17  D. Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 5. 
18  Alyson J. K. Bailes and Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Instrumentalizing the European 
Union in Small State Strategies’, Journal of European Integration, 35, 2 (2013), 99–115. 
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Nordic states’ shelter
The five Nordic states all have populations smaller than 10 million (see 
Table 1), and similar political (democratic), social (welfare-oriented, 
egalitarian) and cultural (secular, open and liberal) systems. Historically 
violent, the Nordics have built a new image as a non-aggressive, high-
minded family of states whose troops go abroad only for peace missions. 
Despite many similarities between them, the Nordic states have opted 
for different forms of shelter, as shown in Table 2. Economic shelter is 
typically found in European integration, but the level of participation 
differs between the Nordic states. Political shelter is found in NATO and 
the European project, the former providing ‘hard’ and the latter ‘soft’ 
security. Also, the US offers the Nordic nations political cover directly 
or indirectly. Societal shelter is mainly sought via Nordic cooperation. 
Table 2. Present economic, political, societal and security shelter of the 






Political Societal Hard security Soft security
Sweden EU No EU EU/NCa No EU/Schengen
Denmark EU DKK(EU)b EU/NATO EU/NC NATO EU/Schengen
Finland EU EU EU EU/NC No EU/Schengen




No NATO EEA/NC NATO Schengen




Greenland DKe DK DK/US/NATO DK/NC/WNC DK/US/NATO DK/Schengen
Faroe 
Islands
DK DK DK/NATO DK/NC/WNC DK/NATO DK/Schengen
a Nordic Cooperation.
b Danish krone (DKK) pegged to the euro.
c European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association.
d West Nordic Cooperation.
e Denmark.
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Shelter in NATO and the US
Unable to deter or defeat Russian threats with their own small forces, 
the Nordics after World War Two had to balance the logic of seeking big-
power protection against that of avoiding provocation and distancing 
themselves from the military actuality of confrontation between East 
and West. Finland continued as a buffer state, opting for neutrality and 
friendly relations with both East and West. Plans for a four-member 
Scandinavian Defence Union containing Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
and Iceland fell apart over differences between Norway and Sweden 
over NATO guarantees.19 These four states then jumped different ways 
in 1949: Iceland, Norway and Denmark becoming founding members 
of NATO, and Sweden settling for neutral status — as shown in Table 
2. The choices of the four states reflected their threat perceptions and 
history. As one simplified explanation suggests, neutrality had failed in 
World War Two for the three prospective NATO members whereas the 
Swedish policy of neutrality had paid off. 
NATO membership was, however, not without controversy for these 
formerly neutral states. Norway and Denmark insisted on no stationing 
of foreign troops or nuclear objects on their soils during peacetime, with 
the exception of Greenland.20 Iceland entered into a basing agreement 
with the US in 1951 after painful internal debates, driven by the growing 
perception of global instability in the wake of the Korean War, its own 
lack of armed forces, and fears that NATO membership alone was not a 
sufficient deterrent to Soviet aggression or a Socialist coup.21 Iceland’s 
NATO membership and the US basing agreement would remain highly 
divisive issues in Icelandic politics until the late 1970s.22 
With the end of the Cold War, the strategic salience of all parts of 
Europe for US planners began to wane, but as Russian forces evacuated 
former Warsaw Pact territories and NATO expanded, the remaining 
concentration of Russia’s strength along its Northern coastlines actually 
19  G. Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by 
Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 51–52; 
Tony Insall and Patrick Salmon, ‘Preface to the Nordic Countries: From War to Cold 
War, 1944–1951’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 37, 2 (2012), 136–55. 
20  Lundestad (2003), p. 57.
21  Valur Ingimundarson, The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of 
Empire 1945–2006 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2011).
22  Ingimundarson (2011).
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increased the relative importance of Nordic stability. Since 2008–2009, 
strategic interest has been attracted back to the area by speculations 
on the opening up of the Arctic,23 as well as the evidence of Russian 
aggression in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). Under its new Strategic 
Concept of 2010,24 NATO has offered Nordic and Baltic member states 
enhanced contingency planning for possible attacks, and in 2014 — in 
reaction to Ukrainian events — both Sweden and Finland signed up for 
closer territorial defence cooperation with NATO.25
For the two most easterly, non-allied Nordics, the indirect and 
informal nature of Western strategic cover after 1949 made other 
potential shelters more interesting. After joining the EU in 1995, Finland 
and Sweden played an influential role in the development of the Union’s 
military arm, now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).26 
While keen to avoid the EU’s competing with NATO or provoking 
Russia, they valued whatever ‘soft’ protection might come from equal 
involvement in a militarily active European family. Both embraced the 
new language in the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon (entering into force on 1 
December 2009) committing EU members — albeit with strictly limited 
practical effect — to help each other in case of military attack, regardless 
of alliance status. 
If Nordics must sacrifice their precious sovereignty and free choice 
in defence, they will do so for partners who really can protect them, not 
for each other. Thus, when in 2011 they adopted a mutual ‘solidarity’ 
declaration,27 it explicitly excluded cases of warlike attack. Aside from 
the sphere of peacekeeping, Nordic regional defence cooperation has 
been a relatively late-blooming flower, currently coordinated through 
23  Christian Le Mière and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity 
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014).
24  NATO, ‘Strategic Concept’ (2010), http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept- 
2010-eng.pdf
25  A. Klus, ‘The Nordic Dimension of the Ukrainian Crisis’, New Eastern Europe 
(2014), http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1242-the-nordic-dimension- 
of-the-ukrainian-crisis
26  M. Strömvik, ‘Starting to “Think Big”: The Nordic Countries and EU Peace-
Building’, in The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy, ed. by 
Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 199–214.
27  Nordic Ministers, ‘Declaration of Solidarity’ (2011), http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.
is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/Norraen-samstoduyfirlysing-ENG.pdf
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the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).28 
Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine crisis have spurred new talk of, notably, 
a Finnish-Swedish axis; but a Swedish independent policy review in 
2014 (the Bertelman Report) warned that no degree of cooperation, 
with anyone, can release Sweden from the quandary caused by its 
own defence cuts.29 At best, intra-Nordic defence work can be seen as 
embroidery upon the still overwhelmingly trans-Atlantic nature of the 
region’s ‘hard’ shelter umbrella. 
Shelter in the EU
Through European integration, the Nordic states find numerous types of 
shelter, primarily economic. They also enjoy considerable political cover 
(soft security shelter) from membership of Schengen and enormous 
societal shelter, for example from the EU’s research and development 
projects (see Table 2). In 1973 Denmark became the first Nordic state to 
join the EU, with Sweden and Finland ultimately joining after the end 
of the Cold War. From 1994, Iceland and Norway have been members of 
the European Economic Area (EEA) and thus of the EU’s Single Market, 
deeming it sufficient economic shelter for the time being. They have 
all taken part in Schengen from the beginning and cooperate with the 
agencies EUROPOL and EUROJUST. 
At the same time, Nordic relations with the EU have been diverse 
and often idiosyncratic. Collectively the Nordics are relative newcomers 
to the European project. Absent at the signing of the Treaty of Rome, 
the Nordic states opted for limited trade partnerships with the EU, 
such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In 1994, Norway 
negotiated terms for entry for the second time but its people voted No 
again. Iceland applied for membership in 2009 following its economic 
crash, but froze the application in 2013. Since spring 2015 its government 
28  H. Ojanen, ‘Nordic Defence Cooperation — Inspiration for the EU or a Lesson in 
Matching Expectations?’, TEPSA Policy Paper (2014), http://www.tepsa.eu/tepsa-
policy-paper-by-hanna-ojanen-nordic-defence-cooperation-inspiration-for-the-
eu-or-a-lesson-in-matching-expectations; Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The Rise of Nordic 
Defence Cooperation: A Return to Regionalism?’, International Affairs, 89, 5 (2013), 
1161–81.
29  Government of Sweden, ‘International Defence Cooperation: Efficiency, 
Solidarity, Sovereignty’ (2014), http://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/
Bertelman2014.pdf
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no longer considers Iceland an applicant state — though it has not 
formally withdrawn the membership application. Greenland is the only 
entity to have left the EU, by a referendum in 1985 after it had been 
obliged to join with Denmark. Britain is on course to follow Greenland 
in the next few years. The Faroe Islands, another autonomous Danish 
territory, were allowed their own choice at the time of Danish entry and 
opted not to join, entering into a sui generis relationship with Brussels. 
The three Nordic members of the Union each have a distinct status, with 
only Finland participating fully in all EU policies including Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). In 2003 Sweden’s people voted against 
participating in the Eurozone. Denmark gained four opt-outs in 1993 
at the time of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty: from EMU, EU defence, 
European citizenship, and justice and home affairs. 
The choice of economic shelter for the Nordic states consequently 
varies, reflecting not only national levels of Euroscepticism but also 
objective features of their economic structure. All Nordic states are 
similar in having lofty economic and welfare standards combined 
with relatively large state sectors, requiring the private sector to 
produce high added value. Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, however, profit mostly from natural resources (fish, oil, 
gas, other power sources and tourism); and this, as well as political 
culture and geography, may help explain why they have not seen 
strong enough protective benefits in the EU to be willing to cede 
sovereignty.30 For Sweden and Denmark with their more continental 
orientation and greater agricultural and industrial exports, the appeal 
of the EU market has been stronger.31 Finland’s motives for EU entry 
and its commitment to EMU are the most clearly security-related: the 
EU helped to compensate for the collapse of former Soviet trade, and 
sealed the Western character of the Finnish land and people.32 Just as 
with defence, however, some of these national solutions appear more 
easily sustainable than others. While Norway hardly wavered with the 
economic crash of 2008, Iceland suffered abject failure in the attempt to 
30  Ingebritsen (1998); Baldur Thorhallsson, Iceland and European Integration: On the 
Edge (London: Routledge, 2004). 
31  Ingebritsen (1998).
32  [N.a.], ‘Finland and Europe: In and Happy’, Economist, 9 October 1997, http://www.
economist.com/node/102291
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diversify its narrow economic base by building up banking services — a 
classic small-state ploy. Another volatile industry, tourism, has now 
‘replaced’ the financial sector as a ‘saviour’ from the reliance on fisheries 
and energy supplies to the aluminium industry. 
Shelter in Nordic cooperation
Despite never achieving (or perhaps wanting) full regional integration, the 
Nordics have nevertheless supplied each other with significant elements 
of shelter: most obviously societal (see Table 2), but also supplementing 
the primary economic, diplomatic and soft security shelter derived 
from the EU, NATO and the US. Nordic cooperation is formalised in 
the Nordic Council, a parliamentary cooperation body supplemented 
since 1971 by the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). These institutions 
deal with a wide range of issues such as culture, media, the economy, 
business, working life, education, research, environment, legislation, 
justice, welfare, and gender equality, and have more recently expanded 
their coverage to at least the ‘softer’ security fields. 
Achievements of Nordic cooperation include the Nordic Passport 
Union, established by four of the nations in 1958 (Iceland joined in 
1965), which waives the obligation for citizens of the Nordic States to 
travel with passports between Nordic states.33 The Nordic Convention 
on Social Assistance and Social Services and the Nordic Convention on 
Social Security allow migrant Nordic citizens to claim social security 
on the same basis as the nationals of the state in which they live.34 The 
common Nordic labour market, first agreed to in 1954 (agreement 
renewed in 1982), reflects a ‘fundamental right for nationals of the 
Nordic countries to be able freely to take up employment and settle in 
another Nordic country’.35 
33  Nordic Council, ‘The Nordic Passport Convention’ (2015), http://www.norden. 
org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordic-agreements/treaties-and-agreements/passport- 
issues-citizenship-and-national-registration/the-nordic-passport-convention
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Intra-Nordic trade is extensive: 19% of Nordic exports go to other 
Nordic countries and 22% of Nordic imports come from other Nordic 
countries. Greenland (86.6%), Faroe Islands (62.6%) and Iceland 
(27.9%) import the most from other Nordic states whereas Greenland 
(93.7%), Sweden (24.7%) and Denmark (23.0%) export the most to their 
co-Nordics.36
Nordic states have a reputation for diplomatic cooperation in 
international bodies. Nowhere is this plainer than in the United Nations, 
where the Nordic states overcome their small size by taking joint 
positions and initiatives, and supporting each other in bids for elections 
of non-permanent Security Council members. This Nordic unity has 
survived Finland’s and Sweden’s EU entry which also commits them 
to EU group efforts at the UN.37 Nordic cooperation also results in 
more influence in bargaining within the EU. Since the 1990s the Nordic 
Heads of Government have pre-consulted before major EU meetings, 
either streamlining their views or finding non-damaging ways to agree 
to differ. The Nordics have concocted joint inputs to high-profile EU 
policies, such as the Nordic Battle Group (though excluding Denmark) 
for EU military missions, and more recently, a proposed joint rescue 
module for civil emergencies.38 According to Panke, the Nordic states 
can, through such systematic cooperation, ‘increase their collective 
bargaining leverage and shape EU policies more effectively than 
through unilateral action’.39
The Nordic states have cooperated among themselves in ‘soft’ 
security since the 1950s, notably through networks of police and rescue 
organisations. In 2009 a programme to boost mutual learning and 
collaboration when dealing with civil emergencies was launched as the 
‘Haga process’. The Haga system has by now reviewed many specific 
36  Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2014 (Copenhagen: Nordic 
Council of Ministers, 2014), p. 111.
37  Katie Verlin Laatikainen, ‘Norden’s Eclipse the Impact of the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 38, 4 (2003), 409–41.
38  Alyson J. K. Bailes and C. Sandö, Nordic Cooperation on Civil Security: The Haga Process 
2009–14, Occasional Paper, Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small 
State Studies (Reykjavík 2014), http://www.ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
The-Haga-Process-PDF.pdf
39  Diana Panke, ‘Small States in the European Union: Structural Disadvantages in EU 
Policy-Making and Counter-Strategies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 6 (2010), 
799–817.
62 Baldur Thorhallsson and Alyson J. K. Bailes
issues and operational areas, albeit with sparse visible results.40 Its latest 
studies, notably on host nation support for cross-border civil operations, 
have highlighted the considerable variations in national structures and 
laws regarding non-military security. Cultural differences over central-
local burden-sharing, over how far to trust the military, and over public-
private relations, further complicate the picture. Haga’s limitations are, 
however, to some extent compensated by other advances being made 
e.g. in Nordic cyber-security cooperation and cooperative research into 
societal security.41
Scottish shelter options
As seen in Table 3, four entities — NATO, the EU, the US, and the rUK 
itself — appear best suited to meeting Scotland’s needs for economic, 
societal, and political shelter (including hard and soft security). In 
its given, north-west European and ‘strong state’ context, Scotland’s 
independence — should it ever happen — would be more of a ‘velvet 
divorce’ than a violent (conflict-driven) breakaway or radical régime 
change. The new country’s strategy might thus be expected to lean 
towards continuity at least in relation to its international alliances. 
Further, Scotland’s peripheral geographical site and its shortage of 
neighbours mean that it has few, if any, truly new options for any 
dimension of shelter. In fact, the SNP have made clear that Scotland has 
a vital interest in staying in the EU and would also wish to remain a full 
member of NATO. Controversy during the referendum debate hinged 
on the conditions on which this might happen and especially, whether 
Scotland would have a residual right to membership (as a former part 
of the UK) or would need to apply afresh. 




Political Societal Hard Security Soft security
EU/rUK rUK EU/NATO/NC rUK/EU/NC rUK/US/NATO rUK/EU
40  Bailes and Sandö (2014).
41  Ibid.
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What is clear is that the Scottish situation lacks direct European precedent, 
as no member state has split up after previously joining NATO and/or 
the EU. This leaves room for widely diverging hypotheses, as was seen 
in the referendum campaign. To an outside observer, however, it seems 
hard to build realistic scenarios where London would wish or be able to 
treat Scotland in a zero-sum, purely hostile and vengeful way — at least 
on strategic points — when facing a peaceful split. After all, Scotland 
would remain physically attached to the rUK, as its strategic hinterland 
and main buffer against the traditional line of perceived threat from 
Russia. It would fall to London to try to reassure NATO about the 
impact of the split on defence readiness in, and contributions from, the 
British Isles.
Shelter in NATO, the US and the remnant UK
The logic of Scotland’s seeking its ‘hard’ strategic shelter from NATO is 
both external and internal. No other organisation offers the collective 
military strength to deter possible assailants (from any quarter), while 
also following democratic practices that give a voice to its smallest 
members. Some Scots may appreciate being part of a trans-Atlantic 
political community based on democratic values. Others might simply 
find it a reassuring element of continuity.
From an internal viewpoint, being a small member of NATO gives 
scope to reduce national defence spending and avoid building a full 
range of force capabilities. Small members that deviate from this pattern 
normally have special reasons for threat-consciousness, such as Estonia, 
on the Russian border.42 During the crisis sparked by Russian action in 
Ukraine, NATO has renewed its appeal for all Allies to meet a norm for 
2% of GDP spent on defence,43 but it continues to send mixed signals 
to its smaller members by stressing specialisation and offering them 
designated reinforcements. Also, its recent ‘Smart Defence’ concept 
42  Alyson J. K. Bailes and Örvar Þ. Rafnsson, ‘Iceland and the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy: Challenge or Opportunity?’, Icelandic Review of Politics & 
Administration, 8, 1 (2012), 109–31.
43  NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, 5 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (A declaration issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales.)
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positively encouraged members to give up capabilities too limited to 
be viable.44
NATO’s collective budget is very small and not a significant cost for a 
nation like Scotland. Like the Nordic neighbours, the Scots would more 
probably have to ‘pay’ by continuing to contribute to NATO-led (as well 
as EU- or UN-led) military missions abroad; even small states can meet 
niche requirements in this context, while their presence conveys political 
solidarity. In the independence debate, the SNP said they would wish 
Scotland to join in such tasks when backed by a clear international-legal 
mandate — i.e. not Iraq-style coalitions.45 One study at the time claimed 
that intervention forces as well as basic territorial defence could be 
provided for little more than half the money Scottish taxpayers currently 
contribute to UK defence.46 The SNP itself proposed to save GBP one 
billion annually on the latter figure.47 Much would, of course depend on 
the division of former UK forces; on whether Scotland tried to sustain 
independently viable naval and air arms, with their high equipment costs 
(the SNP suggested sharing air and sea bases with the UK which would 
open up an extra dimension of cover); and other possible changes in force 
structure, such as a revised active/reservist balance.
Would NATO itself want to keep Scotland, as a small ‘security importer’ 
with reduced defence spending and capacity, where — moreover — the 
dominant political movement proposes to declare itself a non-nuclear 
state and remove the present Trident nuclear submarine base at 
Faslane?48 The major headaches this poses for the UK Government 
should not obscure the fact that very few NATO states now have 
other people’s nuclear forces on their territory, and Scotland’s nearest 
neighbours — Norway and Denmark — co-founded NATO while 
rejecting any such presence. (Iceland joined this position in the 1980s.) 
Viewed logically, NATO should care about maintaining an effective 
UK deterrent, and about handling the delicate London-Edinburgh 
44  NATO, ‘Smart Defence’, 1 September 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
34AEED99-772DF4E3/natolive/topics_84268.htm
45  E.g. Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2009), p. 119.
46  Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets: Defending an Independent 
Scotland (London: Royal United Service Institute, 2012).
47  [N.a.], ‘In Full: SNP Resolution on Nato’, Scotsman, 16 July 2012, http://www.
scotsman.com/news/politics/in-full-snp-resolution-on-nato-1-2414919 
48  Scottish Government (2009). 
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negotiations sensibly, rather than about exactly where the British 
assets ended up. It would be hard for it to reject Scottish accession 
on the grounds of military spending or force size, when other recent 
entrants’ performance has varied considerably and Iceland, a founder 
ally, has no forces at all. What would probably dominate, ultimately 
also in London’s view, would be the case for maintaining unbroken 
NATO coverage (with its scope for coherent US reinforcement) across 
the Nordic/North Atlantic space, and having Scotland as a modest 
contributor rather than a detached free-rider.
The United States does not want an independent Scotland and has 
made that clear. It does not want to lose access to Scottish facilities and 
have a strategic black hole north of the rUK. This would be a serious 
setback for US defence leaders who envisage a gradual strategic ‘pivot’ 
away from Europe to Asia. Should this nevertheless happen, while 
protective of the rUK’s interests, Washington could be expected to urge 
London to reduce the risks by building a good defence understanding 
with its new northern neighbour. Edinburgh would come under equally 
strong US pressure to cooperate and would have good cause to do so. 
Its territory’s ultimate shelter would be US nuclear and conventional 
might, as is the case for all the present Nordic (and Baltic) nations. 
Further, ‘the USA is Scotland’s largest [overseas] export market and the 
leading source of inward investment into Scotland’49 — investments that 
would be least disrupted if Scotland’s present EU status was preserved. 
Scottish cultural and societal links with North America are strong, as in 
Ireland. Overall, one might imagine Washington not only strategically 
underwriting Scottish/British solutions but actively brokering them, as 
it has done between London and Dublin at crucial turning points — a 
classic aspect of political shelter.
The analysis thus far makes plain that good ‘shelter’ solutions for 
Scotland depend, not least, on coming to terms with the rUK as shown 
in Table 3. In reality, the latter would be Scotland’s primary shelter even 
after independence: in strategic, economic, and soft-security terms, and 
also societally and culturally insofar as cross-border agreement would 
reduce disruption and distress for ordinary citizens. The SNP has 
49  Scottish Development International, ‘North America Briefing’ (2013), http://
www.scottish-enterprise.presscentre.com/International-activity/North-America-
briefing-445.aspx [accessed 6 February 2013].
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stated that an independent Scotland would wish to retain the Queen 
as monarch (to keep close societal links with the UK) and the pound 
sterling as currency (implying backing from the Bank of England), so 
an independent Scotland is highly likely to, at least, seek such shelter 
at a minimum.
Shelter in the EU
As Norway’s and Iceland’s cases show, the European Union does not 
automatically appeal to Northern European small states as a shelter. 
Scotland, however, has already experienced and on balance profited 
from it for forty years (see Table 2). Anti-EU feeling is less dominant than 
in the UK. Brussels may even seem a more palatable source of authority 
than London. Continued presence in the EU would thus be an obvious 
solution for Scotland’s shelter needs in the areas of the economy, ‘soft’ 
security, and societal (as regards concrete functions like communication 
and infrastructure) and some political dimensions, as shown in Table 3.
Recent Irish experience of EU support during the debt crisis 
underpins this case, but also highlights the price to be paid.50 How 
the overall ‘costs’ of EU shelter for an independent Scotland might 
change is a complex question that is only starting to be probed in public 
debate. How would Scotland’s independently assessed contribution 
and its receipts from EU funds compare with what it experiences as 
part of a much larger net-contributing nation? If Scotland had to make 
a new membership application as many (including the President of the 
European Commission) believe,51 could it stay outside the Schengen 
system and maintain a ceiling on its budget contribution as earlier 
negotiated for the UK? These are important questions, but such material 
concerns have not deterred other recent small applicants to the EU, who 
reasoned rather in terms of the vulnerabilities they would feel outside 
the Union, the even less attractive prospect of trusting a national 
50  Peadar Kirby and Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Financial Crises in Iceland and Ireland: 
Does European Union and Euro Membership Matter?’, JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 50, 5 (2012), 801–18.
51  Severin Carrol, ‘Barroso Casts Doubt on Independent Scotland’s EU Membership 
Rights’, Guardian, 21 September 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/
sep/12/barroso-doubt-scotland-eu-membership
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protector, and the support and discipline of a political community 
grounded in the world’s most peaceful values.
Scotland’s calculation may be even easier because it faces ceding no 
sovereignty to Brussels beyond what it is already accustomed to. Only 
joining the Euro would change that, and the SNP have no such plans at 
present — though the calculus might change after Brexit. Granted EU 
membership, Scotland would have far fewer representatives and votes 
and a much smaller voice at the EU table than the UK has at present. 
But that would be offset by the freedom to promote its own distinct 
European interests — which Scottish representatives, unlike genuinely 
new entrants, could do with skills honed for decades. They could freely 
seek new political/tactical alliances with member states both small and 
large.
Shelter in the Nordic family
Enough has been said already to show that the Nordic states as such 
cannot offer Scotland sufficient shelter in any vital dimension, given 
their own limitations and strategic dependence. They all rely openly or 
de facto on the US and NATO, while Iceland and Greenland have special 
bilateral defence arrangements with Washington. Further, all are deeply 
involved in the European integration process as full members or as part 
of the Common Market through the EEA. Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands, though not formally in the EU, have fisheries agreements with 
Brussels and draw indirect economic benefits through Denmark. All 
enjoy a wide range of political and societal protection from the Union’s 
diplomatic strength and its extensive regional, research, educational and 
cultural programmes. All derive soft security benefits — not currently 
available elsewhere — from European cooperation in fields such as 
environmental and energy security, disease control and migration 
management: all of which would be equally pressing concerns for 
Scotland.52 
Iceland’s case as the Nordic state with the most acute shelter needs 
may illustrate the point. The other Nordics could neither fill the whole 
gap left in Iceland’s military security after US forces withdrew in 2006, 
nor rescue the Icelanders from their exceptionally severe economic 
52  Bailes and Thorhallsson (2013).
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crash in 2008. Yet, to balance this, Nordic cooperation offers Iceland 
crucial political and societal links with an otherwise remote European 
mainland; provides a multiplier effect for its policies on key issues like 
the Arctic; and draws it into joint positions on many European and 
international issues where it shares in the undoubted appeal of the 
Nordic ‘brand’. Such Nordic practices offer a powerful example for 
other small states of how to exert influence despite smallness, and they 
would prima facie provide a very desirable added element for Scotland’s 
hypothetical shelter-building as well. The SNP for its part has explicitly 
stated that it wishes to follow the Nordic model and its norms and 
values. With such a new partner, the Nordic states could continue to 
lead by example53 and encourage others to adopt their ‘good’ practices.
Specifically, the Nordic states could support Scotland’s negotiation 
of good bargains with the US and rUK, inside and outside multilateral 
institutions, and would have powerful motives for doing so, given their 
own stake in North European stability. They could provide political 
inspiration and cover for distinctive characteristics the Scots might want 
to stress in fields like peace promotion, arms control, humanitarian 
initiatives and the anti-nuclear stance (as well as social-liberal values at 
home). Both these roles would provide ‘political’ shelter for Scotland’s 
willed identity change. Concrete economic, soft security, and societal 
benefits could be sought through closer Scottish-Nordic cooperation, 
including common approaches to the growing Arctic challenge. 
Scotland’s reduced military resources could be optimised by studying 
Nordic lessons and joining Nordic initiatives like NORDEFCO, the 
current framework for five-nation defence cooperation.54 
Might this mutually sheltering relationship take institutional 
form? Scotland could prima facie try to join both Nordic Cooperation 
(in its parliamentary and governmental dimensions) and the West 
Nordic Cooperation (WNC) of Iceland, the Faroes, Greenland and 
coastal Norway. Nordic political and public attitudes would surely be 
sympathetic, but the precedent involved in granting NC membership 
might give pause since the Baltic States were earlier denied it. 
53  C. Ingebritsen, Scandinavia in World Politics (Lanham and Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006).
54  Håkon Lunde Saxi, Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of Defence Studies, 2011).
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Admitting Scotland to the WNC might be less contentious given its 
close geographical presence — including Shetland and Orkney — and 
common issues such as oil/gas exploitation. Alternative forms of 
association, or new ‘Nordic-plus’ cooperation frameworks, could 
doubtless be invented.
Scotland needs to find like-minded states in order to receive backup 
in international negotiations. The Nordic nations seem like ideal 
partners but if they are not willing to support Scottish negotiation 
positions, and, for example, would rather remain silent in order to keep 
cordial relations with the US and the rUK, Scotland has to look for other 
partners or move closer to the US and/or the rUK positions.
Conclusion 
The five Nordic states have lived for decades with the same strategic 
asymmetry that would face an independent Scotland. They have found 
many-sided shelters while maintaining strong national idiosyncrasies. 
The diversity in the types of shelter pursued by the Nordic states 
reflects each state’s unique challenges and the costs associated with 
different shelter options. Norway, Denmark and Iceland found military 
shelter in NATO, whereas Finland and Sweden were best served by 
neutrality. An equally wide range of Nordic national solutions applies 
to relations with the EU. In each other, the Nordic states find many 
types of shelter, primarily societal. In other dimensions, the shelter of 
Nordic cooperation basically supplements that provided by European 
integration, NATO and/or the US.
In extending the general small state analysis and lessons of the 
Nordic model to a potential independent Scotland, we have found four 
entities — NATO, the US, the rUK itself, and the EU — prima facie best 
suited to meeting Scotland’s needs for economic, societal, and political 
shelter including hard and soft security. As any other small entity, a 
Scotland moving towards independence would need to weigh carefully 
the benefits and costs of these shelter options and how they compare 
to the benefits and costs of its current arrangements within the UK. In 
doing so it would need to dismiss at the outset any notion that Nordic 
neighbours could either provide an alternative for any key dimension 
of shelter, or invent solutions offering escape from the sometime very 
70 Baldur Thorhallsson and Alyson J. K. Bailes
tough choices to be made and prices to be paid. With that once clear, 
however, both the lessons of (varied) Nordic experience, and the 
comradeship and softer kinds of shelter to be found within the Nordic 
family, could provide valuable lubrication for the transitional process 
and a supportive pillar for Scotland’s accommodation to independent 
existence in the world. 
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3. Security, Privacy and Oversight
Charles D. Raab
This chapter looks at conceptual and practical issues concerning 
‘privacy’ and ‘security’ as they affect the oversight of security 
and intelligence services. It considers these issues in the light of 
three recent seminal reports in the UK and one in the US. Taking 
a critical view of the conventional wisdom surrounding the 
concepts of ‘privacy’ and ‘security’ and of the way the values they 
represent are thought to be reconcilable, this contribution argues 
that a better grasp of the relationship between these two areas 
in theory and practice is an important component of satisfactory 
oversight of intelligence activities. In addition, the extent to 
which overseers and other policy actors can keep abreast of 
technological developments is identified as a problem for the 
effectiveness of legislation and oversight, requiring changes to 
existing procedures.
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The long-awaited British debate on the extent to which the security and 
intelligence services are — and how they could be — effectively kept 
within the bounds of the rule of law and the workings of a healthy 
democracy gathered pace in 2015. Among the most prominent events 
in this period were the publication of three reports from a range of 
weighty participants and commentators: the Intelligence and Security 
Committee of Parliament (ISC); David Anderson QC, the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IPR); and the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI).1 A controversial Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was 
introduced into Parliament in November 2015. It drew considerably 
upon Anderson’s report especially, and travelled on a somewhat 
potholed pathway until it reached the statute book in November 2016. 
In these post-Snowden times, the three reports have attracted much 
comment and criticism, but also — and to different extents — some 
praise for having moved the issue further into the public arena, and for 
having raised a range of questions for public and political debate. They 
also provide an insight into the way the issues are considered in the 
counsels of the state, and into the perceptions and (mis)conceptions that 
colour any attempt to deliberate on the problems and to move towards 
a better system of oversight of surveillance and intelligence activities. 
The reports bring a mixture of both stale and fresh air to one of the most 
crucial contemporary issues affecting the relationship between citizens 
and the state.2 This chapter does not attempt to review in detail or to 
appraise the reports’ recommendations and the commentary that they 
have spawned in traditional and social media, among interested parties, 
and in academia. 
1  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A Modern 
and Transparent Legal Framework (London: HMSO, 2015), https://b1cba9b3-a-
5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20150312_
ISC_P%2BS%2BRpt(web).pdf; David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of 
the Investigatory Powers Review (London: HMSO, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/434399/IPR-Report-
Web-Accessible1.pdf; Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies, A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent Surveillance Review 
(London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015).
2  See an earlier investigation into this subject: House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, 2nd Report of Session 2008–09, 
Hl Paper 18-I (London: HMSO, 2009), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1802.htm. This did not, however, deal centrally with 
national security and intelligence.
 793. Security, Privacy and Oversight
Others have described and assessed the ISC and other oversight 
bodies in terms of their historical origins, and the remits, expectations, 
and positions within the constitutional orders of their political 
systems. Their strengths, but especially their deficiencies, in providing 
satisfactory oversight and in holding intelligence services to account 
have been at the forefront of scholarly attention.3 Somewhat less 
discussed is the relationship between intelligence, oversight, and 
human rights, although this has also been critically explored in recent 
years with regard to the UK.4 The chapter therefore focuses on these 
areas that need deeper consideration and re-thinking, and looks across 
the Atlantic for some of the illumination of practices and concepts that 
is required if oversight is to be improved in the country. In particular, 
it brings into view some underlying conceptual issues that have been 
overlooked both by commentators and oversight practitioners. The 
way in which under-specified notions of privacy, security, and balance 
might be more fully and soundly articulated is central to this discussion. 
These matters bear upon the processes and institutions of oversight, and 
on the rights-related assumptions that are entailed when intelligence 
agencies and overseers consider the necessity of limiting surveillance. 
Although this chapter does not examine or comment on the 
Investigatory Powers Act, the latter applies to Scotland with, it appears, 
mainly mutatis mutandis variations that take account of Scottish 
institutional and jurisdictional dimensions, such as the implementation 
of interception warrants and other differences.5 It should be pointed out 
3  See, for example, Mark Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence 
Accountability’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (2007), 75–99; Andrew 
Defty, ‘Educating Parliamentarians About Intelligence: The Role of the British 
Intelligence and Security Committee’, Parliamentary Affairs, 61, 4 (2008), 621–41; L. 
E. Halchin and F. Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure 
and Alternatives (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012); Samuel J. 
Rascoff, ‘Presidential Intelligence’, Harvard Law Review, 129, 3 (2016), 633–717.
4  See, for example, Peter Gill, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the 
Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of International Studies, 35, 4 (2009), 929–41; 
Peter Gill, ‘Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 27, 2 (2012), 206–22; Ian Leigh, ‘Rebalancing Rights and National 
Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 27, 5 (2012), 722–38; Peter Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight 
Committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (2007), 14–37.
5  See, for example, sections 21, 22, 30, 39, 117, 118 and 125 of the Act. Note that 
members of the Scottish Government, and not only Scottish Ministers in the UK 
Government, may be involved in warrantry processes.
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that most statutory law in this area covers the UK as a whole, although 
Scotland has a separate Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and 
the machinery of oversight is likewise unified. Similarly, in terms of 
the focus of this chapter on concepts of privacy and security, there is 
currently no significant Scottish angle that would affect the intelligence 
matters under consideration, at least in terms of the way data protection 
(which is not the same as privacy, but is closely related to it) is enshrined 
in law and implemented through regulatory machinery.6 In areas that 
are perhaps parallel to the data protection regime but arguably not 
directly relevant to the proposed investigatory powers legislation, 
there are some Scottish differences that have at times come into the 
limelight: for instance, a shorter period for the retention of DNA data 
in law enforcement.7 Possibly more significantly for future challenges 
brought on transparency grounds, Scotland has a separate Freedom 
of Information Act that has its own Commissioner and judicial regime 
capable of deciding matters differently. Whilst it is not clear that these 
variations will have a bearing on any oversight and adjudication of the 
Act, future constitutional scenarios for the UK could entertain questions 
about whether an independent Scotland, for example, might have the 
scope to develop a different understanding of security and privacy to 
underpin different legislative provisions for security, and for oversight 
arrangements.
The question of oversight
In addition to conceptual issues, the performance of oversight requires 
further inquiry, partly in terms of the outlooks that shape it, but also 
in terms of machinery and process. Institutions, processes, and incisive 
interrogation are intertwined aspects of oversight. Effectiveness has 
partly to do with the structures and mechanisms that are put in place 
to hold the intelligence and security services accountable. The degree of 
independence of this machinery might well shape the ability of overseers 
6  As will be mentioned in a later section, data protection concerns the privacy of 
personal data, but there are many other domains in which privacy might be at stake.
7  This was regarded favourably in the European Court of Human Rights decision 
in the case of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom (Applications nos. 30562/04 and 
30566/04), 4 December 2008. 
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to ask the right questions, and hence put limits to the effectiveness of 
their oversight. The capacity to ask the right questions is also related to 
the conceptions, assumptions and thinking that underlie them; and this, 
in turn, owes much to the individuals, personalities, and backgrounds 
that are represented in these structures. This intertwining is not quite 
circular, but tendencies to closure in the oversight ‘club’ are strong, 
given — for all its internal diversity and scope for dissensus — the 
tightly-knit nature of the security, intelligence, defence, and foreign-
policy community that presides over the channels of oversight and 
accountability, and thus arbitrates the intellectual basis of oversight 
(see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this community and its relationship 
to the wider field of politics). Schattschneider long ago observed 
famously that ‘[s]ome issues are organized into politics while others 
are organized out’: an institutional ‘mobilization of bias’ that leaves 
many issues and alternative perspectives out of account, or suppresses 
them.8 The understandable need for opacity and the near-closure of 
the oversight process abets this bias, and also militates against the 
prospects for wider and better-informed debate about national security 
throughout society and the political system. In the absence of dramatic 
events (e.g., the Snowden revelations) triggering convulsions of public 
and political opinion, leading to some embarrassment in the intelligence 
and oversight community, demands for greater transparency are easily 
defeated, ostensibly for good reasons, thus further deepening public 
scepticism and lack of trust in government and politics.9 This is a 
predicament for which there are no clear solutions, especially at a time 
when such scepticism and even revulsion is at a high level. 
The intelligence and security services are bound by a sense of mission: 
our continued safety and security is the paramount rationale for their 
role and their claim on the material and governmental resources of the 
country. How safe and secure we, and the country, need to be kept is never 
explained or debated: ‘safety’ and ‘security’ enjoy the status of ineffability. 
8  Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 71; This can be seen as an 
exercise of power, see Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
9  On scepticism, see Mark Phythian, ‘Still a Matter of Trust: Post–9/11 British 
Intelligence and Political Culture’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence, 18, 4 (2005), 653–81.
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In fulfilling their mission, the services are circumscribed by the rule of 
law and by specific regulations that include certain practices and exclude 
others, and they are bound to respect privacy and other rights. Whether 
the rule of law is maintained in the intelligence and security process has 
to do in part with the way in which these services understand the effects 
of their performance upon individuals and society, with respect to the 
values of security (or safety), privacy, and the exercise of freedoms, and 
bring this understanding to bear on their operations.
The oversight machinery’s enquiry into these matters is therefore 
aimed at ensuring not only the effectiveness of these services but also 
their adherence to constitutional and legal circumscription. As agents 
in an accountability process, overseers should be able to require that 
the services give accounts — stories about the performance of their 
role — but should also be able and willing to interrogate those accounts, 
probing them for evidence and explanation, and perhaps challenging 
them with alternative constructions of the stories and different ways 
of thinking about the values that are served by security activity.10 By 
itself, the statutory framework for oversight of the services cannot tell 
one about the effectiveness of oversight in practice, which — as already 
been indicated — has a great deal to do with the way oversight roles 
and powers are exercised and the way the machinery of oversight is 
constituted and populated. These latter factors, in turn, affect the way 
in which overseers think about what they are doing, and upon their 
understanding of the values at stake when the intelligence and security 
services perform their work. Oversight depends upon the enquiry 
to which the intelligence and security services are, or will be, subject 
when they undergo scrutiny, by the way the questions are shaped by 
conceptual understandings and frameworks, and by the parameters 
that are set in the oversight process. 
There is a second and consequential step in this process. Overseers 
are intermediaries who act on behalf of the general public or its 
parliamentary representatives, but oversight bodies are themselves 
10 In a related field, see C. Raab, ‘The Meaning of “Accountability” in the Information 
Privacy Context’, in D. Guagnin, L. Hempel, C. Ilten, I. Kroener, D. Neyland 
and H. Postigo (eds.), Managing Privacy through Accountability (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), pp. 15–32.
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accountable to the latter for their performance of this role, and thus 
for the way they have held the intelligence and security services to 
account. Here, too, there are dilemmas about transparency, and a 
necessary element of trust that the public or Parliament must have 
in the veracity of the accounts that these intermediaries give, and in 
their effective performance of the oversight stewardship role. How the 
public or Parliament is able to interrogate the overseers’ accounts, or to 
challenge them, is a conundrum that mirrors, at this level, that of the 
intermediaries’ primary relationship to the intelligence and security 
services. Regarding both the security or intelligence services and the 
oversight bodies, this is not precisely the problem indicated by the 
frequently asked question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who watches 
the watchmen?), for the buck does stop somewhere in the constitutional 
and practical make-up of parliamentary democracy (see Bochel and 
Defty in Chapter 3 for further discussion). It rather concerns how the 
guardians at both levels do their work, and how they frame and act out 
their ‘take’ on the values that underpin the work they carry out. 
There are many dimensions of the vexed question of how, in a 
democracy, security and intelligence organisations, including law-
enforcement agencies, can be subject to effective and transparent 
oversight procedures. The three reports mentioned above all cast light 
upon the current state of the art, and make many recommendations 
across a very wide range. There is no space here to look at any of these 
in depth; however, some important facets can be highlighted, upon 
which the conceptual, ethical and legal aspects of this chapter have some 
bearing. Oversight should be independent of the agencies and of the 
government. The importance of this autonomy, and the importance of the 
separate assessment of technologies, and of legal and ethical compliance, 
lies, in part, in the ability of independent overseers and assessors to ask 
questions that would probably not be asked from within the culture that 
prevails among security and intelligence officials. It is also necessary that 
the overseers should have sufficient technical knowledge to be able to 
relate those facts to values. Some of those questions might not only be 
about privacy and civil liberties, but also about the means and ends of 
security; and they might even enable fresh perspectives to be taken on 
just what constitutes privacy, security, risk and harm. 
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Understanding security and privacy
One of the main high-profile public issues in the work of intelligence 
and security services — and indeed in policing as well — is the extent 
to which their operations pay due regard to the liberties and rights of 
individuals and groups who may be affected by the covert or overt 
collection and use of personal information in the course of performing 
security-related intelligence work. This is not a question of malevolence 
or turning a blind eye to soft values by a hard-boiled professional culture, 
but one of cognition: how the services understand the wider world 
beyond the operation or tasks that they are called upon to perform, and 
how they bring to bear criteria of success or effectiveness that lie further 
afield than the achievement of specific objectives. Liberties, rights and 
the nature of security are topics and ideals that are difficult enough for 
philosophers, lawyers and other academic specialists to grapple with, 
let alone those who have to take them into consideration in the heat of 
their working day, and then to give an account of how they brought 
this thorny bundle to bear upon their activities. But the same goes 
for the overseers, who evaluate what is done by the overseen. For the 
participants in both parts of the oversight ‘two-step’, how the ostensibly 
competing imperatives — security, and rights and liberties — are to be 
reconciled is a perennial dilemma. It cannot be answered by formulaic 
methods or rhetoric, but must be considered in each instance, or class 
of instances, in which such competition is felt to arise, in the light of a 
more general clarification of the underlying principles that guide the 
application of these values in practice.
A relevant illustrative case in point where this reconciliation and a 
search for new approaches is attempted is the investigation that the 
ISC, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, launched 
into security and privacy with a call for evidence in December 2013. 
This was only a few months after the Snowden revelations of the mass 
surveillance activities of the US’s National Security Agency (NSA) 
and the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
had caused considerable reaction in political circles, in the media, and 
among concerned interest groups in the UK, the US, and around the 
world. The ISC announced that it was ‘broadening its inquiry into 
the laws which govern the intelligence agencies’ ability to intercept 
private communication. In addition to considering whether the current 
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statutory framework governing access to private communications 
remains adequate, the Committee is also considering the appropriate 
balance between our individual right to privacy and our collective right 
to security’.11 The ISC’s subsequent report held fast to this framing of the 
way it saw privacy and security. It did not elaborate upon what ‘security’ 
might mean. It never considered that the privacy of the individual, and 
the value of privacy, might be about more than just the individual and 
the value to her of the right of privacy, and it did not question the nature 
of the process of achieving ‘balance’. 
For the Government’s part, Philip Hammond, the then UK Foreign 
Secretary, echoed the ISC’s outlook in saying:
We are after all, all of us in our private lives, individuals who seek 
privacy for ourselves and our families, as well as citizens who demand 
protection by our government from those who would harm us. So we are 
right to question the powers required by our agencies — and particularly 
by GCHQ — to monitor private communications in order to do their 
job. But we should not lose sight of the vital balancing act between the 
privacy we desire and the security we need.12
Note that it is as ‘individuals’ that we are said to seek privacy, but as 
‘citizens’ we demand protection from harm; it is ‘the privacy we desire’ 
versus ‘the security we need’. The rhetorical effect of these associations 
and contrasts would be quite different if they were reversed in each part 
of the statement; moreover, a ‘balancing act’ is asserted in describing 
the relationship.
We might be able to escape these deep-seated ritual constructions in 
our search for the best way to frame the guiding principles underpinning 
the work of oversight and accountability. If the ISC, and ministers or 
other government actors in their oversight roles, are to exercise their 
functions, they need to examine the assumptions that underpin these 
functions, and they need sometimes to ask awkward questions. How 
well equipped they are to do this, by virtue of their constitutional 
11  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘Privacy and Security 
Inquiry — Call for Evidence’ (11 December 2013), https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20131211_ISC_Call_for_
papers-Privacy.pdf
12  Foreign and Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon Philip Hammond, ‘Foreign 
Secretary Intelligence and Security Speech’, Gov.uk, 15 March 2015, https://www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-intelligence-and-security-speech
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position, composition (in the case of agencies), resources and remit, is 
at issue. Moreover, the assumptions that form their mindset need to be 
articulated and subject to public discourse and debate. 
Let us look at these issues. The first one lies in the way ‘security’ is 
construed. There are many ways of understanding ‘security’ — or its 
fellow, ‘public safety’13 — and whatever right is considered to pertain to 
it, as well as its relationship to other rights.14 Leaving aside the question 
of individual or personal security, one issue is that ‘collective’ security 
could refer to security at a variety of levels: for example, international, 
national, local, neighbourhood, or social group. Directly or indirectly, 
the intelligence and security services’ activities involve all of these. How 
the demands for security at each of these levels might be promoted in 
the presence of the right to privacy (itself of diverse meanings), and 
thus the nature of any reconciliation, will vary. Another issue is whether 
objective security, involving probabilities of risk, and/or subjective 
security, involving feelings of insecurity, should be at the focus of 
attention in security activities and in their oversight (for example, in 
judging necessity and proportionality), and how these two perspectives 
can be reconciled.15 
13  The distinction between ‘security’ and ‘safety’ is blurred, and their usage often 
interchangeable. Philip Hammond used the words ‘safe’ and ‘safety’ eleven times 
and ‘security’ eighteen times in his RUSI speech of 10 March 2015 on Intelligence 
and Security; Foreign and Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon Philip Hammond 
(2015). Both the UK Conservative Party and Labour Party 2015 election manifestoes 
used ‘safe’, ‘secure’, and derivative words profusely and indiscriminately in 
relation to an enormous variety of issues: banking, borders, children, communities, 
the country, cyber activity, cycling, the economy, the elderly, energy supplies, 
families, farming, the Green Belt, health care, hospitals, jobs, the Middle East, 
neighbourhoods, religious practice, retirement, work, etc. 
14  See Lucia Zedner, ‘The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis’, 
Legal Studies, 23, 1 (2003), 153–75; Lucia Zedner, ‘Seeking Security by Eroding 
Human Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due Process’, in Security and Human Rights, 
ed. by Benjamin J. Goold and Liora Lazarus (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 257–77; Lucia 
Zedner, Security: Key Ideas in Criminology Series (London and New York: Routledge 
2009); S. Fredman, ‘The Positive Right to Security’, in Security and Human Rights, 
ed. by B. J. Goold and Liora Lazarus (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 307–24; L. Lazarus, 
‘Mapping the Right to Security’, in Security and Human Rights, ed. by B. J. Goold and 
Liora Lazarus (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 325–46. 
15  Jennifer Chandler, ‘Privacy Versus National Security: Clarifying the Trade-Off’, in 
Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society, 
ed. by I. R. Kerr, V. M. Steeves, and C. Lucock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), pp. 121–38. 
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The second issue is the way in which ‘privacy’ is construed. 
Privacy as a fundamental but not absolute right is enshrined in 
prominent national and international legal instruments. However, 
privacy’s importance goes beyond that of the individual: it is a crucial 
underpinning of interpersonal relationships, of society itself and its 
groups and categories of persons, and of the workings of democratic 
political systems. Although defining ‘privacy’ has long been highly 
contentious,16 the trans-individual meaning and its implications for 
rights and freedoms is gaining ground in academic commentary17 and 
is appreciated in constitutional argument and judicial decision as well 
as in some prominent reports. To consider privacy only as an individual 
right — or as a mere ‘desire’ — is to slight its fuller significance in 
theory and practice. When individual privacy is protected, the fabric of 
society, as well as the functioning of political processes and the exercise 
of important freedoms, are thereby protected. When it is eroded, 
society and the polity are also harmed. It is in the public interest, and 
not only in the interest of the individual, to have privacy protected as 
a ‘constitutive public good’: a societal good, understood as an integral 
and essential element of society itself.18 In that sense, we need privacy as 
citizens, and not just as customers or consumers of goods and services in 
the commercial marketplace. 
16  See Ferdinand David Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology 
(Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 444.
17  Sources include Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social 
Values, and Public Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); 
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social 
Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Benjamin J. Goold, ‘Surveillance 
and the Political Value of Privacy’, Amsterdam Law Forum, 1 (2008), 3–6; Julie E. 
Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 2012); Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); V. Steeves, ‘Reclaiming 
the Social Value of Privacy’, in Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy 
and Identity in a Networked Society, ed. by I. R. Kerr, V. M. Steeves, and C. Lucock 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Colin Bennett and Charles Raab, The 
Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006), Chapter 2; Charles Raab, ‘Privacy, Social Values and the Public 
Interest’, in Politik Und Die Regulierung Von Information, ed. by A. Busch and J. 
Hofmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp. 129–51.
18  Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 145.
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In stark contrast, there is the assertion that ‘the provision of basic 
security is the paramount human good, upon which all other political 
goods depend’.19 Whilst the individual’s right may be set aside for legal 
and legitimate reasons, such as the overriding importance of other 
rights and interests, including security, the claims of the latter to prevail 
must be argued — as it certainly can be, in given instances — and not 
merely asserted. However, they must not be permanently accepted by 
default, and may ultimately be a matter for the courts to determine in 
terms of necessity and proportionality. Insofar as these claims may be 
made on behalf of organisations whose legitimacy lies in their acting in 
support of ‘collective’ interests, to ignore the perception that privacy is 
also a collective citizen interest is to put a thumb on the ‘balancing’ scale. 
It is also powerfully to shape the public understanding of what is at 
stake by relegating the social and political value of privacy to the status 
of a claim that need not be seriously respected. Moreover — although 
this point cannot be discussed further here20 — just as there are many 
dimensions and levels of security, information privacy, which was 
prominently at stake in mass surveillance of the kind illuminated by 
the Snowden revelations that instigated the inquiries and reports, is 
only one kind of privacy; privacy (e.g., of the body or of space) is often 
invaded even if information is not collected and processed further, 
including its communication through myriad channels.
The third issue concerns the relationship between security and 
privacy, and their reconciliation or ‘balancing’. The ISC’s view of the 
‘balance’ or trade-off between individual privacy — and, indeed, other 
individual rights and liberties — and national security was neither 
inescapable nor unbiased in terms of what the implicit outcome should 
19  Amitai Etzioni, Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 2008), p. xviii.
20  See Rachel L. Finn, David Wright, and Michael Friedewald, ‘Seven Types of Privacy’, 
in European Data Protection: Coming of Age, ed. by Serge Gutwirth et al. (Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands, 2013), pp. 3–32; David Wright and Charles Raab, ‘Privacy 
Principles, Risks and Harms’, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 
28, 3 (2014), 277–98; The latter article points to a further issue requiring exploration: 
the non-privacy effects of surveillance on individuals, groups and categories, 
which could be very important in the context of intelligence and oversight. See 
the discussion of harms of intelligence collection to ‘vital interests’ in Ross Bellaby, 
‘What’s the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 27, 1 (2012), 93–117.
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be.21 In contrast, in another context — that of cyber security — the 
President of Estonia said: ‘freedom and security need not contradict each 
other: secure online interactions, enabled by a secure online identity, 
is a precondition for full internet freedom’.22 This is the beginning of 
a departure from conventional wisdom. The report by RUSI clearly 
staked out the ground for a fresh departure by casting doubt on the 
existing terms of public debate:
The most striking characteristic of public discussions on surveillance to 
date is the perceived dichotomy between the rights or values of collective 
security and privacy. A common and repeated assumption made by 
politicians, the media and the general public is that these values are 
opposed, and that the issue is one of ‘national security’ versus ‘personal 
privacy’. The subsequent assumption is that a trade-off can be made 
between the two: Is the right balance being struck between national 
security and civil liberties, or between collective security on the one side 
and individual freedoms and personal security on the other?23
Another step, perhaps more paradoxically, is to reflect on whether 
privacy and civil liberties (or freedoms) should not themselves be 
regarded, at least in some respects, as valuable because of the security 
and safety — not least, of personal data — they provide for individuals, 
groups and societies. As do national security strategies, they can involve 
protective, precautionary, defensive and risk-averse measures taken in 
the face of technologically assisted policy initiatives. In societies driven 
21  See analogously Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 11, 2 (2003), 191–210; Chandler (2009); Charles Raab, 
‘From Balancing to Steering: New Directions for Data Protection’, in Visions of 
Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digital Age, ed. by C. Bennett and R. Grant (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 68–93; Relevant arguments on privacy and 
security in the context of democracy are developed in Annabelle Lever, Democracy, 
Privacy and Security (Rochester: Social Science Research Network, 2015).
22  Toomas Hendrik Ilves, ‘“Rebooting Trust? Freedom vs Security in Cyberspace” 
Opening Address at Munich Security Conference Cyber’, Office of the President, 
Republic of Estonia (Munich, 31 January 2014), https://vp2006-2016.president.
ee/en/official-duties/speeches/9796-qrebooting-trust-freedom-vs-security-in-
cyberspaceq. Office of the President, Republic of Estonia (Munich, 31 January 2014 
23  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2015), p. 216. 
These remarks underline points made in the author’s evidence to the ISC inquiry 
and to Anderson. See Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Investigatory 
Powers Review Written Submissions (H-V) (London: Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation, 2015), https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Submissions-H-Z.pdf
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by counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and a preoccupation with 
personal safety, ever-increasing volumes and granularity of personal 
data are collected, mined, shared and stored in the name of security and 
safety. In those circumstances, privacy can provide a secure refuge for 
individuals and groups against the prying eyes of the state or private 
companies, whether that refuge serves inward-looking individual 
purposes or the possibility of external sociality and participation. To be 
secure in our homes is, at the same time, to inhabit a protected private 
space: one of the meanings of privacy. If so, the overlapping or even 
isomorphic relationship between privacy and security is far more subtle 
than might be imagined, and cannot be glossed over by a rhetoric of 
the ‘opposed’ rights or values of security and privacy.24 The unfortunate 
example of societies under totalitarian or authoritarian governments, in 
which surveillance affords neither privacy nor personal security at the 
level of persons and groups, serves as a reminder of the importance of 
this point.
The affinity between privacy and security has begun to be 
appreciated in various quarters, such as the US, where the Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, appointed 
by President Obama, reported in December 2013.25 In a section on 
Principles, the Review Group Report included the following:
1. The United States Government must protect, at once, two different 
forms of security: national security and personal privacy.
In the American tradition, the word ‘security’ has had multiple 
meanings. In contemporary parlance, it often refers to national security 
or homeland security. One of the government’s most fundamental 
responsibilities is to protect this form of security, broadly understood. At 
the same time, the idea of security refers to a quite different and equally 
fundamental value, captured in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated […]’. Both forms of security must be protected.26
24  Charles Raab, ‘Privacy as a Security Value’, in Jon Bing: En Hyllest/A Tribute, ed. by 
D. W. Schartum, L. Bygrave, and A. G. B. Bekken (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2014), pp. 39–58.
25  The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 
The NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2014).
26  The NSA Report, pp. 14–15. 
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In seeing that privacy itself has security value,27 the Review Group 
Report subtly shifted the terms of policy and debate in a way that is 
available to other policy deliberations outside the specifically American 
constitutional context. This construction, of course, does not by itself 
necessarily undermine the idea that conflict may occur between 
collective and individual meanings of security. But by considering 
afresh the connection between privacy and security, it throws into 
question — on both the level of policy discourse and rhetoric, and on 
the legal level — the implicitly unequal weighting between these two 
desirable values. This inequality would most likely be reflected in the 
outcome of any attempt to ‘balance’ the two in a construction that pits 
the national interest against that of the individual. This may especially 
be the case in the climate of fear and vulnerability brought about by 
terrorism and other real or perceived attacks.28 Individual rights have 
historically been set aside, albeit temporarily, in favour of collective ones 
or in favour of collective anxieties that construe national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity to be severely threatened. The Review Group Report 
was indeed explicit and sceptical about the question of ‘balancing’:
3. The idea of ‘balancing’ has an important element of truth, but it is also 
inadequate and misleading. It is tempting to suggest that the underlying 
goal is to achieve the right ‘balance’ between the two forms of security. 
The suggestion has an important element of truth. But some safeguards 
are not subject to balancing at all. In a free society, public officials should 
never engage in surveillance in order to punish their political enemies; 
to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress legitimate criticism 
and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide 
domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit 
or burden members of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, 
race, and gender.29
27  See Raab (2014). 
28  Gill observes: ‘The pressures on intelligence agencies to “deliver results” and on 
parliamentary and other oversight bodies to relax oversight are greatest when 
security fears and uncertainties are at their height. This is the danger of the oft-
quoted need to “balance” security and rights; the need for oversight is actually 
greater at times such as this in order to promote effectiveness and prevent abuses 
of human rights’ (Gill (2009), p. 221). He also asserts that ‘intelligence can advance 
human security but the role of oversight remains to ensure that intelligence is 
conducted proportionately, not to seek some mythical “balance” between rights 
and security’ (ibid, p. 218). 
29  The NSA Report, p. 16.
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Further evidence that supports the argument that the relationship 
between security and privacy (or other liberties) is complex can be 
found in US legislation: the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, which established a reconstituted Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) as an independent body in 
the Executive Branch.30 On the one hand, Title VIII of the Act remained 
within a ‘balancing’ framework, charging the PCLOB to: ‘analyze and 
review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from 
terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with 
the need to protect privacy and civil liberties’.31 On the other hand, it 
preceded this with a quotation from the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’ 9/11 Report which, it said, had:
correctly concluded that ‘The choice between security and liberty is a 
false choice, as nothing is more likely to endanger America’s liberties 
than the success of a terrorist attack at home. Our history has shown us 
that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose 
the values that we are struggling to defend’.32
The RUSI report’s construction of the relationship between privacy and 
the values of democracy resembled this in spirit, and was markedly 
different from what the ISC (or former Foreign Secretary Hammond) 
presumed. Recognising the trans-individual importance of privacy to 
the nation’s political and governmental practice, as well as to freedom 
of the press, it said:
Privacy is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of individual freedom, 
and its erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on which 
democracy and good governance have traditionally been based in this 
country. […] Privacy is also a pre-requisite for democracy. It gives people 
the freedom that is needed to be personally autonomous, to seek out 
alternative sources of information and to question the status quo. […] 
30  US Congress, Public Law 110–53, 110th Congress—Aug. 3, 2007: Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Congress.gov, 2007), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/1; For further discussion and 
background, see Garrett Hatch, ‘Report for Congress Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status’ (Washington DC, 2012). 
31  Public Law 110–53, p. 121 Stat. 352. 
32  Ibid.; The quotation is from National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (Authorized Edition) (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 
p. 395.
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Those who challenge the state — through journalism or legal advocacy, 
for example — need to be confident they are not spied upon, otherwise 
they cannot do their jobs effectively, and such jobs are an acknowledged 
part of a functioning democracy.33
This report did use the term ‘balance’ in referring to various rights, 
but it immediately veered away from this trope; its understanding of 
rights was carefully phrased to reflect a sense of their deeper and more 
intricate mutual dependence:
The concepts of liberty, security and privacy are central to a number of 
universal rights outlined by important pieces of twentieth-century treaties 
and legislation […] These rights are not seen as absolute or unconditional, 
but rather as qualified rights. This qualification — that these rights are in 
turn subject to other rights — is important if these rights are to be consistent, 
balanced and mutually reinforcing. Each right must be protected and 
respected, to the greatest extent possible, but it cannot exist in isolation. 
There is no privacy without respect for security; there is no liberty without 
respect for privacy; security requires both certain liberties and privacy. It 
is therefore unfruitful (indeed misleading) to cast debates about privacy, 
liberty and security as a matter of choice or ‘balancing’ between these 
rights, still less to think of trade-offs between these rights.34
Furthermore, RUSI said:
The relationship between privacy on the one hand, and liberty and 
security on the other, is complex. Discussions of privacy and security 
are often described as a matter of finding or striking a ‘balance’; this 
traditional metaphor can be misleading. There is no metric for ‘weighing’ 
different rights, or even for comparing the ‘weight’ of different rights in 
particular cases. But it is feasible to set out robust standards that must 
be met in adjusting rights to one another and to devise and establish 
structures to do so.35
Anderson devoted a chapter to exploring the meaning and functions 
of ‘privacy’, showing an understanding of the literature as well as the 
case law that underscored the multifaceted and contextual nature of the 
concept, its values to the individual and society, its relation to other 
33  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2015), pp. ix, 2.10.
34  Ibid., p. 2.3. 
35  Ibid., p. 2.6; see also the author’s evidence to the ISC inquiry: Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation (2015). 
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rights and freedoms, and its practical manifestations. For example, the 
report cited case law in highlighting the importance of privacy:
A good start is provided by the recent judicial description of privacy 
protection as ‘a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and 
autonomy as well as to the maintenance of a thriving democratic society’. 
As that statement implies, the privacy ecosystem has individual, social 
and political aspects.36 
The Anderson report clearly grasped the subtlety of privacy’s 
importance beyond the individual. Although it did use the terms 
‘balance’ and ‘balancing’ in a more or less conventional way, this was 
done frequently in a legal framework to show the relevance of the test 
of proportionality that is applied in judicial decision-making and is urged 
as a principle for political and organisational decision contexts as well. 
Thus proportionality under Article 8(2) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) — the ‘right to privacy’ — ‘is determined 
via a balancing exercise, which may for example require “the interest 
of the […] state in protecting its national security” to be balanced against 
“the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his 
private life”’.37
This construction invites a more nuanced resolution of the 
reconciliation — or, indeed, the ‘balancing’ — of the two values or 
rights in circumstances where national security is implicated. It shares 
something of the spirit of the US’s Review Group Report, which, like 
Anderson, discussed the matter within a framework of principles, 
here putting it in terms of risk, and extending the list of consequences 
36  Anderson cites the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 
involving privacy and anonymity on the Internet and the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’; A Question of Trust, p. 27. See Barry Sookman, ‘Internet Users’ Privacy and 
Anonymity Protected by Supreme Court: R v. Spencer’, 13 June 2014, http://www.
barrysookman.com/2014/06/13/internet-users-privacy-and-anonymity-protected-
by-supreme-court-r-v-spencer/ Anderson cited the Court’s differentiation of 
several types of privacy interest and meaning. Nevertheless, the public’s feeling 
of safety and security may justify the necessary and proportionate overriding of 
privacy in justifiable circumstances: see A Question of Trust, p. 40.
37  Anderson quotes the case of Leander v. Sweden, para. 59; emphasis in original: 
ibid., p. 76. See also ibid., p. 252: ‘Central to most of these rights are the concepts of 
necessity and proportionality. Because those concepts as developed by the courts 
are adaptable, nuanced and context-specific, they are well adapted to balancing the 
competing imperatives of privacy and security’. The ISC Report also emphasised 
the importance of the test of proportionality.
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beyond the risk to national security to embrace privacy, civil liberties, 
international relations, and international commerce.38
Policy, oversight and technology
In the US, there has been a long saga regarding the establishment of 
ancillary machinery for security and intelligence policy and practice.39 
The PCLOB was eventually constituted in 2012 as an independent 
agency in the Executive Branch, but the independence of such a body 
had been a matter of contention over the previous eight years. So too 
have been PLCOB’s remit, powers and composition; such arguments 
continue, with the Review Group Report’s recommendation that this 
body should be supplanted by a Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection 
(CLPP) Board that would have foreign intelligence within its scope of 
oversight, and not only anti-terrorism.40 
As for establishing in the UK something akin to the US’s PCLOB, 
the Government declared an intention to legislate for a Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Board (PCLB), eschewing the word ‘oversight’ in its 
title. Many, including Anderson, looked askance at a PCLB; Anderson’s 
role as IPR, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, it 
was envisaged, would be replaced by this new body, or at least to be 
assisted by such a body whose remit and purpose were not clear and 
appeared unnecessary. In the event, a PCLB was passed into law as the 
general and opaque Section 46 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015, but requiring secondary legislation for its implementation 
and with no certainty that this would ever be implemented. Its 
very name — suggesting a privacy-and-civil-liberties function and 
remit — seems belied by the bare outline of these as given in the Act.41 
It is a well-grounded observation that technological change 
outpaces the capacity of law (and lawmakers, judges and overseers) 
38  The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
(2014), p. 15. 
39  For historical details, see Hatch. 
40  The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
(2014), pp. 195–99. 
41  For critical comment on this, see Cols. 307–18 of the House of Lords, Lords Hansard 
Text for 28 Jan 2015 (Pt 0003) (London: HMSO, 2015), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150128-0003.htm
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to catch up for the purpose of regulation in the interest of human 
rights — including privacy — and other values. This observation is 
no less relevant to intelligence oversight, in which the practices that 
are overseen rely heavily on technologically very complex and often 
arcane means of information gathering and analysis. It is therefore 
appropriate to mention the way in which recent reports have touched 
on the question of how technological knowledge can be brought to 
bear effectively in oversight arrangements. The Review Group Report 
considered the creation of an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
within the CLPP Board to be useful ‘to assess Intelligence Community 
technology initiatives and support privacy-enhancing technologies’.42 
As the Report states, ‘[a]n improved technology assessment function is 
essential to informing policymakers about the range of options, both for 
collection and use of personal information, and also about the cost and 
effectiveness of privacy-enhancing technologies’.43 
Circumstances within the UK prevent any simple borrowing from the 
example of other countries’ institutions, and technology assessment in 
the Federal Government has its own institutional and political backstory 
that shapes present recommendations. But the Review Group Report’s 
suggestion of an OTA may have some greater traction in the UK, owing 
to an internationally shared need to keep abreast of the information 
and communication technology (ICT) instruments that are increasingly 
used in terrorism and crime. In the UK, the ability of overseers, let alone 
Government, Parliament, and the panoply of Commissioners operating 
in the security and intelligence field, to keep abreast of information 
and communication technology (ICT) developments and the worlds 
of the internet and ‘data’ remains a problem for the effectiveness of 
legislation and oversight, as was remarked upon in the three UK reports 
considered in this chapter.44 Anderson referred to the views he received 
42  Privacy impact assessment (PIA) has become a widespread technique for 
information systems and technologies, see David Wright and Paul De Hert, 
Privacy Impact Assessment (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012); among the 
organisations that conduct PIA is the US’s Department of Homeland Security, see 
Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessments (24 August 2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-impact-assessments
43  The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
(2014), p. 198.
44  E.g. A Question of Trust, Chapter 4; Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies (2015), Chapter 1.
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that emphasised the importance of involving technical specialists in 
the oversight process, whether as part of the oversight machinery or 
playing supporting roles.45 In proposing the creation of an Independent 
Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC), he thought ISIC 
‘should be willing to draw on expertise from the worlds of intelligence, 
computer science, technology, academia, law and the NGO sector’.46
The RUSI report recommended the creation of an Advisory Council 
for Digital Technology and Engineering as a statutory non-departmental 
public body. It would:
keep under review the domestic and international situation with respect 
to the evolution of the Internet, digital technology and infrastructure, as 
well as:
•  Provide advice to relevant ministers, departments and agencies on 
technical measures.
•  Promote co-operation between the public and private sectors.
•  Manage complaints from CSPs [communications service providers] on 
notices and measures they consider unreasonable.
•  Advance public education.
•  Support research on technology and engineering.47
Moreover, this Advisory Council would be a resource for the ISC and 
for the new proposed National Intelligence and Surveillance Office that 
is recommended to replace the present array of three Commissioners in 
this field.48 Whether any of these alternatives will gain support cannot 
be foretold. However, as with the recommendation of an OTA in the US, 
they speak to a glaring need in the operations of security and intelligence 
oversight and democratic control. Whatever the status of the agencies’ 
own knowledge of new and emerging technologies, overseers need 
sufficient knowledge to understand the technological side of the work 
of those they oversee, and to bring to bear upon it their independent 
critical intelligence and their sense of the rights and values at stake. 
Such knowledge may help them to shape the questions they ask of 
agencies — and to interrogate the answers — whose vested interests may 
not always align with the interests, rights or needs of those whom they 
45  Ibid., p. 236. 
46  Ibid., p. 305.
47  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2015), pp. 107–08. 
48  Ibid., p. 108.
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are tasked to protect. This problem is acknowledged universally, but 
there is no easy, and no prominent, agenda for a solution in the rapidly 
changing circumstances of threats and of the technological means both to 
carry them out and to frustrate prevention, detection and apprehension. 
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt briefly with some conceptual and practical issues 
in the oversight of security and intelligence services, and in the wider 
field of human rights or civil liberties that are affected by these services 
and by their oversight as well. It has sought to highlight difficulties and 
ambiguities that stalk the attempt to improve the way a democratic 
society and political system attempts to ‘civilise security’, to borrow 
a term from the academic literature.49 It is appropriate to end with a 
question that puts the point clearly:
What kind of institutional matrix is likely to permit [the state] to be able 
to exercise sufficient vertical oversight and control over the plurality of 
agents and agencies who today promise to deliver security, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the state anchor remains, in both its delivering 
and regulatory dimensions, subject to adequate democratic contestation 
and public and legal scrutiny?50
The areas touched on in this chapter resonate with two of the elements 
of an ‘institutional matrix’ — rights and resources — proposed by 
Loader and Walker,51 but much further analysis is needed to explore 
how better thinking about privacy, security, independent oversight and 
its machinery, and technological understanding, might take their place 
in a matrix, without welding them into a rigid pattern that cannot be 
altered as new circumstances arise. 
49  Loader and Walker (2007). 
50  Ibid., p. 215.
51  Ibid., Chapter 8.
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4. Parliamentary Oversight of 
Intelligence Agencies: Lessons from 
Westminster 
Hugh Bochel and Andrew Defty
While oversight of intelligence agencies can take a number of 
forms, legislative oversight is often seen as particularly important 
as it can help ensure agencies’ independence from the executive, 
maintain public confidence and provide legitimacy for the 
agencies and their actions. This chapter draws on research on 
oversight of the intelligence and security agencies by the United 
Kingdom Parliament to consider possible lessons for legislative 
oversight in emerging states, and in particular, a potentially 
independent Scotland. It suggests that the challenges associated 
with such a development have been largely overlooked, and 
that careful consideration would need to be given to a number 
of issues, including the capacity and expertise required for 
intelligence oversight, in addition to the powers of any oversight 
body and indeed of Parliament as a whole.
© 2017 H. Bochel and A. Defty, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.04
104 Hugh Bochel and Andrew Defty
As noted elsewhere in this volume (Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in particular), 
while the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 provided an 
opportunity for discussion of the role and scrutiny of intelligence 
agencies in a post-inreferencesdependence Scotland, plans in this area 
were relatively undeveloped. Moreover, while there was at least some 
debate about the development of an independent Scottish security 
and intelligence agency, plans for oversight of the new agency were 
minimal. The UK Government’s analysis, which emphasised the 
challenges involved in establishing a new intelligence agency, assumed 
that when it came to oversight, Scotland would simply seek to replicate 
the mechanisms currently in place in the rest of the UK.1 Similarly, 
the Scottish Government’s White Paper on independence, which 
did include consideration of the role of a new Scottish security and 
intelligence agency, said little about intelligence oversight. It noted that 
early legislation would set out the ‘purpose, duties and powers’ and 
‘the controls that will exist on the use of those powers’. However, aside 
from asserting that the new agency would be accountable to Scottish 
ministers and to the Scottish Parliament, there was no discussion as to 
what form that accountability would take, or, for example, how it might 
follow or differ from the system currently in operation at Westminster.2
This chapter seeks to offer some perspective on the potential 
approaches and pitfalls in establishing intelligence oversight by 
drawing on research on the current arrangements for the oversight 
of the intelligence and security agencies by the United Kingdom 
Parliament.3 It provides a brief introduction to the nature of legislative 
oversight of intelligence, and draws out some of the key findings of 
the research with regard to the various mechanisms through which 
parliamentarians have sought to scrutinise the UK intelligence and 
security agencies. It concludes by considering the implications and 
possible lessons for oversight, including for emerging states, such as a 
potentially independent Scotland.
1  HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8741: Security (London: HMSO, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
253500/Scotland_analysis_security.pdf 
2  Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/00 
439021.pdf, p. 266. 
3 H. Bochel, A. Defty, and J. Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the 
Intelligence Services (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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Legislative oversight of intelligence agencies
Intelligence oversight can be seen as having a number of functions: 
ensuring that intelligence agencies do not break the law or abuse the rights 
of individuals at home or abroad; ensuring that agencies are managed 
effectively, and that money is spent appropriately and efficiently; and 
helping to provide legitimacy for the work of the agencies and the use 
of intelligence gathered by them. Oversight methods vary considerably 
across states, and may be influenced by history, constitutional and 
legal systems, and political culture. Born and Leigh have argued that 
oversight can typically be seen as taking place at several different levels:
The executive controls the services by giving direction to them, including 
tasking, prioritising and making resources available. Additionally, the 
parliament focuses on oversight, which is limited to more general issues 
and authorisation of the budget. The parliament is more reactive when 
setting up committees of inquiry to investigate scandals. The judiciary is 
tasked with monitoring the use of special powers (next to adjudicating 
wrong-doings). Civil society, think tanks and citizens may restrain 
the functioning of the services by giving an alternative view (think-
tanks), disclosing scandals and crises (media), or by raising complaints 
concerning wrong-doing (citizens).4 
It is therefore possible to identify a range of institutions and actors with 
a role in the oversight of intelligence and the different levels at which 
oversight can take place. Building on such ideas, Caparini developed a 
framework for the accountability of intelligence and security agencies 
based upon three different types of accountability: 
• horizontal — the restraint of state institutions by other 
state institutions, which might therefore include executive, 
legislative and judicial oversight of agencies; 
• vertical — reflecting hierarchical relationships and levels of 
access and control, and including non-state actors and the 
public. This enables differentiation between, for example, 
executive and legislative oversight.
4  H. Born and I. Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice 
for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (Oslo: Parliament of Norway, 2005), p. 15, http://
www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35100/525417/file/making-intelligence.pdf
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• the ‘third dimension’ — the role of international actors, 
such as foreign governments and intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organisations.5 
Scrutiny by the legislature, the focus of this chapter, is only one of a 
number of possible mechanisms for oversight of intelligence agencies. 
Nevertheless, it is generally viewed as central, since it provides 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, and some form of legislative 
oversight has become the norm in most democratic states.6 It typically 
ensures that, at a minimum, legislation concerning the agencies and 
their activities has been subject to parliamentary debate, that they 
are placed within an existing constitutional framework, and that the 
agencies are subject to the law. It can also provide for ongoing scrutiny, 
as with other areas of public policy. While it might be claimed that 
executive oversight also provides scrutiny by democratically elected 
politicians, legislative oversight generally involves individuals who 
are not involved in the process of tasking the intelligence agencies, 
and who are not the immediate consumers of their work. It should 
therefore help ensure the independence of the agencies from political 
pressure. Legislative oversight is also important in maintaining public 
confidence in the agencies, including by demonstrating more open and 
accessible oversight than through internal or executive mechanisms, 
and reassuring the public that the agencies or the government are not 
abusing their powers.
However, legislative oversight of intelligence does pose a number 
of distinctive challenges. Gaining the trust of intelligence agencies can 
be a significant task for legislative oversight bodies. There are risks that 
parliamentarians might seek to manipulate the oversight process for 
political advantage, or that they might leak information, accidentally or 
intentionally. There are also challenges for those involved in the process, 
which, while not necessarily unique to intelligence issues, are perhaps 
made greater by the nature of the subject matter. These include: the lack 
of experience or expertise in intelligence among most parliamentarians; 
the risk of being misled or diverted from asking difficult questions; and 
5  M. Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic 
States’, in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. 
by H. Born and M. Caparini (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 3–24.
6  Born and Leigh (2005).
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the dangers of becoming seduced by privileged access and ‘captured’ 
by the interests that they are supposed to be scrutinising.
Moreover, the degrees of separation between the various levels 
of oversight may not be as clear as is often implied. In parliamentary 
systems, where the executive is drawn from the legislature, there 
is considerable potential for the same individuals to be involved in 
oversight at different levels, even simultaneously. In some states the 
membership of legislative intelligence oversight committees may 
include government ministers. Although this has not been the case in 
the UK, the membership of the Intelligence and Security Committee 
has been dominated by parliamentarians who have previously served 
as ministers with briefs which included the intelligence and security 
agencies. There has also been considerable movement of personnel 
between the various institutions involved in oversight, with the House 
of Lords, in particular, having a number of appointees who have been 
involved in other forms of oversight as government ministers, judicial 
commissioners, or former senior members of the intelligence community. 
While the overlap between different levels of intelligence oversight 
may be a natural consequence of parliamentary systems which do not 
entrench a separation of powers, it may also be a result of the relatively 
small number of individuals with expertise in this area. This may be 
more acute in small or emerging states in which the pool of individuals 
with experience or expertise in field of intelligence and national security 
may be very small.
Parliamentary oversight of intelligence in the UK 
Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies in 
the UK is a relatively recent phenomenon. For most of the agencies’ 
one-hundred-year history, oversight was overwhelmingly undertaken 
by the executive. Legislation during the 1980s and 1990s placed the 
agencies on a statutory footing, and also established a number of 
oversight mechanisms, including judicial commissioners to oversee 
the issue of warrants to intercept communications, and a committee 
of parliamentarians, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), to 
oversee the agencies. 
The ISC is a statutory committee of parliamentarians established by 
the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The creation of the ISC represented 
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a significant step forward in the oversight of the UK intelligence and 
security agencies. The Committee has a membership of nine, drawn 
primarily from the House of Commons, initially with one member, 
increased to two from 2010, from the House of Lords. The Committee 
sets its own agenda, but has on occasion been asked by the government 
to carry out investigations. Although the ISC’s remit was, until recently, 
confined to the administration, policy and expenditure of the three 
intelligence and security agencies, it is widely seen as having expanded 
its mandate, both functionally, to encompass operational matters, and 
organisationally, to scrutinise other parts of the intelligence community 
including defence intelligence and the Joint Intelligence Committee.7 
The Committee works almost entirely in secret, but is required by 
law to publish an annual report on its work. It has also published a 
number of additional reports covering its inquiries into a wide range 
of subjects, including intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, 
the handling of detainees by UK intelligence personnel, the murder of 
Fusilier Lee Rigby, and the role of women in the intelligence community. 
In addition to the publication of reports, since 1998 there has been 
an annual House of Commons debate on the Committee’s work. This 
presented a new and potentially significant opportunity for Parliament 
to debate intelligence and to scrutinise the Committee. However, the 
debates have often been squeezed out of the parliamentary timetable, 
and have typically had fairly low levels of participation, with normally 
between fifteen and twenty-six speakers, and an average of nineteen, in 
each debate; perhaps unsurprisingly, current and former ISC members 
have tended to constitute a significant proportion of those taking 
part. Moreover, on many occasions debates have been dominated by 
discussion of the status of the ISC and the relative merits of replacing it 
with a select committee. While this perhaps reflected the parliamentary 
appetite for reform of the ISC, it has also displaced time for debate on 
the content of its reports and more substantive discussion of the work 
of the agencies. There have also been frequent delays between the 
publication of ISC reports and the timetabling of debates, and, perhaps 
more worryingly, the annual debates appear to have fallen into abeyance 
7  P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity, 2006); 
Mark Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 22 (2007), 75–99, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200822
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in recent years. The last substantive House of Commons debate on the 
work of the ISC took place in 2011, and while House of Lords debates on 
the Committee’s work were introduced in 2009, there have, at the time 
of writing, only been two debates in the Upper House. 
The apparent lack of parliamentary interest in the work of the ISC 
perhaps reflects the Committee’s struggle to establish credibility. There 
have been a number of significant criticisms of the ISC from Parliament 
and beyond. The ISC’s anomalous status as a statutory committee of 
parliamentarians appointed by and reporting to the Prime Minister, 
and staffed and funded by the Cabinet Office, led to the criticism 
that it is too close to those it is responsible for scrutinising.8 These 
concerns have perhaps been exacerbated by disquiet about the kind of 
parliamentarians selected to serve on the Committee. There has been 
a tendency towards seniority in appointments to the ISC, with more 
than two thirds of members having previously held Ministerial office, 
primarily in the fields of security, defence, and foreign affairs, while 
all but one of the chairs of the Committee have been former cabinet 
ministers. This has led to an unfortunate perception that membership 
of the Committee is a compensation for the loss of high office, and 
that members are less likely to ask difficult questions of the agencies 
or the Government.9 These have been reinforced by evidence that the 
agencies have not always been entirely open with the ISC in relation 
to the provision of documents, for example on Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction and also the 7/7 London bombing.10 
In recent years a number of reforms have served to increase the 
powers of the ISC and also sought to enhance its credibility. The reforms 
reflected an acceptance on the part of successive governments, and some 
members of the ISC, that the Committee has not always enjoyed the 
confidence of Parliament. The Justice and Security Act 2013 reconstituted 
8  Peter Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence 
and Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 
22 (2007), 14–37, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200756; J. Wadham, ‘The 
Intelligence Services Act 1994’, Modern Law Review, 57, 6 (1994), 916–27.
9  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014). 
10  Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2003–2004 (London: HMSO, 
2004), https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.
uk/isc/files/2003-2004_ISC_AR.pdf; Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 
Have Been Prevented: Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 
2005 (London: HMSO, 2009), https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/july7review.pdf
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the ISC as a committee of Parliament, provided it with greater powers, 
and expanded its remit to include oversight of operational activity 
and the wider intelligence community. As a committee of Parliament, 
members of the ISC are now appointed by Parliament, albeit following 
nomination by the Prime Minister, in consultation with opposition 
leaders. The Committee also now reports to Parliament, although it 
retains the capacity to report directly to the Prime Minister on matters 
of particular sensitivity. A number of other changes not included in the 
legislation have also altered the way the ISC operates. The Committee 
enjoyed a significant increase in resources from 2013, with a doubling 
of the budget and the number of staff available to it. The Committee 
also sought to make itself more transparent, including through holding 
public evidence sessions. Although this has the potential to enhance the 
profile of the ISC in Parliament and beyond, the unchallenging nature 
of the Committee’s first public cross-examination of intelligence agency 
heads in November 2013 provided little reassurance that it was capable 
of rigorous scrutiny.11 
Most research on legislative oversight in the UK has understandably 
focused on the ISC,12 nevertheless, there is evidence of a growth in 
parliamentary interest in intelligence issues beyond the ISC. This has 
been prompted in part by the Labour government’s use of intelligence to 
make the case for war in Iraq, the responses of successive governments 
to the terrorist threat within the UK, and more recently the introduction 
of legislation designed to enhance the interception powers of the UK 
intelligence agencies. It is also apparent that wider parliamentary 
11  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘Uncorrected Transcript 
of Evidence Given by Sir Iain Lobban, Director, Government Communication 
Headquarters; Mr Andrew Parker, Director General, Security Service; Sir John 
Sawers, Chief, Secret Intelligence Service’ (London, 7 November 2013), http://isc.
independent.gov.uk/public-evidence/7november2013; Andrew Defty, ‘Having 
Security Chiefs Give Evidence to Parliament Is Progress, but Future Sessions 
Must Dig Deeper’ (Democratic Audit UK, 15 November 2013), http://www.
democraticaudit.com/2013/11/15/having-security-chiefs-give-evidence-to-
parliament-is-progress-but-future-sessions-must-dig-deeper/
12  A. Glees, P. H. J. Davies, and J. N. L. Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy (London: 
Social Affairs Unit, 2006); Gill (2007); I. Leigh, ‘The UK’s Intelligence and Security 
Committee’, in Born and Caparini (2007), pp. 177–94; M. Phythian, ‘“A Very 
British Institution”: The Intelligence and Security Committee and Intelligence 
Accountability in the United Kingdom’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security 
Intelligence, ed. by L. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 699–718; 
Leigh (2012).
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interest is partly the result of long-term dissatisfaction with the 
work of the ISC, which has prompted the development of a range of 
alternative mechanisms to scrutinise the intelligence agencies and the 
Government’s use of intelligence, including through parliamentary 
questions and debates, the work of all-party parliamentary groups, and 
most notably, the work of parliamentary select committees.
A number of select committees, particularly the Home and Foreign 
Affairs committees and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, have 
sought access to intelligence material and called for greater parliamentary 
scrutiny of the intelligence and security agencies. The interest of some 
select committees in intelligence issues pre-dates the creation of the 
ISC in 1994. For example, in 1985 the Foreign Affairs Committee was 
granted access to intelligence material in relation to its investigation 
into the sinking of the Argentine battleship, General Belgrano, during the 
Falklands conflict. Under the ‘crown jewels’ procedure the Committee 
was shown intelligence material under supervision in the Foreign 
Office, with the proviso that they could not take notes.13 The Home 
Affairs Committee was at the forefront of calls for greater parliamentary 
oversight of the intelligence agencies. In 1989 it persuaded the Director 
General of the Security Service, Stella Rimington, to meet it,14 and in 
1992 recommended that it would be appropriate for the departmental 
select committees to oversee the work of the agencies, as well as the 
departments responsible for them.15
However, the existence of the ISC has to some extent complicated the 
work of select committees on intelligence issues and their relationships 
with the agencies.16 Requests from several select committees for access 
to intelligence agency staff and documents have been denied on the 
grounds that the ISC is the only body responsible and qualified to be 
allowed access to intelligence material. For example, when the Foreign 
Affairs Committee invoked the ‘crown jewels’ procedure in seeking 
13 Liaison Committee, First Report — The Work of Select Committees HC323-I (London: 
HMSO, 1997), appendix 6, paras 35–38.
14  S. Rimington, Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5 
(London: Hutchinson, 2001), pp. 158–59.
15  Home Affairs Committee, Accountability of the Security Service, First Report of Session 
1992–93, HC 265 (London: HMSO, 1992).
16  See H. Bochel, A. Defty, and J. Kirkpatrick, ‘“New Mechanisms of Independent 
Accountability”: Select Committees and Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Intelligence 
Services’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68 (2015), 314–31.
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access to intelligence on the decision to go to war in Iraq, their requests 
were declined on the grounds that this was now the responsibility of the 
ISC.17 Similar requests have been denied to the Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee in relation to intelligence on the Omagh bombing, and the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to the interrogation of 
terrorist suspects.18 The withdrawal of access to intelligence material 
from select committees, coupled with the anomalous status of the ISC, 
prompted a number of select committees to question the role of the ISC 
and call for it to be reconstituted as a parliamentary select committee.19
Interestingly, while successive governments and the ISC have 
resisted closer cooperation with the select committees, there is evidence 
of developing engagement between some select committees and the 
agencies themselves. The Foreign Affairs Committee and the Home 
Affairs Committee have received briefings from MI6 and MI5, although 
these are informal and are not recorded as evidence in committee 
reports.20 While this may suggest an appreciation that the ISC does not 
have a monopoly over access to the agencies, these briefings are offered 
by the agencies and can be withdrawn by them. Moreover, while some 
committees have been willing to accept off-the-record briefings, others 
have not. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has declined such 
offers from the Security Service, arguing that democratic accountability 
and public confidence ‘cannot be achieved by off the record, secret 
17  Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 
2002–03, HC 813-I (London: HMSO, 2003), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272087/6062.pdf
18  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Seventeenth Report): Bringing Human Rights Back in, Sixteenth Report of Session 2009–
10, Hl Paper 86, HC 111 (London: HMSO, 2010), http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/86/86.pdf; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, 
Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 2005–06 (London: HMSO, 2006), https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272344/6920.pdf; 
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Omagh Bombing: Access to Intelligence 
(London: HMSO, 2009), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/
cmselect/cmniaf/873/87303.htm
19  For example, Home Affairs Committee, Accountability of the Security Service, Third 
Report of Session 1998–99, HC 291 (London: HMSO, 1999); Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Implications for the Work of the House and Its Committees of the Government’s Lack of 
Co-Operation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into the Decision to Go to 
War in Iraq (London: HMSO, 2004), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/440/440.pdf
20  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2015).
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briefings’.21 While the reconstitution of the ISC as a parliamentary 
committee, although not a select committee, may serve to ameliorate 
select committee demands, unless the ISC is also prepared to work with 
the select committees this seems unlikely to address their concerns in 
full.
There are, then, a range of mechanisms through which the 
Westminster Parliament and its members have sought to scrutinise 
the UK intelligence and security agencies. While the ISC is the most 
important of these, it is not without its flaws and its critics. Partly as a 
result of this a number of other parliamentary bodies, as well as several 
enterprising individual parliamentarians, have sought to exert pressure 
for greater openness and reform in relation both to the work of the 
agencies, and the operation of the formal oversight mechanisms. After 
a prolonged period of opposition to further scrutiny, in recent years the 
UK government has accepted some measure of reform of the oversight 
mechanisms and the ISC in particular. While the impact of these reforms 
is not yet clear, the notion that Parliament has a legitimate interest in 
scrutinising the work of the intelligence agencies and the Government’s 
use of intelligence is now firmly entrenched.
Establishing legislative oversight of intelligence: 
lessons from the UK Parliament
Clearly, in the event of independence, or even some sharing of 
responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence agencies, Scotland 
would have to consider what form of legislative oversight would be 
appropriate. The UK’s oversight mechanisms, as outlined above, 
provide one possible model. The establishment of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee represented a significant step forward in 
intelligence agency accountability in the UK. It has allowed a small 
number of parliamentarians wide-ranging access to the intelligence and 
security agencies, their documents and staff. Moreover, it has expanded 
its mandate both organisationally and functionally, and recent reforms 
have considerably enhanced the powers and resources of the Committee. 
However, the Westminster experience also highlights some of the 
21  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2010).
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challenges involved in establishing intelligence agency accountability, 
most notably in relation to whether Parliament has sufficient powers 
and capacity to conduct effective scrutiny in this area.
As a reserved power, the Scottish Parliament has no experience of 
scrutiny of issues of intelligence and national security. In developing 
legislative oversight of intelligence it would, therefore, be starting from 
a very low base. There have been a small number of intelligence-related 
questions and motions in the Scottish Parliament, primarily in relation 
to the interception of MSPs’ communications, the opening of an MI5 
office in Scotland, and the use of Scottish airports in rendition flights 
(although the latter related mainly to the CIA). However, intelligence-
related questions and motions have originated from a relatively small 
number of members, six MSPs, of whom four came from the SNP 
and one each from the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats. Moreover, the Scottish Government’s response to such 
questions has been to emphasise that as national security is a reserved 
power it would not be appropriate to comment. The current absence of 
powers, coupled with the lack of opportunities to ask questions in this 
area, means there may be very little interest in intelligence issues in the 
Scottish Parliament, and almost certainly very little expertise. 
The Scottish Parliament’s involvement in scrutiny in this area is not, 
however, very different from that of the Westminster Parliament prior 
to the establishment of the ISC in 1994. When the ISC was established 
in 1994, the UK intelligence and security agencies had operated for over 
eighty years with very little external scrutiny, either from Parliament 
or even the executive. Not only was there no formal mechanism for 
legislative oversight, for much of their history successive governments 
refused to avow the existence of the intelligence and security agencies 
and MPs were prevented from asking questions about them.22 Indeed, 
in one important respect a new Scottish oversight body could find itself 
in a stronger position than the embryonic ISC. Intelligence and security 
agencies are now an avowed and accepted part of the machinery of 
state, and legislative oversight bodies to hold them to account exist 
in most democratic states. As a result, intelligence oversight bodies 
in newly independent states may need to spend less time seeking to 
22 Bochel,  Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014).
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establish their legitimacy or building a relationship with intelligence 
agencies. While ISC members claim that the early committees spent 
a considerable amount of time seeking to gain the trust of the UK 
intelligence and security agencies, in a newly independent Scotland 
it is likely that legislative oversight would be established alongside 
the creation of intelligence and security agencies. While there would 
still be a need to build trust between the agencies and their overseers, 
oversight bodies would perhaps be less likely to be viewed as a new and 
potentially threatening development. 
The need to build trust, particularly in states where intelligence agencies 
are already well established, has also meant that legislative intelligence 
oversight committees have often started with relatively modest powers, 
designed to reassure intelligence agencies that parliamentary bodies can 
be trusted in such a role, and have evolved over time, acquiring extra 
powers and new roles. As noted above, the ISC, for example, was created 
with a mandate limited to scrutiny of the administration, expenditure 
and policy of the three intelligence agencies, and has only recently 
expanded this to include operational matters and the wider intelligence 
community. One obvious solution to this is to provide oversight bodies 
with a more powerful mandate from the outset. A committee modelled 
on the current ISC would, for example, be considerably more powerful 
than one which mirrored the powers exercised by the ISC when it was 
first established. This also emphasises the need to allow for evolution in 
intelligence oversight mechanisms. Although this has happened in the 
UK, the pace of intelligence oversight reform has been slow. Indeed there 
may be real benefits in establishing oversight mechanisms at the same 
time as intelligence agencies, in that the two processes could inform each 
other. In this way, executive and legislative oversight bodies, and indeed 
also civil society, could play a role in ensuring that effective internal 
procedures are put in place regarding what is and what is not acceptable 
for intelligence agencies to do, and what powers should be wielded by 
the different oversight bodies.
Even if a relatively powerful legislative intelligence oversight 
committee were established, the lack of experience in this area would 
perhaps still be the most significant challenge involved in establishing 
legislative oversight of intelligence in a newly independent Scotland. 
Our research on parliamentary oversight at Westminster found that in 
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addition to the form and powers of legislative intelligence oversight 
bodies, another crucial factor in their effectiveness is the level of 
expertise of those involved in oversight. In its first report, published 
in 1995, the ISC stressed that the Committee was taking a considerable 
time to ‘learn’ about its subject, observing that ‘the intelligence and 
security field is a specialist and complex one, about which relatively 
little is reliably known from the outside’.23 One possible, although 
far from ideal, response to this challenge, which has been adopted 
at Westminster, has been the tendency to appoint ISC members, and 
particularly committee chairs, with previous ministerial experience in 
departments involved in the work of the intelligence agencies. Such 
an approach has its drawbacks. Although this has allowed the ISC to 
establish a reputation as a well-informed and senior committee, as 
noted above, it has also led to accusations that ISC members have been 
too reluctant to criticise the agencies. 
Not only is the Scottish Parliament much smaller than the 
Westminster Parliament, providing a much reduced pool of potential 
expertise on which to draw, but as national security is at present a 
reserved power, the number of former ministers with experience in this 
area is likely to be extremely limited or possibly even non-existent. The 
possible solution of allowing serving ministers to sit on an intelligence 
oversight committee, something which is forbidden at Westminster but 
does take place in other systems, would undermine the independence 
and credibility of any oversight committee and would be best avoided. 
While there are likely to be few MSPs with any experience of the UK 
intelligence agencies, one potentially significant development in this 
respect was the appointment of an SNP MP, Angus Robertson, to 
the ISC following the 2015 General Election. Research indicates that 
ISC members have played an advisory role within their parties by 
providing informal briefings on intelligence issues for party leaders 
and frontbench spokespeople.24 The emergence of a body of MSPs with 
experience of intelligence oversight at Westminster might therefore be 
an alternative means of building capacity in the Scottish Parliament.
23  Intelligence and Security Committee, Interim Report of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, Cm. 2873 (London: HMSO, 1995).
24  Defty (2008).
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Another means of building capacity in intelligence matters at 
Westminster, both within the ISC and in Parliament as a whole, has been 
to use the House of Lords as a reservoir of expertise. As a joint committee, 
the ISC membership has included a number of members of the House 
of Lords with experience of working with the intelligence community, 
including former Ministers, senior civil servants, and a former member 
of the Secret Intelligence Service, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale. A 
high proportion of former members of the ISC have also remained in 
Parliament through appointment to the House of Lords, while in recent 
years a number of retired senior members of the intelligence community 
have been appointed as crossbench peers, including former Directors-
General of the Security Service. While this has provided a significant 
body of experience on intelligence issues in the Upper House, it can 
also lead to questions about the level of independence of parliamentary 
scrutiny in this area. Moreover, as a unicameral and entirely elected 
system these options are not available to the Scottish Parliament, and 
consideration would therefore have be given to alternative means 
of building capacity in intelligence expertise within the chamber. 
This could include, for example: allowing all MSPs greater access to 
intelligence and security agencies, such as through regular intelligence 
agency briefings for other parliamentary committees with an interest in 
this area, like those now provided for select committees at Westminster; 
public evidence sessions; and opportunities for parliamentarians to 
visit the agencies. 
Opportunities for wider parliamentary debate on intelligence issues, 
or at least on the work of an oversight committee, are also important 
both in terms of providing democratic accountability and in building 
capacity. As noted above, there has been a tendency on the part of British 
governments to view intelligence as the sole preserve of the ISC, and to 
use the Committee’s existence to prevent wider parliamentary scrutiny 
of intelligence. However, the experience at Westminster indicates 
that the existence of a dedicated intelligence oversight committee is 
unlikely to discourage other parliamentary committees or individual 
parliamentarians from taking an interest in this area. It is important 
that legislative intelligence oversight committees are seen as part of 
Parliament and not as a proxy for wider parliamentary scrutiny. In 
recent years, the UK government has recognised an overlapping agenda 
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between the ISC and a number of other parliamentary committees, 
while the appointment of former ISC members to other select 
committees has facilitated greater cooperation between the ISC and the 
rest of Parliament. The introduction of annual debates on the work of 
the ISC is another potentially important development. Although these 
have been poorly attended at Westminster, and indeed have fallen into 
abeyance in recent years, they could be a useful means of enhancing the 
credibility of a committee which operates largely behind closed doors. 
Another significant factor in building capacity, particularly in 
relation to the work of a legislative oversight committee, is the resources 
available. Unlike other parliamentary committees, the ISC is funded by 
central government rather than Parliament. Although this naturally 
raises questions about the Committee’s independence, it has also 
meant that it has been a well-resourced committee, particularly when 
compared to other parliamentary committees. Given the nature of the 
subject matter, and the relative lack of expertise of Committee members 
on appointment, the Committee has relied considerably on building up 
an independent investigative capacity with staff who are able to go into 
the agencies and ask questions on the Committee’s behalf. In contrast, 
the Scottish Parliament has been criticised for not having a sufficiently 
large and well-trained staff, and Scottish parliamentary committees in 
particular for being under-resourced.25 The creation of new committees 
within the Scottish Parliament to cover additional responsibilities would 
be likely to place extra strain on resources, while finding committee 
staff with the necessary expertise in this area is also likely to prove 
challenging.
As noted above, issues of funding and expertise have led to questions 
about the independence of the ISC. There is clearly a careful balance 
to be maintained between the desire to provide a well-supported and 
experienced committee and the need to ensure sufficient distance 
between it and those it is responsible for overseeing, including the 
Government. This may be particularly acute in the field of intelligence, 
25  P. Cairney, ‘How Can the Scottish Parliament Be Improved as a Legislature?’, 
Scottish Parliamentary Review, 1, 1 (2013), http://www.scottishparliamentaryreview.
org/; P. Cairney, ‘The Analysis of Scottish Parliament Committees: Beyond Capacity 
and Structure in Comparing West European Legislatures’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 45, 2 (2006), 181–208.
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where the monopoly on expertise lies largely with the executive. 
However, it is crucial that legislative oversight bodies have credibility. 
It is not sufficient simply to claim to exercise considerable power, 
particularly if most oversight activities take place behind closed doors. 
In 2010, the incoming Chair of the ISC, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, observed 
that the Committee must ‘not just be entirely independent in law and 
in the eyes of its own members. That independence must in practice, be 
fully respected by all government departments and the ISC perceived 
to be fully independent, both by Parliament and by the public’.26 As 
Rifkind acknowledged, for much of its existence the ISC struggled to 
establish its credibility. This is, in part, because the Committee itself 
has paid little attention to its wider public and parliamentary profile 
and has been somewhat dismissive of attempts at scrutiny by other 
actors. In a newly emergent state, particularly where one party might 
be dominant, it would be important, both within Parliament and for 
the wider public, to ensure that an oversight committee were clearly 
independent of the executive and the agencies.
Finally, some consideration may need to be given to the question of 
what protections might be extended to parliamentarians to shield them 
from scrutiny by the intelligence agencies. Since 1964, UK intelligence 
agencies have been prevented from intercepting the communications 
of parliamentarians at Westminster under a convention known as the 
Wilson doctrine.27 While there are some limitations to this convention, 
and it has come under pressure in recent years, it is clearly something 
that parliamentarians value, and under the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016 it will be enshrined in legislation. That legislation will also see 
the principle extended to members of the devolved assemblies and 
to UK members of the European Parliament. While this would clearly 
not protect members of an independent Scottish Parliament from the 
attentions of UK intelligence agencies, retaining the principle in relation 
to any new Scottish agency might be important in helping establish trust 
26  M. Rifkind, ‘Intelligence Oversight in the UK: The Intelligence and Security 
Committee’, London: speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, 16 
November 2010.
27  A. Defty, H. Bochel, and J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Tapping the Telephones of Members of 
Parliament: The ‘Wilson Doctrine’ and Parliamentary Privilege’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 29 (2014), 675–97.
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between Parliament and the intelligence agencies in an independent 
Scotland.
There would, then, be significant challenges involved in establishing 
legislative oversight of intelligence in an independent Scotland. Some 
of these challenges are presaged by the experiences at Westminster, but 
others are likely to be new, or at least more acute, in a newly independent 
state seeking to establish intelligence agencies and legislative oversight 
from scratch. Moreover, it is important to note that while the tendency 
may be to mirror the oversight mechanisms at Westminster, this is not 
the only possible template for legislative oversight in Scotland. Other 
states provide a number of alternative models on which to draw, and 
civil society organisations have also established some notions of best 
practice in this area.28 The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security 
Committee has evolved over time and has recently acquired new powers, 
but it has not been the most powerful or effective of oversight bodies, 
and Scotland may want to look to examples from other states, including 
the Nordic countries or the Netherlands.29 However, it is also important 
to note that powerful oversight structures do not always make for more 
detailed or effective scrutiny. The US has some of the most powerful 
legislative intelligence oversight committees, but much of the current 
debate about intelligence agency powers in the US has revolved around 
whether members of Congressional oversight committees have been 
willing to wield that power. In establishing legislative oversight of 
intelligence in a newly-independent Scotland, as much attention should 
be paid to the composition and capacity of an intelligence oversight 
body as to its form and powers.
28  Born and Leigh (2005).
29  L. Mevik and H. Huus-Hansen, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of the Norwegian Secret 
and Intelligence Services’, in Born and Caparini (2007), pp. 143–62; C. Hijzen, ‘More 
Than a Ritual Dance: The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary Oversight and Control of 
the Intelligence Community’, Security and Human Rights, 24, 3–4 (2014), 227–38.
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5. Scotland and the Politics of 
Intelligence Accountability
Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris
This chapter explores the politics of intelligence accountability in the 
context of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the 
2015 General Election in the UK. Drawing upon Peter Gill’s model 
for assessing the effectiveness of security intelligence accountability, 
it argues that the Scottish Government’s proposals for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland indicated a vague and 
conservative intention to maintain similar mechanisms to the 
existing UK political settlement. By exploring the accountability 
mechanisms for security intelligence in other jurisdictions, this 
chapter suggests that shortcomings in the Scottish Government’s 
proposals could have been addressed by learning lessons and 
adopting practices and processes from beyond the UK. The aftermath 
of the referendum — particularly the landslide victory in Scotland for 
the pro-independence SNP in the 2015 UK General Election — may 
herald consequences for both intelligence accountability in the 
UK and any future plan for accountability mechanisms in an 
independent Scotland. The previously unconsidered prospect of 
direct SNP representation on the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) — now a reality in the UK — raises the scenario that 
pro-independence politicians will develop the expertise, capital, and 
political legitimacy necessary for effective intelligence accountability 
that were lacking in the pre-referendum political landscape.
© 2017 C. Atkinson, N. Brooke and B. Harris, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.05
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In a democratic society, accountability is the requirement for those 
in positions of power to provide answers to those whom they serve. 
Accountability depends, therefore, upon either the presence of an 
informed, inquisitive, and engaged public or an array of elected 
representatives with similar qualities who act on the public’s behalf. 
Although seemingly straightforward, accountability is not a simple 
administrative task; it poses a series of profound and fundamentally 
political challenges concerning the shape, composition, scope, power 
and limitations of any such regime. These challenges are compounded 
when one seeks to ensure accountability for the actions of intelligence 
and security agencies, organisations which, by their very nature, 
operate in conditions of secrecy. It has been argued that the problem 
here can be easily stated: ‘how to provide for democratic control of 
a governmental function and institutions which are essential to the 
survival and flourishing of the state but which must operate to a certain 
extent in justifiable secrecy’.1 Ensuring the democratic accountability 
of intelligence services has been a persistent problem for western 
democracies, a challenge compounded by renewed concerns in the 
post-9/11 era that will undoubtedly persist in the years to come.2
In the UK there are various levels of intelligence accountability; 
however, the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
is the principal mechanism that exists to provide for the accountability 
of the nation’s intelligence agencies.3 Peter Gill has commented upon 
how the history of the oversight of security intelligence agencies in the 
UK is short, and how, with one or two exceptions, ‘it simply did not exist 
before the 1970s, though its spread since then has been rapid’.4 The ISC 
was first established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine 
1  I. Leigh, ‘The Accountability of Security and Intelligence Agencies’, in Handbook of 
Intelligence Studies, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 
pp. 67–81 (p. 67).
2  Hans Born and Ian Leigh, ‘Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services’, 
in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, ed. by Institute Stockholm 
International Peace Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 193–214.
3  Mark Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (2007), pp. 75–99; H. Bochel, A. Defty, 
and J. Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the Intelligence Services 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
4 Peter Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 
1 (2007), pp. 14–37 (p. 14). 
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the policy, administration and expenditure of the Security Service, 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). The Justice and Security Act 2013 reformed the 
ISC: making it a Committee of Parliament; providing greater powers; 
and increasing its remit to include oversight of operational activity and 
the wider intelligence and security activities of Government. Other than 
the three main intelligence and security agencies, the ISC examines 
the intelligence-related work of the Cabinet Office including: the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC); the Assessments Staff; and the National 
Security Secretariat. The ISC also provides oversight of Defence 
Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence and the Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. Members of the ISC 
are appointed by Parliament and the Committee reports directly to 
Parliament. The ISC may also make reports to the Prime Minister on 
matters which are sensitive in relation to national security.5
Intelligence oversight in the UK emerged and developed in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; however, the effectiveness 
of the UK’s accountability mechanisms have come increasingly into 
question. The responses to terrorist attacks on 9/11, the events that led 
to the Iraq War and the more recent series of disclosures from both 
Wikileaks and Edward Snowden revealed a range of controversial 
programs and activities undertaken by the intelligence agencies that 
were previously unknown to the public, media, and many politicians. 
It was against this backdrop — and in advance of the 2014 referendum 
on Scottish independence — that the Scottish Government decided 
upon the measures it would propose to ensure the accountability of 
a prospective security and intelligence agency for an independent 
Scotland. These measures were subsequently published in the White 
Paper on Scottish independence titled Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an 
Independent Scotland.6 This chapter evaluates the Scottish Government’s 
proposal for intelligence accountability, locating it in comparative 
context by understanding the mechanisms that are in place in other 
5  The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘About the Committee’ 
(2016), http://isc.independent.gov.uk/ 
6  Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/0043 
9021.pdf. 
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similar jurisdictions. It argues that, despite the claim that a range of 
international comparators were studied,7 the Scottish Government’s 
plans sought to replicate the existing UK model, without an appreciation 
of the challenges of such an approach. It concludes by exploring the 
political aftermath of the both the 2014 Scottish referendum and the 2015 
UK General Election, with a particular focus upon the consequences of 
this new political landscape for intelligence accountability in the UK 
and in the context of any future referendum on Scottish independence.
Examining the proposed measures for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland
In evaluating the performance of the ISC, Peter Gill proposed six 
variables that are important in determining the effectiveness of 
any committee that oversees security intelligence: its form, mandate, 
membership, resources, access to information, and reporting.8 In Gill’s model 
the form of an intelligence oversight committee depends upon the 
situation and status of the parent assembly. For example Gill makes the 
distinction between the committee traditions found in the US Congress 
and those in parliamentary systems, wherein the former offers the 
potential for independent action in terms of budgets, appointments 
and investigations, whilst in the latter, parliamentary committees are 
more likely to be the ‘creatures of the executive’.9 Gill continues that 
the mandate — or terms of reference — for such a committee is likely 
to be a result of its form. Here Gill discusses the distinction between 
the relative freedom and independence of the US congressional model 
and the strictures of the UK statutory model. Considering a UK-style 
model he concludes that, to the extent that the executive is the dominant 
force in writing statutes, a committee’s powers will reflect government 
preferences rather than those of an independent legislator.10 The 
selection of membership for any intelligence accountability committee is 
critical to its effectiveness and legitimacy. Gill considers that members’ 
independence of the executive will be clearest if the members are chosen 
7  Ibid., p. 261.
8  Gill (2007).
9  Ibid., p. 16.
10  Ibid.
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by the assembly itself, as in Argentina and Germany, rather than by 
the government, as was previously the case in the UK.11 Both informal, 
political selection processes and more formal eligibility, selection and 
vetting procedures will undoubtedly have an impact on the membership 
composition of an intelligence oversight committee. The inter-related 
issues of the extent of knowledge and depth of experience of members 
are also vital in assessing the measures for intelligence accountability. 
If accountability can be understood as the requirement for those in 
positions of power to provide answers to those whom they serve, then it 
is imperative that there is the requisite ability in an oversight committee 
to ask appropriate questions. Beyond an appropriately skilled and 
experienced membership, the issue of resources is also critical to the 
effectiveness of an intelligence oversight committee. Whilst Gill 
remarks upon the plethora of resources available to members in the 
US system, he also astutely recognises that ‘generous resources do 
not guarantee effectiveness’ if there is neither the will nor the skill to 
use them in the course of business.12 He continues that intelligence 
practitioners are highly skilled and can easily subvert the uninitiated 
outsider, and further contends that ‘the first task for any committee is 
to discover what the right questions are. This, in turn, depends on the 
expertise, experience and energy of members and staff, if any, and the 
will to use them’.13 This leads to the fifth factor that Gill outlines in his 
model: access to information. Gill describes this as ‘tokenistic’ because, 
even where legislation formally enables unrestricted access, committees 
still need to use skill in negotiating with informal gatekeepers in the 
agencies under scrutiny.14 The final factor considered by Gill is reporting, 
particularly in the context of the tension between the secrecy of the data 
to which committee members will have access and the requirement to 
provide meaningful information on the activities of intelligence agencies 
to the parent assembly and the public. This leaves parliamentarians or 
committee members in the ‘unenviable but inevitable position of being 
unable to tell their voters all that they know’.15
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid., p. 17.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., p. 18.
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Gill’s sexpartite model — encompassing form, mandate, 
membership, resources, access to information, and reporting — offers 
a useful model to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of an 
intelligence accountability regime. In his own evaluative study Gill 
concluded that whilst the ISC had made some appropriate criticisms 
of the UK intelligence agencies the Committee can be faulted for the 
essentially managerialist nature of its reports and its failure to provide 
adequate attention to issues of public education and human rights. 
Gill’s model for evaluation also provides a useful template to assess the 
measures proposed by the Scottish Government to provide intelligence 
accountability in the conditions of Scottish independence. The politics 
of intelligence in Scotland’s independence referendum debate were 
‘hidden’ in the sense that both public interest and political debate on 
this subject were quite limited in scope and intensity.16 The White 
Paper on independence outlined the Scottish Government’s vision of 
threats to security in an independent Scotland and how this newly-
independent country would respond to such threats. It claimed that 
upon independence a single security and intelligence agency would 
be established with a requirement to work with partners to ensure 
Scotland’s national security. The Scottish Government indicated that 
independence offered an opportunity to build a ‘new model’ for such 
work, which was fit for the twenty-first century and which provided 
a proportionate means of ensuring Scotland’s national security.17 
The establishment of a new security and intelligence agency would 
allow Scotland to ‘do things differently, unconstrained by historical 
structures and precedent’.18 Crucially in this context the White Paper 
on independence also indicated the proposed measures for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland, through the role of legislation, 
governance and oversight of this new Scottish security and intelligence 
agency. Considering such matters the White Paper stated that:
16  Colin Atkinson, ‘“The Scottish MI5 Station Will Change to MI6. And You Know 
What MI6 Does!” Understanding the Hidden Politics of Intelligence in Scotland’s 
Independence Referendum Debate’, Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, 21 
(2015), 5–24.
17  Scottish Government (2013), p. 261.
18  Ibid. 
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The controls put in place will be wide-ranging and comprehensive. The 
planned legislation will bring democratic control of our national security 
to Scotland for the first time. Scottish Ministers will be accountable to the 
Scottish Parliament for what a Scottish security and intelligence agency 
does in their name. The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish equivalent 
of the relevant Commissioners will scrutinise and challenge the work of 
the agency, including its covert work. They will be given clear legislative 
powers to support their work, including the power to require documents 
to be provided and to require the senior management of the agency to give 
evidence. There will also be detailed budget scrutiny from the Auditor 
General for Scotland, and the top-level budget will be scrutinised by the 
Scottish Parliament as part of the Budget Bill. This scrutiny will ensure 
that the agency is acting properly, legally, efficiently and effectively, 
in line with international principles for intelligence service oversight. 
These processes must take transparency as their starting point. But in 
so doing, they will appropriately and rigorously protect aspects of the 
agency’s work that cannot be made public, and will respect the control 
principle at all times.19
Given that there was no further discussion of intelligence accountability 
in the White Paper, this represents a useful point at which to apply Gill’s 
six variables in order to determine the effectiveness of any proposed 
accountability structures and processes for a new Scottish security and 
intelligence service in an independent Scotland.
The form and mandate of the prospective regime for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland was broadly sketched within 
the constraints of the White Paper, which outlined that ‘Scottish Ministers 
will be accountable to the Scottish Parliament for what a Scottish security 
and intelligence agency does in their name’. This would include the 
introduction of ‘early legislation’, written constitutional rights for 
Scottish citizens and clear arrangements for investigatory powers that 
build upon — and update where necessary — the existing UK legislation 
19  Ibid., p. 266. The control principle, or rule, means that intelligence supplied by 
one party to another cannot be shared with an additional third-party without 
the originator’s consent. See Stéphane Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas 
of International Intelligence Cooperation’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence, 16, 4 (2003), 527–42 (p. 532). Discussing the difficulties of this 
principle Robert David Steele reduced the rationale to a clear and parsimonious 
statement: the default condition of the secret intelligence world is ‘do not share’. 
See R. D. Steele, ‘Open Source Intelligence ‘, in Strategic Intelligence: Understanding 
the Hidden Side of Government, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Westport, CT and London: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 95–122 (p. 113).
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governing such matters.20 Moreover, the White Paper detailed that 
the work of the Scottish security agency would be scrutinised and 
challenged by both the Scottish Parliament and ‘the Scottish equivalent 
of the relevant Commissioners’ — meaning the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, 
and the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners under the pre-existing 
UK arrangement — using ‘clear legislative powers’.21 Beyond the bold 
claims of the White Paper there clearly remain significant unanswered 
questions in relation to the form, and subsequently the membership 
and resources, of such a regime for intelligence accountability. The 
ISC, for example, is a parliamentary committee comprised of nine 
members, drawn from both the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords, with none permitted to be a Minister of the Crown. These 
members, who are normally seasoned parliamentarians with relevant 
experience, are nominated by the Prime Minister but their appointment 
must be approved by parliament. The ISC Chair is selected by its 
members. It is possible to infer that an ISC equivalent for Scotland was 
not explicitly mentioned due to the controversial reputation of the ISC 
in relation to its provision of effective oversight,22 but there nevertheless 
remain unanswered questions relating to exactly who, in a prospective 
Scottish Parliament for an independent Scotland, would be responsible 
for the scrutiny and oversight of a Scottish security agency, and how 
they would be selected. Compounding these uncertainties, the issue 
of specific resources for intelligence accountability were not given any 
consideration in the White Paper. Resources were only discussed in the 
context of establishing the new security and intelligence agency itself, 
and not the accountability mechanisms for this service. In relation to an 
intelligence agency itself the Scottish Government proposed to maintain 
a ‘comparable level of spending under independence’ in relation to 
Scotland’s pre-independence contribution,23 but this did not take 
into account any costs that would be associated with establishing the 
necessary resources to maintain effective oversight and accountability 
of this new security and intelligence agency. The most recent update 
20  Scottish Government (2013), p. 266.
21  Ibid. 
22  See Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014). 
23  Scottish Government (2013), p. 266.
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from the ISC, following reforms made under the Justice and Security 
Act 2013, reported that it was supported by ten staff and an investigator, 
with a total budget of around £1.3 million per annum.24 There was no 
indication of the resources available to fund a Scottish mechanism for 
intelligence accountability.
Access to information and the ability to report such information 
effectively are vital components of any effective regime for intelligence 
accountability. The Scottish Government’s White Paper was clear that 
both the Scottish Parliament and relevant commissioners would be given 
clear legislative powers to support their work, including the powers to 
require the provision of documents from a Scottish security agency and 
to require the agency’s senior management to give evidence.25 There was 
no real clarity in Scotland’s Future on the ways in which such information 
would be reported, beyond taking transparency as ‘a starting-point’ 
whilst respecting both the need to protect the agency’s work where 
necessary and the control principle. In broadly resonating with the 
UK legislation and arrangements — and particularly the Justice and 
Security Act 2013, which reformed and emboldened the ISC — these 
commitments ultimately appear as a case of plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose, a feature that inhabits (or inhibits) much of the thinking on 
issues of intelligence and security in the Scottish Government’s White 
Paper. The political strategy of such an approach is expedient and 
understandable: gain public confidence through political reassurance. It 
is worth recalling here, however, that Gill warned against the ‘tokenism’ 
of legislation, highlighting the requirement for the use of skill in 
negotiating with informal gatekeepers in the agencies under scrutiny.26 
In this context the immaturity of Scotland’s political structures in 
dealing with matters of national security must be considered. 
Scotland’s Future was explicit in stating that the planned legislation 
would bring democratic control of national security to Scotland for the 
first time. A case can certainly be constructed that the existing cadre 
of 129 elected members in the Scottish Parliament broadly lacks the 
24  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament Annual Report 2015–2016 (London: HMSO, 2016), https://b1cba9 
b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/2015- 
2016_ISC_AR.pdf
25  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2016).
26  Gill (2007), p. 17.
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capacity and capability to effectively scrutinise an emerging intelligence 
and security agency with the same rigour as that of its Westminster 
counterpart. It is true to say that an intelligence oversight committee in 
Scotland would have less ground to cover, at least in the longer-term, 
and would thus require fewer political representatives to function 
effectively. However, it is unclear as to whether, based on the existing 
arrangements, there would actually be enough MSPs with the skills, 
knowledge and experience to provide the necessary level of scrutiny, 
particularly given the expanded remit of a newly independent Scottish 
Parliament to provide governance of, and accountability for, whole 
new swathes of political activity. The provision of additional civil 
service support would also be necessary, but at least here a case can be 
made, cost permitting, for the ‘poaching’ of expertise from the existing 
UK structures. In considering the Scottish Government’s proposal for 
intelligence accountability a key question thus emerges: would an 
independent Scotland have the right people asking the right questions, 
as well as the necessary resources, to hold a developing intelligence and 
security agency to account effectively? The answer to this question may 
be informed by a considered analysis of the successes and failures of 
intelligence oversight and accountability in other European nations that 
are comparatively similar to Scotland.
Comparison with accountability 
mechanisms in other jurisdictions 
The French security expert Philippe Hayez recently remarked that 
intelligence and security services have moved from serving princes 
to serving citizens.27 Not only do contemporary democratic societies 
now require their intelligence agencies to be accountable, but the 
bodies responsible for this task are often overseeing secretive agencies 
that have been established for a considerable period of time. The 
White Paper, Scotland’s Future, argues that this is to Scotland’s benefit, 
allowing Scotland to proceed unburdened by the past; however, as 
previously argued in this chapter, there are real challenges with regards 
27  P. Hayez, ‘National Oversight of International Intelligence Cooperation’, in 
International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, ed. by H. Born, I. Leigh, and 
A. Wills (Abingdon and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), pp. 151–69 (p. 151).
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to the extent to which the Scottish Parliament would have the capacity 
and capability to carry out this task. Nevertheless, in comparing an 
independent Scotland to other similar nations it is clear that Scotland is 
in a unique position to establish, at the same time, both a new security 
agency and mechanisms for the oversight of such an agency.
The unique position of Scotland in relation to the simultaneous 
design and implementation of both an intelligence service and an 
accountability mechanism is further compounded when one considers 
the post-‘shock’ modification of intelligence oversight. Writing on 
intelligence oversight in the US in the Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 
Loch K. Johnson noted,
An analysis of intelligence accountability indicates a pattern in recent 
decades: a major intelligence scandal or failure — a shock — converts 
perfunctory patrolling into a burst of intense firefighting, which is 
the followed by a period of dedicated patrolling that yields remedial 
legislation or other reforms designed to curb inappropriate activities 
in the future. […] Once the firestorm has subsided and reforms are in 
place, however, lawmakers return to a state of relative inattention to 
intelligence issues.28
Johnson’s argument, one that has played out frequently in the post-
9/11 security landscape, is that the greatest impetus for the progress of 
oversight is an intelligence failure or scandal that leads to public demand 
for change. Terrorist attacks by groups linked to Al Qaeda in Madrid and 
London, the massacre committed by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway, 
and the killing of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands all prompted 
inquiries about intelligence failures. Such inquiries, which fall under the 
purview of security oversight, were carried out by existing or specially-
convened bodies, and from which changes were assumed to follow. 
Similarly, the intelligence scandals surrounding the recourse to the 2003 
Iraq War, the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and the revelations 
from whistle blowers such as Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, have all 
had a similar impact: leading to inquiries that can be considered within 
the remit of oversight and intelligence accountability. It is from the 
shock of intelligence failures and scandals that progress on intelligence 
28  L. K. Johnson, ‘A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence’, 
in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Abingdon and New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2007), pp. 343–60 (p. 344).
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and security oversight is frequently made, thus raising the possibility 
that the measures for intelligence accountability in Scotland may not 
be fully effective until a similar shock is experienced. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of intelligence oversight and accountability mechanisms 
can be evaluated and further developed by considering the process in 
similar nations.
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, Scotland’s Future indicated that 
an independent Scotland would draw from the UK model of security 
intelligence oversight, with little indication that any such model would 
be tailored to fit the challenges of the Scottish context. An independent 
Scotland would have a more limited global reach, presence, and footprint 
than that of the UK, with the possible implication that Scotland would 
face a decreased threat from international terrorism, as well as other 
security risks. This could be termed the ‘small nation security dividend’. 
This section will consider approaches to intelligence oversight and 
accountability in two states closer in size and global presence to 
Scotland: Norway and Belgium.29 The appropriate mechanisms in these 
two nations will be examined to identify the viability of alternative 
approaches beyond the replication of the UK model in the context of an 
independent Scotland.
Norway
Writing about intelligence oversight in Norway before the attacks 
committed by Anders Behring Breivik, Fredrik Sejersted argued, ‘the 
preconditions for making intelligence accountable are among the most 
favourable in the world. If democratic oversight is not possible [in 
Norway], it is not possible anywhere’.30 The Norwegian model focuses 
on legislative oversight, with accountability directly falling to the 
Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and the Security 
Services (known as the EOS Committee). The EOS Committee was 
29  Ireland, a country with historical, cultural and societal similarities to Scotland, was 
also considered for comparison, but the absence of a dedicated security agency 
raises several challenges in relation to a comparative study of intelligence oversight 
regimes.
30  F. Sejersted, ‘Intelligence and Accountability in a State without Enemies: The Case of 
Norway’, in Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, 
ed. by H. Born, L. K. Johnson, and I. Leigh (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 
pp. 119–41 (p. 120). 
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established in the 1990s based on the recommendations of the Lund 
Commission, established to consider accusations of illegal surveillance 
by the security services. This Committee is appointed by and reports 
directly to Parliament, containing seven non-parliamentary members: 
an aspect that differs from oversight models in other Western states 
that draw their personnel from parliamentarians. The Committee 
operates with a high level of independence from political interference, 
and conducts oversight in two ways: ‘through inspections of the 
agencies, and by dealing with complaints and inquiries’.31 Returning 
to the six key variables outlined by Gill, Norway’s accountability 
mechanisms meet these criteria fully with regards to membership, form 
and mandate. In addition to the work of the committee, the executive 
retains control over traditional elements of the oversight infrastructure 
through traditional governmental administrative structures. The main 
purpose of the Committee’s work is safeguarding individuals against 
abuses committed by the security agencies (focusing on the protection 
of civil liberties and restricting intrusive surveillance methods), but it 
largely refrains from evaluating and analysing the efforts of the security 
agencies, with this task falling to the executive branch.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks committed by Anders Behring 
Breivik in July 2011, a ten-person special commission headed by 
Alexandra Bech Gjørv was established to ascertain the facts behind the 
attacks and make recommendations to help prevent similar attacks in 
the future. Their report, delivered in August 2012, indicated that the 
police could have done more to prevent the bombings and criticised 
the response to reports of shootings on Utøya, especially the time it 
took to reach the island itself.32 The Gjørv report could be considered an 
extraordinary act of security oversight, coming in the wake of a shock. 
Norway, so often portrayed by many as a nation from which Scotland 
would do well to learn lessons, introduced oversight measures in the 
direct wake of an intelligence scandal in the mid-1990s, and the Breivik 
attacks on 2011. In line with the social democratic values often associated 
with Scandinavian states, Norway has chosen to isolate its oversight 
infrastructure from direct political control by granting the principal 
31  Sejersted (2005), p. 128.
32  [N.a.], ‘Norway Police “Could Have Stopped Breivik Sooner”’, BBC News, 13 
August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19241327
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committee substantial independence, whilst retaining executive 
control of the security services. Moreover, the committee’s focus on 
preventing abuses of Norwegian citizens by the security agencies is 
logical considering the reduced threat of international terrorism faced 
by Norway.
Belgium
Belgium, is a smaller country geographically than Scotland but twice as 
populous, with nearly eleven million citizens. Like Scotland, it borders 
a much larger country that has been directly attacked by actors linked 
to international terrorist groups in the last decade. Similar to Norway, 
the Belgian intelligence and security oversight body (the Standing 
Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, or Committee I) was set up in 
the 1990s and maintains a public presence. The Committee consists of 
three individuals, one of whom acts as chairman, a position that must be 
held by a magistrate.33 The Belgium Senate appoints these individuals, 
as well as two substitute members on a six-year term. The principal 
role of the Committee is described as ‘reviewing the activities and 
functioning of State Security and the General Intelligence and Security 
Service […] [and] the functioning of the Coordination Unit for Threat 
Assessment and the various services that support this coordination unit’, 
focusing on the ‘legitimacy (review of observance of the applicable 
laws and regulations), effectiveness (supervision of the efficiency of the 
intelligence services), and coordination (the mutual harmonization of 
the work of the services concerned)’ of these bodies.34
Broadly similar to Norway and Scotland in international profile, 
Belgium demonstrates the limits of reliance on the ‘small nation security 
dividend’, as the events of 22 March 2016 demonstrated, when thirty-
two people were killed by three bombings in the capital, Brussels: the 
first two at the city’s airport, the latter on the Metro. This attack came 
only months after the November 2015 Paris attack, carried out by a 
Belgian-based group of Islamic State supporters, of whom some were 
33  [N.a.], ‘A Review Committee Acting as an Jurisdictional Body. The New Role of 
the Belgian Committee within the Framework of Reviewing Special Intelligence 
Methods’, in Workshop on Best Practices for Intelligence and Intelligence Oversight, 
Montreux, 1–2 March 2010.
34  Ibid. 
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Belgian-born.35 Previous to this, Belgium has witnessed the threat from 
its own citizens returning from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq in a deadly 
attack on a Jewish Museum in Brussels in June 2014 and the killing of two 
‘suspected jihadists’ who had been suspected by police of an imminent 
attack in January 2015.36 This rapid series of events has led to suggestions 
that Belgian intelligence is ‘regarded as weak […] more divided than 
most and more beset with scandals and charges of inefficiency’.37 In 
response to these attacks, and to questions about the ability of the 
Belgian intelligence services, the president of Committee I, Guy Rapaille, 
pushed back, stating, ‘these attacks show that more coordination with 
the United States is clearly desirable […] but you have to remember that 
big powers guard their intelligence very closely’.38 Furthermore, another 
member of the oversight committee publicly suggested, ‘we are paying 
for our naïveté […] it’s not a weakness in intelligence. It’s a weakness in 
society’.39 Thus, in a short space of time Belgium has gained experience 
in the necessity of responding to the threat of international terrorism 
and it seems likely that Committee I will have a substantial role to play 
in investigating the extent to which the intelligence agencies failed, and 
how these inadequacies can be addressed.
The most visible component of Committee I is its Investigation 
Service, which can carry out investigations based on ‘its own initiative, 
on the request of the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives or the 
competent minister or authority,40 or on the request of a citizen or a 
35  [N.a.], ‘Paris and Brussels Bombers’ Links Uncovered’, BBC News, 9 April 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35879401 
36  [N.a.], ‘Belgian Anti-Terror Raid in Verviers Leaves Two Dead’, BBC News, 16 
January 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30840160 
37  John Lloyd, ‘The World’s Spies Agree Belgian Intelligence Is Broken’, Reuters, 24 
March 2016, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/03/24/how-the-worlds- 
intelligence-services-rate-each-other/ 
38  Mark Hosenball, ‘U.S. Frustration Simmers over Belgium’s Struggle with 
Militant Threat’, Reuters, 24 March 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us- 
belgium-blast-usa-intelligence-idUSKCN0WQ0BU
39  Adam Nossiter, ‘Brussels Attacks Underscore Vulnerability of an Open European 
Society’, The New York Times, 25 March 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/
world/europe/belgium-security.html
40  When asked to carry out an investigation by Parliament or by Ministers of Justice, 
Defence or the Interior, Committee I is required to carry out the investigation. 
Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, ‘Home’ (2016), http://www.
comiteri.be/index.php/en/. See Peter De Smet, ‘Excerpt of the Speech Held at the 
6th International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference (‘Does Setting Priorities 
Mean “to Lose”?’)’, in 6th International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference (New 
Zealand, 2008). 
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civil servant who lodges a complaint or files a denunciation’ or ‘in the 
framework of a parliamentary enquiry’.41 The Committee is a powerful 
body: it can compel the security services to provide all documents 
relating to an investigation that it chooses to undertake, and because 
all members and employees of the committee hold security clearance, 
they can request classified material. Furthermore, the Committee has 
the power to ‘advise’ the Belgian courts on the legality of ‘special and 
exceptional methods’ and ‘forbid the further use of the method in 
question’ if deemed illegal.42 Additionally, the Committee can summon 
anyone to undertake an interview and may require the individual 
to testify under oath, as well as having strong reporting capacities. 
Committee I is extraordinarily powerful when it comes to requesting 
information and testimony. Thus, there are many similarities between 
these two cases: operating independently from parliament with strong 
investigative powers. 
Reflections on the Scottish case
Scotland has, in different ways, much in common with the two 
countries considered here. Whilst it is tempting to rely on the small-
nation dividend when considering the security implications for an 
independent Scotland the series of terrorist attacks conducted, or 
planned, in Belgium between 2014 and 2016, and the attacks of Anders 
Breivik in Norway, caution against complacency, particularly if an 
independent Scotland sought to remain a close ally of both the UK and 
the US. With particular regards to intelligence accountability, Scotland 
could benefit from considering the examples of Norway and Belgium 
in the appointment of non-parliamentary experts to the oversight 
committees. This would alleviate the problem that results from the 
lack of experience, expertise and skill in overseeing the functions 
of the intelligence security services among the vast majority of the 
existing cadre of Scottish parliamentarians. Furthermore, these cases 
demonstrate some of the advantages of legislative independence of the 
primary security and intelligence oversight bodies, and Scotland would 
be well served if a similar model were adopted. Yet when it comes to 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid.
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security oversight there is no model that Scotland should adopt in its 
entirety, and the requirement would remain to structure a security 
and intelligence service and accountability mechanisms to meet the 
challenges faced by an independent Scotland.
Post-referendum politics and intelligence 
accountability 
The 2014 Scottish referendum on independence and the 2015 UK General 
Election remain fresh in the collective political consciousness, not least 
given the decision of the UK electorate in June 2016 to leave the European 
Union. Considered and dispassionate analysis of post-referenda politics 
has therefore been limited in volume, breadth and rigour. It is clear that, 
whilst Scotland voted to remain part of the UK, the electoral landscape 
of both Scottish and UK politics was transformed by the landslide 
victory for the pro-independence SNP in the 2015 UK General Election, 
which returned 56 Scottish representatives to Westminster from a 
possible total of 59. Whilst there is some scholarship and commentary 
on the most prominent issues affecting this post-referendum political 
landscape — from tax powers43 to Trident44 — the impact of the Scottish 
referendum White Paper, debate, result and subsequent electoral 
outcomes on the accountability of the intelligence agencies in the UK 
has attracted little to no attention. The nature of this now transformed 
post-referendum politics, however, may possibly herald some important 
consequences for both intelligence accountability in the UK and any 
future plan for accountability mechanisms in an independent Scotland.
The most immediate outcome for intelligence accountability in post-
referendum politics in the UK was apparent in the third variable in 
Gill’s sexpartite model: the change in membership of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee. The dissolution of parliament in advance of 
the 2015 General Election necessitated the parallel dissolution of the 
ISC. Previous ISC members ceased to be so. Similarly, the election of a 
new government required that a new ISC membership be established. 
43  J. Aitken, ‘The Continuing Battle for Scottish Tax Powers’, in After Independence: 
The State of the Scottish Nation Debate, ed. by G. Hassan and J. Mitchell (Edinburgh: 
Luath Press Ltd, 2013). 
44  W. Walker, ‘Trident’s Insecure Anchorage’, in Hassan and Mitchell (2013).
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Following the electoral success of the SNP there emerged some support 
for the inclusion of an SNP member on this new ISC, with initial reports 
suggesting that Scotland’s former First Minister, Alex Salmond, would 
be the front-runner for such a post.45 The inclusion of SNP representation 
on the ISC, whoever the member would be, received a mixed response 
from some quarters. For example, a small number of Unionist MPs 
voiced concern over the SNP stance on key issues of defence and security, 
whilst others accepted the requirement for SNP representation on the 
ISC as part of the democratic process.46 Following the 2015 General 
Election the SNP was given representation on the ISC: on 9 September 
2015 the Rt Hon Angus Robertson MP was nominated to this committee 
and subsequently appointed by the Prime Minister. The appointment of 
Robertson, the parliamentary group leader of the SNP at Westminster, 
is notable not only for his support for independence and his opposition 
to the UK nuclear deterrent capability, but also for his views on the role 
and remit of the ISC. Robertson has been, for example, critical of the UK 
Government in relation to parliamentary oversight of UK drone strikes 
in Syria.47 The impact of the change in ISC membership may, however, 
extend beyond a shift in the nature of intelligence accountability in the 
UK context; the inclusion of SNP representation on the ISC may also 
provide valuable experience, capital, and political legitimacy that could 
deepen and enhance any future plans for intelligence accountability in 
an independent Scotland.
The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence was undertaken 
on the shared proviso that it would be a ‘once in a generation’ event;48 
45  See ‘Salmond Lined up for Role as Top Spy Chief’, Sunday Post, 10 May 2015, https://
www.sundaypost.com/news/scottish-news/salmond-lined-up-for-role-as-top-spy-
chief/ This speculation was seemingly predicated on two factors. Firstly, that ISC 
members are by convention also Privy Councillors, and Alex Salmond was then the 
only Privy Councillor in the SNP’s ranks. Secondly, that Salmond had ruled himself 
out of other important roles at Westminster.
46  Michael Settle, ‘Tory Fears over Allowing SNP Role in UK Security’, Herald, 22 
May 2015, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13214836.Tory_fears_over_ 
allowing_SNP_role_in_UK_security/ 
47  House of Commons, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 09 Sep 2015 (Pt 0001) 
(London: HMSO, 2015), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/
cmhansrd/cm150909/debtext/150909-0001.htm#15090926000005
48  Karen McVeigh, ‘Scottish Referendum: Yes and No Agree It’s a Once-in-a-Lifetime 
Vote’, Guardian, 17 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/
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however, the issue of a second referendum has remained very much 
in the political spotlight.49 As previously argued in this chapter, the 
mechanism for intelligence accountability sketched in Scotland’s Future 
offered little deviation from the existing UK model. In the context of a 
future referendum on Scottish independence, however, one of the most 
significant political consequences of the revised membership of the 
ISC may be the experience and, more importantly, political legitimacy, 
gained through SNP representation on the ISC, and the associated 
capital and credibility that would be accrued as a result. As Bochel, 
Defty, and Kirkpatrick noted in Watching the Watchers,
Like the departmental select committees, the ISC has allowed a small 
number of parliamentarians to acquire specialist knowledge in a 
particular policy area, and moreover one in which few parliamentarians 
have had any prior experience.50
Nevertheless, there will remain challenges for a prospective intelligence 
accountability mechanism in Scotland, particularly given that the 
ISC has, to a great extent, relied upon the experience of its members 
from both chambers of the UK parliament.51 The nature of the now 
transformed post-referenda political landscape in the UK — where 
Nationalist representation at Westminster is stronger than ever before 
and the prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence 
remains a clear possibility — may result in some significant changes 
in the practices of intelligence accountability in the UK and the rigour 
of any proposed mechanisms for intelligence accountability in an 
independent Scotland.
sep/17/scottish-independence-referendum-yes-no-agree-once-in-lifetime-vote; 
Keely Lockhart, ‘Alex Salmond: “This Is a Once in a Generation Opportunity for 
Scotland”’, Telegraph, 14 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/scottish-independence/11095210/Alex-Salmond-This-is-a-once-in-a-
generation-opportunity-for-Scotland.html
49  [N.a.], ‘Nicola Sturgeon Asks Opponents to Back Second Independence 
Referendum’, BBC News, 24 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-scotland-scotland-politics-34333394; Jon Stone, ‘Second Scottish Independence 
Referendum Is Inevitable, Says Nicola Sturgeon’, Independent, 12 October 2015, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/another-scottish-independence-
referendum-is-inevitable-says-nicola-sturgeon-a6690586.html
50  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014), p. 77.
51  Ibid., p. 79.
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the politics of intelligence accountability 
in the context of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and 
the 2015 General Election. It examined and evaluated the Scottish 
Government’s vision for the accountability of a proposed new security 
and intelligence service in Scotland, exploring the consequences of 
the decision to remain in the UK and the 2015 electoral outcome on 
both intelligence accountability mechanisms in the UK and for a future 
independent Scotland. Drawing upon Gill’s model for assessing the 
effectiveness of security intelligence accountability, the chapter argued 
that the Scottish Government’s proposals for accountability mechanisms 
were vague, but inherently conservative, indicating a continuation of 
similar mechanisms used in the existing UK political settlement. This 
issue was brought into particular focus by exploring the accountability 
mechanisms for security intelligence in other jurisdictions, a process that 
highlights how shortcomings in the Scottish Government’s proposals 
could have been addressed by learning lessons and adopting practices 
and processes from beyond the UK. Despite Scotland’s decision to 
remain part of the UK, the aftermath of the referendum, particularly 
the landslide victory in Scotland for the pro-independence SNP in the 
2015 UK General Election, may herald some important consequences 
for both intelligence accountability in the UK and any future plan for 
accountability mechanisms in an independent Scotland. The previously 
unconsidered prospect of direct SNP representation on the ISC — now 
a reality in the UK — raises the issue that pro-independence politicians 
will develop the expertise, capital, and political legitimacy necessary 
for effective intelligence accountability that were lacking in the pre-
referendum political landscape.
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6. ‘Hardly a Moment’s Discussion’? 
Intelligence and the Scottish Referendum1
Sandy Hardie
This chapter offers an account of ‘intelligence’ in the Scottish 
Referendum, the first occasion on which the subject had 
featured in a British political contest. It documents and assesses 
the strategic dimension in UK national security, its visibility 
to voters, the presentation and impact of arguments for and 
against separate arrangements, and the professional and political 
constraints on the Yes and No camps. Press coverage emerges 
as reasonable and fair if largely reactive, while the broadcasters 
were distinctly cautious, and overall treatment of the cyber 
threat to an independent Scotland was inadequate. The chapter 
concludes with a forward look to the likely profile of intelligence 
in the event of a second referendum.
1  My thanks to the organisers of the CeSeR launch conference ‘The Future of Security 
Research: Multidisciplinary Perspectives’ for their kind invitation to speak, and to 
participants for a stimulating panel discussion. This essay was produced on the 
basis of the public record, personal recollections, and meetings with a wide range 
of campaign participants, observers and former national security practitioners, to 
all of whom I am grateful for sharing knowledge and perspectives. 
© 2017 Sandy Hardie, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.06
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‘In the debate about Scotland’s future, there has hardly been a moment’s 
discussion about how best to protect Scotland’s security in the event 
of independence’. Such was Sir Menzies (now Lord) Campbell’s 
conclusion just two weeks before the referendum.2 Was he right? Two 
years on, with a possible second referendum a live issue, the profile of 
‘intelligence’ in the campaign calls for review. 
This was the first political contest in Britain in which intelligence had 
featured as an issue. There was no precedent either in time of national 
crisis or in the post-war process of de-colonisation.3 At Westminster, 
following ‘avowal’ of the agencies in 1994, intelligence had largely been 
a bipartisan matter.4 The workings of the intelligence community and 
its performance in the run-up to the war in Iraq had of course been 
the subject of unprecedented public scrutiny in the Butler Review 
of 2004. Yet when questioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 
the intelligence implications of Scottish separation, a Foreign Office 
minister observed ‘it is one of the frustrating things as a minister that 
you cannot rightly talk about this’.5 He was voicing a continuing, and 
generally shared, constraint on open exchange. But given the profound 
implications of separation for future security on both sides of the 
border, the intelligence dimension simply had to be acknowledged 
and addressed.6 In addition, the prospect of a new security apparatus 
alongside the recently-centralised Scottish police authority raised major 
issues around oversight and civil liberties, and these too called for public 
2  Menzies Campbell, ‘Sir Menzies Campbell: We Are Safer Together’, Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, 5 September 2014, http://www.scotlibdems.org.uk/intervention_from_ 
intelligence_chief_shows_we_are_safer_together
3  For the immediate pre-war period, however, Churchill’s 1939 speech in the House 
of Commons praising SIS as ‘the finest service of its kind in the world’ and warning 
Chamberlain and Halifax against ignoring its product, stands out: see Richard 
Aldrich and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime 
Ministers (London: HarperCollins, 2016), pp. 83–84.
4  ‘Avowal’: a standard term for the process of acknowledging the existence of the 
intelligence agencies, represented by the Intelligence Service Act.
5  Richard Lidington, cited in Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Considerations 
for the UK and Scotland in the Event of Scotland Becoming an Independent Country, Sixth 
Report of Session 2012–2013 (London: HMSO, 2013), Ev. 66, Q 341., http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf 
6  Just one commentator challenged this proposition at the time: Alex Massie, ‘Theresa 
May’s Grubby Little Warning: An Independent Scotland Will Be out in the Cold’, 
Spectator, 29 October 2013, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2013/10/theresa-mays-
grubby-little-warning-independent-scotland-will-be-left-out-in-the-cold/ 
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scrutiny and submission to the voters. I took part in the No campaign 
through 2013 and 2014 as a Scot living in Scotland, and as a former 
foreign service officer. The questions to be addressed in what follows 
arise from that experience, and its pro-Union perspective. How visible 
was the strategic intelligence dimension to Scottish voters? How were 
the issues and arguments presented, and what impact did they have? 
What constraints were in play? And how well was the public served by 
media coverage?
At the outset, public interest in intelligence appeared to be low. On the 
central campaign battleground it was eclipsed by the more visible and 
emotive matters of the armed forces, Trident, and NATO membership. 
Campbell himself conceded that there probably weren’t many votes in 
intelligence and security issues. Yet that assumption seems not to have 
been tested with campaign focus groups. And for what it may be worth, 
the Sunday Express of 7 September 2014 listed ‘British Intelligence’ 
seventh out of ‘25 things we’ll miss in independent Scotland’; then 
again, on 19 September, the Scottish Daily Mail put ‘intelligence services’ 
sixth in its list of the ‘twenty real reasons’ No-voters wanted to keep the 
Union ‘but are too polite to admit’.7 Whether ‘quiet No-voters’ had a 
larger appetite for the subject than campaign managers were prepared 
to admit is now beyond verification, but by 18 September there was 
at least some sense that security and intelligence had edged out of the 
shadows and into the light. 
The first effort to get to grips with the subject came from Westminster. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) opened their hearings in late 
2012;8 their report, published on 1 May 2013, offered what is still the 
most thoughtful exploration of the wider-world dimension to Scottish 
separation; the likely threat environment; the correlation of external 
intelligence work and domestic security; the infrastructure requirements 
of an independent Scotland; and the question of assistance from the rUK. 
Expert witnesses argued that a Scottish administration would need a 
new, independent intelligence and security infrastructure, and would 
7  Borland, Ben, ‘25 Things We’ll Miss Independent Scotland’ [sic], Scottish Express, 7 
September 2014, pp. 38–39; Jonathan Brocklebank, ‘Fear and Laughing in the Ad 
Campaigns as We Reveal What Really Drove Better Together’, Scottish Daily Mail, 
19 September 2014, pp. 14–15.
8  Foreign Affairs Committee (2013). 
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face substantial set-up costs and formidable technical challenges over 
an extended timeframe. They foregrounded cyber security (the threats 
of cyber espionage, fraud, and potential sabotage), but they suggested 
that, within the field of cryptography, there was no certainty that even 
a small-scale (‘mini-GCHQ’) project would be feasible.9 Nobody denied 
Scottish capacity to put some sort of infrastructure in place, given time, 
resources, effective direction and the good will of partners, but new 
structures could not replicate the levels of protection afforded by MI5, 
MI6 and GCHQ, and the ability of a Scottish government to protect its 
citizens at home and abroad would likely be diminished. 
Oral and written evidence stressed the objective rUK interest in 
helping develop Scottish capabilities, and one submission argued 
that close institutional cooperation between the rUK and Scotland 
would be needed if the present UK National Security Strategy itself 
was to be implemented effectively.10 But witnesses also stressed that 
bilateral assistance would be contingent on the conditions and mood 
of separation, including the defence and external approach of an 
independent administration.11 Policy on Trident, and its impact on the 
NATO alliance (US perceptions in particular), would bear upon rUK 
attitudes and interests. For its part, the FAC acknowledged that the 
rUK could well have an interest in advising and assisting an embryonic 
Scottish intelligence community, not least given the risk that under-
investment could result in perceptions of Scotland as a ‘weak link’ in 
counter-terrorism and cyber defences and as the easy way to attack the 
rUK, with loss of security on both sides of the border.12 But it concluded 
that ‘it remains unclear how much support the rUK might be willing or 
indeed able to give and what impact this might have on its other foreign 
policy priorities, budgets and resources’.13 Here was a warning that the 
rUK’s perception of its own interests would be conditioned by existing 
alliances as well as by reformulated requirements in relation to the 
British land mass, and that the quality of start-up assistance to Scottish 
agencies would be determined in the light of the strategic situation in 
its entirety and not by Scottish considerations, however immediate, 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid., Ev 86 (Dr Malcolm Chalmers), Ev 92 (Dr Daniel Kenealy).
11  Ibid., Ev 25–31.
12 Ibid., Ev 31, Para 125, citing Sir David Omand (Q154). 
13 Ibid., p. 54 (my emphasis).
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alone. In adding ‘or indeed able’, the FAC hinted at constraints on rUK 
freedom of action. The point was made more explicitly by the former 
Director of GCHQ, Sir David Omand, commenting on GCHQ’s ‘deep 
technical assessment’:14 
Whether an independent Scotland would benefit from that, and from the 
American underpinning of it is a bigger question about the relationship 
in the whole intelligence sphere between an independent Scotland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom and, indeed, the United States.
In other words, the rUK would be unable, on its own authority, simply 
to pass on the technical or intelligence products of its strategic alliance 
with the US. A good deal of later discussion, it might be added, focussed 
on whether Scotland might join the Five Eyes intelligence alliance 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US).15 However, early 
Scottish accession to this group, and its security protocols, was never 
a realistic prospect and arguably served as a distraction from more 
immediate issues, including cooperation with the principal European 
agencies (the latter, for their part, seem to have shown scant awareness 
of what was afoot in Scotland until well into 2014). 
On what the Chair rightly described as ‘a very important occasion’, 
the FAC took evidence from Nicola Sturgeon, the then Deputy First 
Minister (DFM), in Edinburgh on 28 January 2013. The SNP had resolved 
in October 2012 that ‘a cyber security and intelligence infrastructure to 
deal with new threats and protect key national economic and social 
infrastructure’ should be maintained, and now, the FAC was seeking 
a closer view of Scottish Government (SG) proposals.16 Sturgeon 
envisaged a Scottish threat environment broadly familiar from the UK’s 
current National Security Strategy (NSS): ‘cyber threat, international 
terrorism […] global instability and failed states, serious international 
organised crime’.17 She did not suggest, as others were, that a distinctive 
14  Ibid., Ev 25.
15  See for example Rob Dover, ‘Cutting the Ties That Bind? Intelligence in an 
Independent Scotland’, PSA Political Insight, 4 November 2013, https://www.psa.
ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/cutting-ties-bind-intelligence-independent-scotland
16  [N.a.], ‘In Full: SNP Resolution on Nato’, 16 July 2012, http://www.scotsman.com/
news/politics/in-full-snp-resolution-on-nato-1-2414919
17  Foreign Affairs Committee (2013), Q309. Cf. HM Government, A Strong Britain 




external posture would lead to reduced levels of threat. She spoke of 
‘independent domestic intelligence machinery […] sitting alongside our 
police service’, but questions as to an external intelligence capability 
were parried by reference to a ‘substantial piece of work’ then under 
way.18 SG understanding of how Scottish intelligence-gathering might 
relate to the acknowledged international dimensions of the threat 
environment was not further probed. Rather, the DFM referred to 
future ‘shared arrangements’ with the rUK: but what she (or those who 
compiled her brief), understood by this was quite uncertain.19 It was thus 
left unclear whether the SG actually envisaged shared responsibility 
for the security of Scotland in the period following 24 March 2016. Her 
performance drew sharply critical comment from Baroness Ramsay, a 
former senior officer of MI6.20 
To her credit, Sturgeon had offered to come back to the FAC for 
detailed discussion of the SG’s preparatory work, which would be 
published ‘in the lead-up to and in the White Paper’.21 In the event, no 
separate publication took place. In response to a Freedom of Information 
(FOI) request, I was informed that ‘a public statement, paper or event 
on Defence and Security (and external affairs in general) was initially 
scheduled for April 2013, then rescheduled to follow Mr Brown’s 
[Keith Brown, MSP, the then SG Secretary for Transport and Veterans 
Affairs] House of Commons defence committee appearance on 2 July.22 
Official records do not discuss why the paper was not published’. The 
successive postponements disclosed in this response suggest emerging 
SG/SNP awareness of a major weakness in the area of national security 
and they point to a political decision taken around mid-2013 to bury 
Defence and Security proposals within the White Paper, thereby 
18  Foreign Affairs Committee (2013), Ev 62. 
19  Ibid.
20  Meta Ramsay, ‘Security Service Can Take Nothing for Granted’, Scotsman, 17 
February 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/meta-ramsay-security- 
service-can-take-nothing-for-granted-1-2795918
21  Foreign Affairs Committee (2013), Ev 62. 
22  In response to a request for a meeting with Scottish Government officials, I was 
told by telephone on 7 October 2015 that SG ministers’ positions on security and 
intelligence remained unchanged from those set out in Chapter 7 of the White 
Paper of November 2013 (cited below, n. 29). I regret that this opportunity for a 
closer, more developed, approach to SG thinking was passed up. The SG’s response 
to an FOI request on issues arising from Nicola Sturgeon’s evidence to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee in January 2013, communicated in a letter dated 23 December 
from the SG Safer Communities Directorate, is reproduced in the main text.
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limiting exposure. At all events, the failure to publish in advance of 
the White Paper, together with the FAC’s own failure to follow up the 
DFM’s offer of further discussions on intelligence and security matters, 
meant that no Scottish leader was again to face purposeful questioning 
on SG proposals or on the ‘substantial piece of work’ to which Sturgeon 
referred. Indeed the exchange with the FAC marked the closure of the 
SG’s active engagement in public discussion of the subject. And in that 
respect certainly, Campbell was right.
A sceptical FAC drew its own conclusions. Here is what it said: 
By the Scottish Government’s own assessment, in the event of 
independence Scotland would need both internal and external security 
and intelligence capabilities to deal with the many diverse potential 
threats it believes it could face. Yet Scotland has no external intelligence 
structure to build upon. With just a year to go before the referendum 
takes place [in fact, over fifteen months], it is not at all clear that the 
Scottish Government has a costed and coherent vision of the security 
and intelligence infrastructure it needs to put in place to protect Scottish 
citizens, business and economic interests.23
A further conclusion foreshadowed what was to become fertile ground for 
pro-Independence counterclaims that the UK Government was bluffing 
on the key issue of future set-up support and intelligence-sharing: 
[…] there appears to be a working presumption on the part of the Scottish 
Government that the rUK would fill the intelligence shortfall that would 
emerge in the short term, but possibly over a longer time frame too. The 
basis for this position is not at all clear. Scotland would undoubtedly 
remain of strategic interest to the rUK and in the vast majority of cases it 
is likely that it would be in the rUK’s interests to assist Scotland. 
The FAC report received fair exposure in pro-Union parts of the 
Scottish press. Sturgeon called it ‘partisan’, with ‘rare examples of 
even-handedness’, and claimed that the FAC’s aim was ‘to undermine 
the case for independence’.24 By contrast, the Foreign Secretary 
23  Foreign Affairs Committee (2013), Para 137. 
24  Severin Carrell, ‘Scottish Independence Quest Hampered by Policy Gaps, MPs 
Say’, Guardian, 19 July 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/may/01/
scottish-independence-hampered-policy-gaps; Matt Chorley and Alan Roden, 
‘Voters Need Facts About Scottish Independence, Hague Says as MPs Warn Rest 




William Hague noted, not without humour, ‘the dependence that an 
independent Scotland would still have on rUK’.25 Intelligence and 
security, in other words, both exemplified a fundamental ambiguity 
in the SNP’s conception of ‘independence’ later noted by (Yes-voting) 
Iain Macwhirter and (No-voting) Alex Massie:26 its attempt to square 
sovereignty with a network of continuing dependencies on its large 
neighbour. 
The FAC added this observation on voter-awareness: ‘it is crucial 
that the Scots are aware that the rUK’s intelligence and security help 
would be discretionary, based on self-interest and could not be taken 
for granted’. Unsurprisingly, there were large gaps in Scottish public 
awareness of intelligence matters, and it was the UK Government’s 
responsibility to put the facts before the voters. Whitehall had the 
benefit of a body of research into communicating strategic issues 
around national security to the public.27 Of course, ‘communications’ 
in a divisive campaign was a quite different proposition from building 
public trust in a national security strategy. Yet Whitehall’s experience 
of what might be said about security and resilience, in what level of 
detail, by whom and to which constituencies was certainly relevant to 
the referendum campaign.
A major cross-Whitehall effort, co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, 
went into a briefing package published in October 2013.28 This was the 
product of extended drafting and a sharply defined internal debate that 
prompted the intervention of Danny Alexander, now in command of 
the tactical interface between coalition and campaign. From the London 
25  HM Government, Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2012–13: 
Foreign Policy Considerations for the UK and Scotland in the Event of Scotland Becoming an 
Independent Country. Response from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs. Cm. 8644 (London: HMSO, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210012/30944_Cm_8644_Web_Accessible.
pdf, para 20. 
26  Cf. Iain Macwhirter, Disunited Kingdom: How Westminster Won a Referendum 
but Lost Scotland (Glasgow: Cargo Publishing, 2014); Alex Massie, ‘Why I Am 
Voting No’, Spectator, 9 September 2014, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2014/09/
why-i-am-voting-no/
27  R. Mottram, ‘Protecting the Citizen in the Twenty-First Century: Issues and 
Challenges’, in The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism, ed. by 
Peter Hennessy (London and New York: A&C Black, 2008), pp. 42–65 (pp. 61–63). 
28  HM Government (2013). The account that follows is based on private information 
from various sources. 
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perspective, the published document represented a preference for factual 
presentation over sharper, more confrontational, lines of approach. 
Scotland Analysis: Security laid out the machinery and its underlying 
principles in fine detail, largely eschewing hype.29 One of a series of 
thirteen papers rolled out as sceptical commentary on separation, and 
as a resource to inform discussion, it made no pretension to direct voter-
appeal. However, its core message was an unambiguous constitutional 
reality: as a separate state, Scotland would have sovereign responsibility 
for its own security. 
This meant that Scotland would necessarily cease to participate in 
the near-seamless arrangements that join MI5 and the National Crime 
Agency to the external operational work of MI6 and GCHQ. It could 
not expect others to be proactive on its behalf. rUK and Scotland 
would no doubt work together, to mutual self-interest: but no external 
liaison, however close, could replicate the intimacy and immediacy 
of integration within the United Kingdom. In short, if the Scots were 
to choose separation, they could not still ‘share’ as though separation 
had not happened: ‘two countries, one system’, to reverse Deng’s 
characterisation of the Hong Kong settlement, was not a constitutional 
option for the security of a dis-integrated country.30 Such was the united 
view of the coalition government, though individual emphases varied 
from time to time. The Foreign Secretary put it thus:31 ‘Although it is 
likely that Scottish and rUK interests would largely coincide in this area 
[…] Scotland would lose access to the many benefits that it currently 
derives from being part of the UK’. Implicitly responding to criticism of 
Better Together negativity, the Prime Minister was to go further in May 
2014, conceding that an independent Scotland would ‘of course’ have 
a share of defence and security resources.32 But that is to run ahead of 
the story. 
William Hague had taken the wider-world arguments for the Union 
to Edinburgh in June 2013 and had touched on the intelligence services 
29  HM Government (2013). 
30  Deng Xiaoping, ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (22 June 1984), http://en.people.cn/
dengxp/vol3/text/c1210.html
31  HM Government (2013), Para 20.
32  [N.a.], ‘The Pros and the Cons of Negativity’, Herald, 16 May 2014, http://www.
heraldscotland.com/opinion/13160648.The_pros_and_the_cons_of_negativity/
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as ‘some of the most capable and professional […] in the world’.33 But 
the task of presenting Scotland Analysis: Security in Edinburgh fell to 
the then Home Secretary, Theresa May. Given her lead on Counter-
Terrorism, and the paper’s emphasis on the protection of people, 
property and prosperity, this made sense; despite divided ministerial 
responsibilities for the agencies, it served to underline the strategic 
integration of external and domestic capabilities with policing across 
the UK. Arguably, too, it made political sense to detach what was said 
about the external agencies from considerations of Britain’s place in the 
world, an arena where Nationalist accusations of post-imperial hubris 
carried undeniable appeal in the long, fractious aftermath of the Iraq 
war.34
Yet Theresa May could have been forgiven for apprehension as 
she travelled north on 29 October. What Alex Salmond had called 
the ‘phoney war’ was at an end, and with the advent of Autumn the 
big beasts were locking horns.35 Visiting Conservative ministers were 
already fair game for SNP accusations of ‘lecturing the Scots’ (primed 
by the new Secretary of State for Scotland Alistair Carmichael’s not very 
private admonitions to his coalition colleagues).36 A recent addition to 
the politics of security was the disclosure of UK/US intercept capabilities 
by the rogue National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, 
later to be elected Rector of Glasgow University (in absentia). Moreover, 
as the Foreign Secretary had found in June, dotty allegations of MI5 pro-
Union ‘dirty tricks’ could still command headlines, a minor symptom 
not just of fringe paranoia but of popular distrust of Westminster and all 
33  William Hague, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Speech: The United Kingdom: Stronger 
Together’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Gov.uk, 20 June 2013, https://www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-the-united-kingdom- 
stronger-together
34  Cf. Harry Reid, ‘Decent Case for a Scots Foreign Policy’, Herald, 2 October 2012, 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/13075312.Decent_case_for_a_Scots_ 
foreign_policy; Harry Reid, ‘Case for Knowing Our Place in the World’, Herald, 
26 August 2014, http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/13176691.Case_for_ 
knowing_our_place_in_the_world/
35  Jason Cowley, ‘Alex Salmond: “This Is the Phoney War. This Is Not the 
Campaign”’, New Statesman, 25 June 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/06/
phoney-war-not-campaign
36  Magnus Gardham, ‘Carmichael Tells Cabinet Not to Give Lectures on Independence’, 
Herald, 11 October 2013, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13126815.Carmichael 
_tells_Cabinet_not_to_give_lectures_on_independence/
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its works.37 In a further illustration of the febrile atmosphere, the then 
Chief Constable of Police Scotland Sir Stephen House declined to meet 
the Home Secretary in the course of her visit.38 
Here, at all events, was the set-piece Edinburgh presentation of 
national security issues as seen from London. Print and broadcast 
coverage was extensive and largely factual, though it added a harder, 
‘Scotland to be frozen out’, edge to what was actually said. Headlines 
focused on counter-terrorism and narcotics, with cyber security some 
way back. Given Scottish sensitivities, however, there was always a 
risk that the effort to inform would be spun as London didacticism, 
that questions addressed to the SG would be heard as threats, even 
that acknowledgement of likely co-operation might be dismissed 
as condescension. The challenge of bringing this occasion off was 
underlined in the acerbic comments of the Scotland editor of The Spectator. 
Intelligence, Alex Massie claimed, was a ‘bother-with-it-later’ item to 
be addressed as and when independence materialised.39 Was Theresa 
May, he asked, trying to persuade ‘[t]he poor sap who might vote Yes 
but can be security-theatred into voting No?’ More predictable was the 
SNP response, voiced by Christine Grahame: ‘This is Project Fear at its 
worst — trying to politicise issues of security and anti-terrorism in this 
way is the height of irresponsibility’.40 
Were the Archangel Gabriel to have materialised in Surgeon’s Hall that 
day, one suspects he’d have been charged with scurrilous scaremongering 
and talking down Scotland. Even so, it’s worth pausing to ask how 
a presentational remix might have fared.41 Suppose, for the sake of 
37 [N.a.], ‘UK spies “not trailing SNP”; Hague dismisses “Scots paranoia”’, Daily Star, 
21 June 2013; Paula Murray, ‘MSP Margo Convinced MI5 Spying in Nat Camp’, 
Scottish Sunday Express, 23 June 2013; cf. Jonathan Brown, ‘SNP Veteran Blames 
MI5 for Trolling over Independence’, Independent, 14 June 2014; Tom McTague, 
‘One in Four Scots Believe UK Spies Are Working against Independence’, Daily 
Mail, 8 September 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2747809/One-
four-Scots-believe-British-spies-secretly-working-against-Yes-independence-
campaign.html 
38  Private information.
39  Alex Massie, Spectator, 29 October 2013.
40  Cited from Richard Ford, ‘SNP Accuses May of Scaremongering‘, The Times, 30 
October 2013.
41  For relevant reflections on George Osborne’s presentation of the currency issue, see 
David Torrance, 100 Days of Hope and Fear: How Scotland’s Referendum Was Lost and 
Won (Edinburgh: Luath Press Ltd, 2014), p. 113.
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argument, that the Home Secretary had foregrounded common security 
interests, accentuated continuity, conceded the likelihood of purposeful 
engagement and a measure of technical support, and then registered the 
constraints on the rUK and the practical challenges that would confront 
the architects of a new security apparatus. A case could certainly have 
been made for some such approach. But the political assessment, at least 
in retrospect, was that the SNP/SG would have pocketed the first half and 
ignored the qualifications (much as it did with selective quotation from 
Scotland Analysis: Security in the White Paper).42 Furthermore, from the 
pro-Union perspective, it would have spun any such soft-sell as evidence 
that Westminster was bluffing, and bluffing also on the central campaign 
issues. Be that as it may, claims that the UK Government position was 
pre-negotiation posturing were in my view wide of the mark.43 In mid to 
late 2013, Scottish independence following a Yes vote was a hypothetical 
situation which UK ministers did not expect to arise. No substantive 
departmental or agency work was done to anticipate this eventuality. 
The cabinet ruling (late 2012-early 2013) against contingency planning 
was observed, though subject to parliamentary criticism (to be repeated 
during the EU referendum) from Lord Hennessy.44 Whether the ruling 
was entirely appropriate within the intelligence and security community, 
given what would have been at stake, was and is open to question. In any 
case, it can be assumed that in the run-up to the vote heads of agencies 
were aware of the issues that would arise, and of immediate actions that 
would need to be taken, had London’s anticipation of a No vote been 
proven misguided. But it would be wrong to suppose that contingency 
thinking informed the Home Secretary’s presentation on 29 October. This 
was no pre-negotiation posture, because no requirement for negotiating 
positions had been anticipated. 
Around this time, two Scottish universities made welcome 
interventions: the Edinburgh Economic and Social Research Council 
series ‘Security in Scotland, with or without Constitutional Change’ had 
42  Scottish Government (2013), pp. 264–65.
43  Cf. Andrew W. Neal, ‘Comment: Scotland Wouldn’t Be Out of Security Loop’, 
Scotsman, 11 November 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/comment- 
scotland-wouldn-t-be-out-of-security-loop-1-3184490 
44  Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, Lords Hansard, Col. 1361–1451 (London: HMSO), 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140130-0001.
htm#14013072000875. Mark Carney revealed in August 2014 that the Bank of 
England had drawn up contingency plans in the event of a Yes vote. 
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kicked off at Holyrood on 4 October, and the Glasgow conference ‘Global 
Security, National Defence, and the Future of Scotland’, followed on 8–9 
November. Each initiative offered a forum for exchange, questioning, and 
exploration, and each put appreciably more information into the public 
domain. And yet, discussion overall remained distinctly asymmetrical: 
publication of the White Paper had been delayed until St Andrew’s Day, 
and SG officials were understandably keeping a low profile. 
In compiling the White Paper, the SG was obliged rapidly to develop 
policies in ‘reserved’ subject-areas of which it had no experience in 
government.45 National security, including intelligence, was one such 
area. Even allowing for absence of expertise, the route by which the SG 
arrived at its proposal is oddly opaque. An endnote on methodology 
refers to ‘a range of expert inputs’.46 Informal feelers had gone out to 
the intelligence community in London, to former practitioners, and 
to Euro-structures in Brussels, and one or two unofficial advisory 
engagements took place in Scotland.47 There were contacts, too, with 
academic specialists, and no doubt the websites of European agencies 
were trawled for data and ideas,48 but the process as a whole remains 
to be documented. Chapter 7 advanced a proposal for a ‘single security 
and intelligence agency’ that would embrace cyber security as well as 
counter-terrorism.49 It was claimed that this arrangement would ‘avoid 
any barriers between different agencies’, and it may be that the authors 
had in mind the scale of overall effort that might be required to protect a 
population of just five million.50 But it represented an unusual (perhaps 
45  Torrance (2014), p. 17.
46  Scottish Government (2013), p. 639. 
47  Private information.
48  David Leask, ‘Scottish Civil Servants Probe Plans for “Nordic” Intelligence Services 
after Independence’, Sunday Herald, 28 July 2013, http://www.heraldscotland.com/
news/13115795.Scottish_civil_servants_probe_plans_for__Nordic__intelligence_
services_after_independence/; Scottish Government (2013), pp. 639, endnote 284. 
The White Paper lists, as international comparators ‘studied’, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland. It is unlikely that SG officials were briefed by any service of 
the countries listed. 
49  Scottish Government (2013), pp. 261–67.
50  Cf. the claim by Allan Burnett that ‘UK security is a long way from being perfect. 
Multiple organisations fight for power and influence and inappropriate UK 
Government interference is rife’. As evidence for this nonsense, he cited the UK 
Border Agency (not, of course, a security agency). [N.a.], ‘Former Senior Police 




unique) concentration of functions, professional cultures and personal 
authority, one that historically had been rejected for the UK agencies.51 
More conspicuously, Chapter 7 failed to define either a strategic 
role for the new agency or a Scotland-specific context in which it would 
exercise its functions. The ‘functions’ themselves were a list of activities, 
not a statement of the responsibilities that the agency would exist to 
discharge. The issue of external intelligence gathering was ducked. As 
for cyber security, it was stated that ‘our strategy will be to protect 
Scotland from attack’: an aspiration, not a strategy. The assumption 
of ‘joint working’ with the rUK remained without definition. On the 
civil liberties front, no case was presented for placing the full panoply 
of state investigative capabilities under the same political authority as 
Police Scotland, and the authors attracted further flak with a pictorial 
mock-up of a future personal data retention system.52
This was an unhappy compilation. Mired in detail, it failed to 
provide a persuasive strategic narrative and it offered instead an easy 
target for opponents of independence. It all suggested that the SG 
leadership had learned little from public discussion of Scottish security 
over the previous twelve months. They had failed to take on board the 
magnitude, costs, and urgency of the security challenge they had set 
themselves. Behind closed doors, it must be added, one or two senior 
figures gave an impression of almost wilful refusal to acknowledge 
threat realities, not least in the domain of electronic and cyber-attack.53 
The fragility of the entire Chapter 7 edifice was encapsulated in the 
assertion that a new capability would be up and running by ‘day one of 
independence’, 24 March 2016: this was an undertaking which could not 
have been delivered even had rUK assistance been instantly negotiated 
and as rapidly deployed.54
51  See, e.g., Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949 
(London and New York: A&C Black, 2010), pp. 595–616; Aldrich and Cormac (2016), 
pp. 158–59. 
52  Cf. Mark Howarth, ‘SNP under Fire over “ID Register” Plans’, Scottish Daily Express, 
24 January 2015; Scottish Government (2013), p. 262. 
53  Private information.
54  Scottish Government (2013), p. 262. The phrase first appears in Nicola Sturgeon’s 
evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (2013), p. 62.
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The sceptical, but largely wait-and-see tone of specialist comment 
shifted to outright hostility.55 This surfaced in the House of Lords 
debate on Scotland on 30 January.56 Hostile media comment spiked in 
March 2014 around a major intervention by the Scots-born architect of 
the UK counter-terrorism strategy, David Omand, who suggested that 
the White Paper showed a ‘basic misunderstanding of intelligence’.57 
Simultaneously, an analysis by the Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI) more or less advised the SG to scrap their proposals and start 
again. Two months later, RUSI’s Director General, Professor Michael 
Clarke, observed that ‘an independent Scotland without an effective 
intelligence agency will be a very attractive niche for terrorists and 
organised crime’.58 
55  For earlier comment, see Peter Jackson, ‘How an Independent Scotland Can 
Run Its Own Intelligence Service’, Sunday Herald, 30 June 2013, http://www.
pressreader.com/uk/sunday-herald/20130630/281560878374529; John Holmes, ‘A 
Note by the Director “the Future of Scotland: International Implications and 
Comparisons — the Ditchley Foundation”’, Ditchley Foundation, July 2013, http://
www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2013/the-future-
of-scotland; Sandy Hardie, ‘The SNP Have Set Themselves Major Challenges to 
Make Scotland Secure’, Herald, 8 November 2013, http://www.pressreader.com/uk/
the-herald/20131108/282243778354838; David Omand, ‘Keynote Speech: Thinking 
Strategically About Security’, in Glasgow Global Security Network International 
Conference 2013 (Glasgow University, 8 November 2013).
56  See Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lords Hansard (London: HMSO, 30 January 2014), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140130-0001.
htm; Baroness Neville-Jones, Lords Hansard (London: HMSO, 30 January 2014), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140130-0001.
htm 
57  Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Head-to-Head: How the SNP and Sir David Omand Disagree on 
Intelligence’, Telegraph, 13 March 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
scottish-independence/10694066/Head-to-head-how-the-SNP-and-Sir-David-
Omand-disagree-on-intelligence.html; Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Scotland ‘More Vulnerable’ 




58  Charlie Edwards, Clare Ellis, and Calum Jaffray, Scotland’s Blueprint for a Security 
and Intelligence Agency: An Initial Assessment (London: RUSI, 2014); Riley-Smith, 
Telegraph, 13 March 2014; Kerry Gill, ‘Think-Tank Warns Separate Scotland Could 
Be “Soft Underbelly” for Anti-UK Terror’, Daily Express, 15 May 2014, http://www.
express.co.uk/news/uk/475986/Think-tank-warns-separate-Scotland-could-be-soft-
underbelly-for-anti-UK-terror; A less critical account is offered by the summary of a 
discussion held on 31 January in the University of Edinburgh: Andrew W. Neal, The 
Threat Environment of the UK and Scotland in the Context of the UK National Security 
Strategy (Edinburgh: Centre on Constitutional Change, 2014).
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The SNP, SG and Yes Scotland proceeded to form a kind of defensive 
triangle that displayed impressive discipline under sustained assault. 
Waves of criticism were met by steady return fire along the lines of: 
‘Scotland will have/could develop first class security arrangements’; 
‘Scotland will get rid of Trident, will not wage illegal wars, and will 
therefore face reduced levels of threat’; ‘Scotland has the skill base on 
which to build effective cyber and counter-terrorist defences’; ‘Scotland 
will be welcomed as a trusted intelligence ally’. Mr Allan Burnett, a 
former Assistant Chief Constable deployed by Yes Scotland as their 
expert spokesman, had claimed in June 2013 that the UK Government 
had cut off debate on post-independence intelligence sharing by refusing 
to discuss the matter.59 Wisely, the SNP had not pursued this particular 
line of defence, for by then or soon after, the leadership evidently 
recognised its vulnerability on intelligence and security and retreated 
into damage-limitation mode: contain exposure; repeat assurances; 
play the critic, not the ball. But Burnett’s mirror-imaging claim that 
Westminster had closed down debate had an ironic sequel in a BBC 
interview with the then Chief Constable which generated the headline 
‘Police discuss post-Yes intelligence and security sharing’.60 This was 
not the only occasion on which a policy-light area was disguised by 
the suggestion that contingency discussions with London were indeed 
under way.61
The SG could have made a more persuasive presentational case than 
it did. It might have been better advised to acknowledge the challenges, 
the likely dependencies and the requirement for a sincere bilateral effort 
to create a security architecture that would ensure continued mutual 
protection. It might even then have reached out to Scottish security 
59  David Leask, ‘Former Security Chiefs Clash over How an Independent Scotland 
Could Protect Itself from Terrorism’, Sunday Herald, 30 June 2013; For comment on 
SNP ‘closing down discussion on mass collection of data’ from the civil liberties 
perspective, cf. Henry Porter, ‘All We Ask Is for Transparency to Inform the 
Surveillance Debate’, The Observer, 3 November 2013, https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2013/nov/03/nsa-surveillance-security 
60  Reevel Alderson, ‘Scottish Independence: Police Discuss Post-Yes Intelligence 
and Security Sharing’, BBC News, 20 March 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-scotland-26651783; cf. also ‘Talks Take Place on Shared Intelligence after “Yes” 
Vote’, The Times (Scotland), 21 March 2014.
61  Cf. James Titcomb, ‘Bank of England Flatly Denies Scottish Currency Talks’, 
Telegraph, 14 August 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/currency/11034881/
Bank-of-England-flatly-denies-Scottish-currency-talks.html
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practitioners who, irrespective of their views on independence, could 
have helped sustain public and agency confidence if independence had 
materialised. As it was, SG messaging was badly flawed both in tone 
and in substance. Part of the problem was the absence of a senior advisor 
with genuine, up-to-date experience of strategic intelligence.62 This was 
more than a matter of presentation: it placed a question mark over the 
quality of advice reaching SG/SNP leaders, and their willingness to listen. 
The Financial Times was not alone in concluding that ‘the deception in 
the Nationalist campaign lies in the assertion that everyone else would 
bend to Edinburgh’s will and allow Mr Salmond to dictate his own 
terms’.63 The risks were self-evident: lacking a first-hand sense of the 
threat environment, the SNP might really believe that Scotland could (in 
the FT’s phrase) ‘inoculate itself against the harsh realities of the wider 
world’; and lacking sufficiently robust advice on the practicability of their 
own intelligence proposals, they might have come to believe that Scottish 
technical and personnel resources were more sophisticated than is the 
case, and that for any skill shortfall they could depend on the enthusiastic 
support of the rUK and other governments.64 The FT’s emphasis on the 
personality of the then First Minister was telling: herein, it seemed, lay 
the prospect of miscalculation, or else (what would have amounted to 
the same thing) of preparedness to take a strategic gamble on public 
security against the prize of a popular majority on 18 September. As the 
polls narrowed, the spectre of an extended and messy transition, with 
diminished security defences on both sides of the border, started to move 
beyond the realm of the hypothetical. 
Yet the UK Government did not press any ‘weak link’ line of 
argument.65 This, it was judged, would have played into the SNP claim 
that the rUK would have to fall in with ‘shared arrangements’. Nor 
62  Dame Mariot Leslie, a former Director-General Defence and Intelligence at the 
FCO who declared herself a Yes supporter in early September 2014, confined 
her public comments to Scotland’s prospects for NATO membership: Tom 
Peterkin, ‘Scottish Independence: “Scots Welcome in Nato”’, Scotsman, 3 
September 2014, http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-independence- 
scots-welcome-in-nato-1-3529122
63  Philip Stephens, ‘Alex Salmond Brushes Aside the Foreign Policy Facts for 
Scotland’, Financial Times, 16 September 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/4460 
7564-3d8b-11e4-b782-00144feabdc0
64  Ibid.
65  It was however echoed in May 2014 by Professor Michael Clarke, Director-General 
of RUSI, cited in Gill (2014).
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would the agencies have wished to draw further hostile attention to 
hypothetical vulnerabilities. In the event, the intelligence debate went 
quiet over the summer of 2014. In the background lay reluctance in 
London to take this most sensitive subject, alongside confidential 
capabilities and relationships, into the campaign bear pit (certainly, it 
would have been out of place in the televised Darling-Salmond debates). 
Again, there would have been no appetite among Whitehall officials for 
making life more difficult for SG counterparts, especially at a time when 
UK inputs into security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games 
(starting on 23 July), already the subject of intensive discussion, were 
being implemented. In Glasgow, the Better Together website carried 
items on national security, but there were gaps in coordination, and 
neither the political leadership nor campaign staff seemed comfortable 
with a subject that they felt was better left to ‘experts’. Consequently, in 
Blytheswood Square and the Savoy Centre, it languished until a Better 
Together sub-group, ‘Forces Together’, embracing defence, security and 
intelligence, sought to re-focus interest. 
In September, just two weeks before the vote, two interventions 
summed up the ‘intelligence’ case for retaining the Union. In the first, 
Sir David Omand focused on cyber security and added this: ‘as a Scot, 
I want security for Scotland. So were independence to come, it must 
leave the people on both sides of the border no less secure than today, 
at no greater cost. The SNP White Paper is fundamentally flawed 
on how either part of that condition could be achieved’.66 By way of 
response, Allan Burnett was quoted as saying ‘Sir David is wrong and 
this is another example of Project Fear at its worst — trying to politicise 
issues of security and anti-terrorism in this way is the height of 
irresponsibility’.67 The second intervention, by Sir John Scarlett, former 
Chief of MI6, followed the next day, 5 September. He too questioned the 
White Paper proposals and then reflected on the wider world: ‘we live 
in unstable times. We must follow and understand jihadi extremism and 
related terrorist threats; deep-rooted regional instability; the policies 
66  [N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence Cyber Plans “Flawed”’, Scotsman, 4 September 2014, 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-independence-cyber-defence- 
plans-flawed-1-3530887
67  Cited from [n.a.], Scotsman, 4 September 2014. Compare Christine Grahame’s 
identical response to Theresa May, in Richard Ford, ‘SNP Accuses May of 
Scaremongering‘, The Times, 30 October 2013. 
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and ambitions of authoritarian states; the ever-present threat of inter-
state conflict, including now on our own continent on the borders of our 
NATO alliance. And all this against the background of rapid economic, 
demographic, social and technological change and fundamental shifts in 
the global balance of power’.68 The two interventions prompted further 
statements from Menzies Campbell, Scottish Conservative leader Ruth 
Davidson, and Shadow Defence Minister, Gemma Doyle.69 The Prime 
Minister added a reference to ‘some of the best security and intelligence 
services anywhere in the world’ at the end of the NATO conference in 
Wales.70 Yet perhaps for reasons to do with the preservation of broadcast 
‘balance’, Omand and Scarlett did not achieve the extended replay by 
the BBC and STV that might have opened out their arguments to a 
larger audience. 
In undertaking this review, I had the impression that there really 
had been ‘hardly a moment’s discussion’. And indeed so far as SNP/
SG engagement was concerned, Menzies Campbell was right. But my 
title acquired its question mark when a trawl turned up rather more 
coverage than I had been aware of at the time. The Scottish press 
has taken a good deal of flak in recent years for declining standards 
of journalism.71 It is true that the most significant interventions on 
the subject of intelligence came through London-based papers and 
their Scotland correspondents. Much Scotland-based coverage spiked 
around political and media inputs that originated south of the border. 
The SG’s defensive posture could, and should, have been probed more 
deeply and directly from Edinburgh and Glasgow. Yet print and online 
media interest was quite widespread, with informative coverage from 
unexpected quarters: the Aberdeen Press and Journal, for example, and 
68  John Scarlett, ‘A Yes Vote Brings Grave Security Dangers’, The Times, 5 September 
2014, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4197050.ece 
69  Gemma Doyle: quoted in Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Scotland Would Be less Protected 
after Independence under SNP’s Intelligence Plans, Former MI6 Head Warns’, 
Telegraph, 5 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-
independence/11077028/Scotland-would-be-less-protected-after-independence-
under-SNPs-intelligence-plans-former-MI6-head-warns.html; ‘Davidson Slams 
SNP Defence Plans’, Evening News, 4 September 2014, http://www.eveningtimes.
co.uk/news/13290481.Davidson_slams_SNP_defence_plans; Campbell (2014). 
70  Rob Reid, ‘Scotland Will Be Safer in Dangerous World by Remaining with UK Says 
David Cameron’, Daily Record, 5 September 2014, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/
news/politics/scotland-safer-dangerous-world-remaining-4172507 
71  See, for example, Macwhirter (2014), pp. 72–95. 
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the Sunday Post in particular.72 The overall impression is one of fair, if 
largely reactive, press reportage, but of a subject the broadcast media 
found almost too hot to handle.73
By 18 September, then, there had been rather more public discussion 
of ‘intelligence’ than Menzies Campbell allowed. But there is a king-
sized qualification on cyber security. On any professional analysis, the 
most immediate threat confronting an independent Scotland on 24 
March 2016 would have come from cyber-attack, and not from terrorism. 
This threat had been covered in Scotland Analysis: Security (though it 
lost visibility amidst a plethora of detail); it was underlined in Omand’s 
interventions; and an outstanding presentation to the second Edinburgh 
ESRC seminar in January 2014 was available online in summary form.74 
One mainstream Scottish journalist made the connection between cyber-
attack and the ‘business voter’,75 and BBC Scotland carried a short piece, 
pairing Allan Burnett and myself. Astonishingly, however (given the 
availability of Scottish expertise), no media outlet offered anything like 
‘the plain man’s guide to cyber and the Indy-vote’.
Cyber-spying, along with long-range cyber-crime, is moving with 
an exponential growth in technical sophistication.76 The capacity to 
discover, diagnose and take counter-measures, which underpins an 
effective cyberspace strategy, requires technological resources of a high 
order, together with a rapid response capability and robust international 
collaboration. Within the UK, this capability resides with GCHQ. This is 
why the UK Government can claim a competitive security edge for the 
72  To the academic commentaries already listed, add Professor Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’ 
thoughtful reflections on Scottish expertise in intelligence gathering: Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones, ‘Masters of the Spying Game’, Scotsman, 8 May 2013, http://www.scotsman.
com/news/opinion/rhodri-jeffreys-jones-masters-of-spying-game-1-2922226
73  For a survey of press coverage (pro- and anti-independence and neutral), see David 
Patrick, ‘Bought and Sold or Hype in Bold? Newspaper Framing of the Scottish 




74  Neal, pp. 8–9. 
75  Terry Murden, ‘Comment: More Needed to Tackle the Cost of Cybercrime’, 
Scotsman, 12 June 2014. Mr. Murden, then Business Editor of The Scotsman, was 
unable to follow this through, for unconnected reasons.
76  On cyber-crime, see Sir David Omand, ‘The Dark Net: Policing the Internet’s 
Underworld’, World Policy Journal (Winter 2015), http://www.worldpolicy.org/
journal/winter2015/dark-net
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UK as business location and as a destination for foreign investment. For 
an independent Scotland, critically dependent as its economy would 
be upon innovative technology, this was not a luxury. Nor could the 
loss of GCHQ capability have been made good by commercial products, 
however persuasive the sales pitch. For families dependent for 
employment in, for example, pharmaceuticals, offshore hydrocarbon 
technology, or advanced IT products, the present level of protection 
of intellectual property within UK cyberspace — though admittedly 
far from perfect — is of a higher order than anything in Europe, and 
for that reason it remains a must-have. In its absence, Scottish firms 
would face a growing incidence of unseen penetration of their systems, 
to be spotted only when something very like their products appeared 
on foreign competitors’ websites. At that point, Alex Massie’s derisive 
slogan, ‘Vote No to remain beneath the GCHQ umbrella’, might have 
seemed not so very far from reality.
That the price of independence would have included at least the partial 
loss of GCHQ/UK protective support for Scottish jobs and prosperity was 
not at all clear to voters. We in the No campaign had not succeeded in 
getting that story across, and in retrospect, the national security debate 
had not moved beyond the familiar images of terrorist outrage to the 
more potent, more immediate, yet less visible threat of the cyber-spy. If 
the cyber debate were to be re-run, with the lessons of some high-profile 
lapses in corporate security in view, growing public awareness of the 
costs of cyber-crime, and renewed focus on the threat presented by China 
and Russia, the level of coverage might be very different. 
Yet two years on, with the rise of so-called Islamic State and the spread 
of domestic radicalisation, the counter-terrorist environment too has 
changed. The use of Belgium as an operating base by those responsible 
for the Paris shootings of November 2015 and for the terrorist attacks 
of March 2016 in Brussels itself have served notice that no country, 
however remote from the geopolitical epicentre in the Middle East, 
can assume it will remain immune to the new levels of threat.77 In a 
broadcast response that attracted the headline ‘Independent Scotland 
“would have better intelligence services than MI5”, says Alex Salmond’, 
the former First Minister predictably sought to play down domestic 
77  See Chapter 5, pp. 138–40, for a discussion of the Belgian comparison.
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implications.78 Symptomatic of renewed public interest in the politics 
of security, however, was the prominence of European intelligence 
cooperation as an issue in the EU referendum of June 2016.79 In contrast 
to Scotland in 2014, political figures were prepared to engage (whether 
or not they knew very much about what they were saying). Meanwhile 
former heads of agency, in public disagreement as to the likely impact of 
Brexit, were given air time by the BBC, as was an American perspective 
from Mike Hayden, former Director of the National Security Agency 
and of the CIA. 
A second independence referendum, should one materialise, would 
take place in quite different circumstances from the first. With changes 
in political leadership, the UK’s departure from the EU, and a fast-
developing threat environment, the tone and content of a renewed 
intelligence and security debate would likely move on. This would no 
longer be unknown public-political territory. A wider range of external 
perspectives might be on view, and might also (with the arrival in 
Edinburgh of Russia’s Sputnik ‘news’ agency) embrace that of Mr Putin.80 
The SNP, through its presence at Westminster and its representation 
on the Intelligence Services Committee and the FAC, would have the 
advantage of closer engagement with national security issues (and the 
SG could quietly jettison Chapter 7). The media, print and broadcast, 
with the benefit of their 2014 experience, might set about drilling into 
the issues and questioning the principals with renewed vigour; and in 
putting out facts and findings, they could help voters take a second, 
better informed, look at the intelligence dimension of separation. 
By way of conclusion, I would recall the odd mixture of business-
as-usual and political touchiness surrounding security and Scotland in 
2014, sharpened as it was by the Commonwealth Games. UK specialists, 
drawing on the 2012 Olympics, worked with Scottish authorities through 
the long lead-up to ensure the all-round security of the event and the 
78  John Ashmore, ‘Independent Scotland “Would Have Better Intelligence Services 
Than MI5”, Says Alex Salmond’, Holyrood, 24 March 2016, http://www.holyrood.
com/articles/news/independent-scotland-would-have-better-intelligence-services-
mi5-says-alex-salmond
79  The topic features briefly in Craig Oliver, Unleashing Demons: The Inside Story of 
Brexit (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2016), p. 220. 
80  Kenny Farquharson, ‘Putin Is Gatecrashing Scotland’s House Party’, The Times, 12 
August 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-is-gatecrashing-scotlands- 
house-party-ml5r9n5p9 
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safety of the participants. These joint efforts were not acknowledged by 
the SG, which went to some lengths to minimise public awareness of its 
reliance on national assets.81 By late August, it would have been open to 
the UK Government to celebrate the combined endeavour: a triumph 
for Glasgow and Scotland, quietly secured. That nothing of the sort was 
proclaimed is a reflection of the professional reticence of those most 
closely engaged. But more than that, London’s silence was a gesture 
of respect for Scottish colleagues whose lot it was to work on as public 
servants, in the eye of the campaign storm.82
81  Private information.
82  On this general subject, see Matt Foster, ‘Civil Service “Should Remain Unified” 
Says Senior Scottish Government Official’, Holyrood, 5 October 2015. 
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7. Press Scrutiny and the Proposals 
for Security and Intelligence in an 
Independent Scotland1
Eamonn P. O’Neill
This chapter examines the scrutiny by the press in Scotland and 
the wider UK, before, during and after the publication of issues 
related to the proposals presented in the Scottish Government’s 
independence White Paper Scotland’s Future in November 2013. 
It outlines the various categories of media coverage in common 
usage and examines a selection of coverage in depth. It argues that, 
with some exceptions, the coverage was narrow and formulaic. 
It suggests more investigative projects could have widened and 
deepened the coverage and led to a more informed debate. 
1  I am grateful to Dr Andrew Neal and colleagues who attended the ESRC seminar 
series at the University of Edinburgh for their work and patience. Also colleagues 
in the media in Scotland, especially at BBC Scotland and The Herald, for their input 
and contributions. 
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When the Scottish Government’s White Paper Scotland’s Future was 
published in November 2013, most media attention was focused on its 
proposals for the economy, social welfare, currency and defence matters. 
When the latter was mentioned, coverage focused on the issue of Trident 
and the implications that would have for the economy. Coverage of 
the SNP’s claims regarding a 2002–2012 Defence ‘underspend’ of £7.4 
billion, for example, featured extensively in the media, as was the policy 
of an independent Scotland having a total of 15,000 regular and 5000 
reserve personnel across land, air and maritime forces by 2026. There 
was also widespread coverage of the SNP’s policy of maintaining a £2.5 
billion annual military budget in an independent Scotland. Whilst these 
military plans were covered by the press, it appeared that little or no 
real attention and scrutiny was paid to the proposals for intelligence 
and security matters within an independent Scotland. 
It might be argued that this was down to the fact that the proposals 
were mentioned across a mere handful of pages in an otherwise lengthy 
policy document. The word count for these proposals ran to little more 
than 1500 words across 6 pages of the 670 page publication. Yet this 
in itself was surprising given some of the implications the proposed 
establishment of the new Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency 
(SSIS) had for both Scotland itself and its relationship with the other 
countries within existing UK borders.
The short content of the White Paper and its subsections did, within 
their limitations, present a deceptively wide range of issues which 
could have acted as starting points for journalists to examine in a variety 
of ways across all publication platforms. Potential subjects for scrutiny 
included — but were not limited to — the following five areas. Firstly, 
the structure and operation of the new SSIS: this included the proposal 
to create a single domestic intelligence agency rather than two or more 
that could also focus on foreign intelligence, the ways in which the SSIS 
would assess and investigate threats and gather and analyse intelligence, 
and how it would be scrutinised by the Scottish Government. Secondly, 
the transition to independence: whether a ‘seamless’2 transition in 
the early period of independence would really be possible to ‘ensure 
2 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent 
Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/
resource/0043/00439021.pdf, p. 262
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the security of both countries [Scotland and rUK]’3 was continuously 
maintained, what the legislative timetable for the establishment of the 
SSIS would be, how the new agency would protect Scotland’s critical 
infrastructure during the transition and after independence, and how 
it would recruit and train its staff, with or without the assistance of the 
remaining UK. 
The third area includes the challenges that would have been 
involved in working with partners, both foreign and domestic: how a 
cooperative relationship with the remaining UK and its agencies would 
be guaranteed and maintained, what the planned role for Scottish 
universities and businesses would be and whether there were any early 
signs of cooperation from these bodies, and what the relationship and 
oversight arrangements between the new single Police Scotland force 
and the planned SSIS would be. Fourthly, the adequacy of the estimated 
£206m budget (calculated from the current Scottish contribution and 
spending based on population in the UK budget) could have been 
questioned, as well as whether the expected significant investment 
in establishing an agency would be factored into an independence 
settlement agreement from the rest of the UK; and fifthly, the plans 
and structures that would have been in place for dealing with cyber 
terrorism could have been explored, including how this would align 
with Scotland’s critical infrastructure protection aims (e.g. protecting 
oil production facilities and output), and whether the planned return 
of proportionate funding from the UK’s Cyber Security Programme 
would adequately fund the new Scottish plans.
The Scottish media coverage in the twelve months before the 
referendum devoted relatively modest resources to the proposals 
themselves, the issues they might have represented, or indeed the 
Westminster Government’s response to them. The narrow amount of 
coverage that did appear was varied in quality and content, and came 
from both Scotland itself and England. The coverage published across 
all platforms (e.g. digital/print/broadcast) tended to break down into 
distinct categories: (a) recounting the policy briefly and uncritically in 
news articles; (b) analysis in news articles or news feature articles; (c) 
framing the policy announcement in feature articles or comment and 
3 Ibid., p. 474.
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opinion pieces that themselves were sometimes presented in overtly 
accessible and populist terms (e.g. headlines which mention ‘Scottish 
James Bonds’ etc.).4 Scant attention was given in investigative contexts 
which might have been reasonably expected to go into considerably 
more depth about the proposals and their myriad implications. 
This chapter asks whether there was sufficient and informed debate 
in the wider UK press and Scottish media about these issues. It examines 
output from a selected range of sources that I believe were broadly 
indicative of the wider underlying trends of coverage. The first section 
of the chapter identifies the theoretical and practical understandings of 
each output category. The second section focuses in more depth on the 
press output on this issue with these definitions and categories in mind. 
The third section concludes with an analysis of what this output meant 
and introduces my own experience working on a BBC project discreetly 
connected to this debate, arguing that investigative journalism could 
have played a more productive and focused part in this process. 
News categories and shifting rules
News articles, by their nature, are meant to be pertinent, factual and 
balanced. They are designed to cover ongoing events which are of 
relevance to the public audience. ‘News values’ are the shifting sands 
of journalism practice, identifiable as an array of tests by which the 
professional (and, increasingly, the amateur unpaid blogger too) uses 
to decide which story, subject, or issue to focus on. This model has been 
articulated as: ‘an attempt to render the daily, instinctive decisions 
of professionalism journalism tangible’.5 I can see the wisdom in this 
interpretation but caveats do apply. Each journalist has their own 
accumulated professional (and life) experiences which shape their own 
4  Kevin McKenna, ‘Would Independent Scotland Have Its Own Spies?’, Japan 
Times, 8 April 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/04/08/commentary/
world-commentary/would-independent-scotland-have-its-own-spies. I use this 
Japan Times version of a deceptively informed article to show the global reach of 
the author and the subject. The ‘Scottish James Bond’ theme was a clever way of 
cloaking a serious topic in an accessible headline and in no way is meant to criticise 
the professional aims of the author which I recognise were serious and complex.
5  A. Smith and M. Higgins, The Language of Journalism: A Multi-Genre Perspective (New 
York and London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).
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professional code in the field and the office. This means any journalistic 
news values are constantly changed and challenged. Smith and Higgins 
are correct to use ‘attempt’ in their analysis since, in most cases, that is 
all it may be. However, in other cases, where strict editorial pressure is 
applied throughout the working day and week, journalists will adhere 
to the model under the threat of losing their jobs if they fail to deliver.
These can include simplistic tests that state ‘if it bleeds, it 
leads!’ — meaning that if human life and limb are at stake, then the 
story might merit attention; ‘all news is local’ is another dictum, 
meaning the ‘relevance’ criterion is mostly geographical and demands 
local demographic impact as well; ‘hold the powerful to account’ is 
another traditional guideline which invokes the role of the press in 
questioning the so-called ‘power elite’ whether they be individuals, 
groups, organisations, or government departments; and the reliable 
old maxim ‘man bites dog’ suggests the ‘unusual’ story is always 
best to consider when ranking a subject for media attention.6 Other 
factors which are in common use to determine the newsworthiness 
of a story on any given day of the week in newsrooms up and down 
the UK could include a mix of the following (in no particular order): 
celebrity (is someone with a news profile in the mix?); shocking and/
or ‘bad news’ issues which might involve human tragedy; ‘good’ news 
or ‘nice surprises’ — reversing the previous category; ‘follow-ups’ or 
‘new chapter’ stories which return to a previous topic and add a new 
body of research, slant or interpretation (these sometimes follow the 
pattern of more serious investigative articles); ‘exclusives’ which the 
news organisation has decided merit their own resources, attention and 
interpretation — these can range from a tabloid ‘splashing’ on the front 
page with a tale of celebrity sex, drugs and anything else to hand, or 
6  I have witnessed this in action during a visit to a Scottish courtroom where a case 
was being heard involving a suspect accused of a knife crime. This in itself is not an 
unusual scenario. However, the accused’s defence lawyer successfully argued the 
stabbing victim had launched herself onto the blade which the accused happened 
to be holding. The jury returned a Not Proven verdict. Press coverage in Scottish 
courts has declined markedly in recent years. This is primarily due to resourcing by 
publications and professional companies employing court reporters. This means 
fewer cases are covered in the press which, in itself, is a challenge to the democratic 
process to have court process and practice recorded and monitored in an open way. 
This can affect complex cases which have later resulted in miscarriages of justice. 
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a broadsheet reporting on its front page and website the results of a 
several-years’ long investigation into phone hacking.7
Depending on the news organisation involved, they also frequently 
have to be constructed according to internal ethical guidelines. Broadcast 
news organisations, like the BBC for example, adhere to the concept 
of journalistic ‘balance’ by timing input from ‘sides’ of the debate in 
an effort to present arguments from the main parties within the same 
amount of air-time. 
Feature articles tend to be on the inside pages of publications and 
are afforded more space for in-depth coverage and analysis. They are 
sometimes investigative in nature and incorporate more facts, expert 
opinion, analysis and comment. They are also the place for journalists to 
express more colour and flair in their writing. News features, as the name 
implies, are something of a hybrid of news and features. The latter form 
would have been ideal print territory for news organisations to have 
carried coverage of an in-depth nature of an independent Scotland’s 
likely security landscape. Randall’s ideal that there is no great difference 
between the standards in either form would have applied here.8
Comment or opinion pieces have more room for debate, subjective 
opinion and polemical approaches. This can lead to articles which vary 
considerably in terms of content, analysis and factual underpinning. 
Humour, ‘devil’s advocacy’ and colourful language feature heavily. 
Personal ‘lifestyle’ and ‘diary’ narratives can sometimes dominate this 
genre. However, as Hobsbawm and Lloyd have argued persuasively, 
there are columnists from both ends of the print-press spectrum who 
are fully paid-up members of a ‘commentariat […] taken seriously by 
most of those who constitute the political class’.9
‘Investigative’ articles form a notoriously difficult journalism category 
to pin down. As I have demonstrated elsewhere there are many disputes 
7  [N.a.], ‘Phone Hacking | Media’, Guardian (2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
media/phone-hacking 
8  D. Randall, The Universal Journalist, 4th edn. (London: Pluto Press, 2011).
9  J. Hobsbawm and J. Lloyd, The Power of the Commentariat: How Much Do Commentators 
Influence Politics and Public Opinion?: A Report (Oxford: Editorial Intelligence, 2008).
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about the roots of the term, the genre and its practices.10 In practical 
terms it endeavours to challenge the perceived ill of ‘passivity’.11
Its definition is also hotly disputed. The criteria adopted by this 
author and based on the founding principles of the US’s Investigative 
Reporters and Editors (IRE) group are that: the project must be the 
result of the author’s own work and not simply the result of passive 
receipt of other’s labours; it must be a subject that others wish to conceal 
from wider public knowledge; it must be relevant and have, where 
possible, impact and ramifications in the legal and/or legislative and 
policy realms. This three-point checklist is, by even seasoned journalists’ 
standards, difficult to fulfil regularly. Aiming for at least two out 
of these three points usually produces hard-hitting journalism with 
investigative qualities. 
The genre of modern investigative reporting is usually regarded as 
being from the Watergate era onwards — meaning from the mid-1970s. 
The primacy and impact of this form of journalism has been challenged, 
however. Both Schudson and Pilger, for example, have questioned 
its social and industry impact and challenged whether the myth of 
Watergate has been helpful to delivering agenda-changing stories 
and questioning the deeper, often hidden political motives which lie 
behind news headlines.12 There are many constraints — inside and 
outside news organisations — on the ability of, and opportunity for, a 
journalist or group of journalists to engage in investigative journalism. 
Lack of finance, lack of training and specialisation, restricted access to 
legal advice, and a dearth of editorial encouragement and ambition in 
the workplace are just a few constraining factors. Lack of a guaranteed 
outcome in terms of a headline-grabbing story and follow-on articles 
(or indeed a cast-iron assurance that the entire project won’t become a 
magnet for expensive litigation) are common reasons, often cited, for 
not pursuing such projects. Within the last decade, the use of Freedom 
of Information (FOI) laws; data journalism techniques; cross-border 
10  E. O’Neill, ‘Digging Deeper’, in Investigative Journalism: Dead or Alive?, ed. by J. Mair 
and R. L. Keeble (Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing, 2011), pp. 291–307.
11  T. Harcup, Journalism: Principles and Practice (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 
and Singapore: SAGE Publications, 2015); O’Neill (2011).
12  J. Pilger, Tell Me No Lies: Investigative Journalism and Its Triumphs (London: Vintage, 
2005); M. Schudson, Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and 
Reconstruct the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 
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projects, and other online developments, have ensured something of 
an evolution and resurgence of the genre. Within the UK, conferences, 
crowd-funded initiatives, two dedicated university masters’ degrees 
and a plethora of major national and international stories related to the 
genre have assured its public and industry profile remains high.
In theoretical terms, investigative journalism is regarded highly by 
many as a ‘watchdog’ on those in power and a ‘voice for the voiceless’. 
It therefore tends to take on myriad political meanings within that 
sphere and its attendant discourse. Within the more general realm 
of accountability post-Watergate it is broadly seen as a contributory 
factor in the process of ensuring a healthy democracy: ‘[investigative 
journalism has a role as] the tribune of the commoner, exerting on his 
or her behalf, the right to know, to examine and to criticise’.13 In theory 
the pursuit of investigative projects is a noble one and its normative 
role within society as a force for good is a position with which I readily 
concur. I agree with the argument that investigative journalism involves 
a ‘morally engaged voice’ and stakes out this argument within the 
normative landscape discussed by Ettema and Glasser, marking out its 
practitioners as ‘custodians of conscience’.14 Yet, equally, I acknowledge 
the difficulty of the current terrain, especially within a Scottish print 
press context, where it is extremely difficult to do investigations for the 
reasons stated earlier. Individual journalists do their utmost and others 
on certain ‘beats’ co-opt investigative approaches as the need arises. 
This results in a patchy picture in terms of output and consistency.
The media and Scottish security pre-referendum
Taking a qualitative, methodologically-narrow approach, looking at 
monthly output across broadsheet newspapers in the UK, I found a 
cluster of articles about Scottish security in the run up to the referendum. 
Initially, the articles featured mainly in publications that have their 
headquarters in London, and take a critical tone towards the issue.
13  H. de Burgh, Investigative Journalism: Context and Practice (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 282. 
14  J. S. Ettema and T. L. Glasser, Custodians of Conscience: Investigative Journalism and 
Public Virtue (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 4.
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In January 2013, for example, following oral evidence heard in 
Edinburgh by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
censorious headlines were generated in several newspapers by what 
was perceived as a lacklustre performance by then Deputy First Minister 
Nicola Sturgeon. In evidence she stated, for example, that £200 million 
would be budgeted for security and intelligence. This was challenged by 
Rory Stewart MP, who said that was for running costs only and did not 
include the billions of pounds required to establish the agencies required 
to overcome the threats she identified. Despite criticism over the lack 
of detail forthcoming from the Deputy First Minister, the information 
contained in these reports about the Scottish Government’s plans was 
not markedly different from that which was eventually published in 
November of that year. The reporting of this was less widespread in 
Scotland-based newspapers than one might have anticipated. In-depth 
coverage came from the London-based papers, in particular The 
Guardian, for example, which had then only one full-time Edinburgh-
based correspondent. Its report raised many of the core issues which 
would come, in my view, to bedevil the SNP Government’s plans as 
the year progressed.15 The article was in technical terms a news feature 
which was published in both print and digital editions. 
In Scotland and in contrast, the left-leaning tabloid The Daily Record 
ran a news feature article which was largely uncritical of the SNP 
Government’s plans and Sturgeon’s evidence about a future Scottish 
intelligence agency. Its headline and content reported the plans 
outlined at her appearance but indicated little about the sceptical line of 
questioning to which she had reportedly been exposed.16
Other newspapers in England continued in a similar vein in 2013. 
Whilst this chapter examines, in the main, the media scrutiny of the 
intelligence issues contained in the White Paper, many articles surveyed 
tended to fold the issue in with the general SNP ‘defence’ plans. Others 
ignored this and reported the whole issue of defence in negative terms 
within news articles. The reporting of The Daily Telegraph throughout 
15  Severin Carrell, ‘Scotland Facing “Enormous” Costs for Independent Security’, 
Guardian, 28 January 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/28/scotland- 
enormous-costs-independent-security
16  [N.a.], ‘Deputy First Minister Says Independent Scotland Will Have Its Own 
Security Service’, Daily Record, 28 January 2013, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/
news/scottish-news/scottish-government-will-set-up-its-own-security-1560814
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the summer and early autumn of 2013 was indicative of the general tone 
and nature of its coverage of the wider defence issue.17
The Independent in September 2013 publicised that the Commons 
Defence Select Committee believed that the £2.5 billion Scottish defence 
budget was too low in a news feature piece. This was a full two months 
before Scotland’s Future was published. The Daily Telegraph followed suit 
in November with almost precisely the same theme in another news 
article.18
Whitehall’s response to the possible move to independence came in 
its paper Scotland analysis: Security in November 2013. This was taken at 
face value by most English newspapers in news articles which covered 
it and was similar in tone and content to other coverage which was 
critical of an independent Scotland’s future security and intelligence 
plans. This was a subtle but nevertheless crucial issue inasmuch as little 
interrogation of this paper’s contents were undertaken, despite their 
significance in relation to the separate SNP Scottish Government plans 
in its own White Paper. 
One of the few exceptions was The Guardian, which scrutinised its 
language, factual accuracy and claims in an in-depth analysis piece by 
defence specialist Richard Norton-Taylor. The latter included a detailed 
inference that the remaining UK would not necessarily share its 
intelligence with an independent Scotland and that the EU and NATO 
wouldn’t necessarily welcome an independent Scotland into the fold of 
either. It also noted in a somewhat sceptical tone:
The Home Office paper also includes tendentious arguments suggesting 
that one of the problems would be the lack of accountability of new 
Scottish security and intelligence agencies.
17  Simon Johnson, ‘Philip Hammond Pours Scorn on SNP’s “Incoherent” Scottish 
Defence Plan’, Telegraph, 14 March 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
scotland/9928041/Philip-Hammond-pours-scorn-on-SNPs-incoherent-Scottish-
defence-plan.html; Simon Johnson, ‘MPs ‘Unconvinced’ by SNP Defence Plan for 
Independent Scotland’, Telegraph, 27 September 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/scotland/10337718/MPs-unconvinced-by-SNP-defence-plan-for-
independent-Scotland.html
18  Nigel Morris, ‘Alex Salmond’s SNP Plans for Scottish Independence Criticised for 
Lacking Crucial Detail over Defence Plans’, Independent, 26 September 2013, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/alex-salmonds-snp-plans-for-scottish-
independence-criticised-for-lacking-crucial-detail-over-defence-8842555.html
 1897. Press Scrutiny, Security and Intelligence in an Independent Scotland
As a ‘separate state’, Scotland could not ‘share’ the UK’s security and 
intelligence agencies ‘for reasons of sovereignty and democratic 
accountability’, it says. ‘They would instead continue to operate in the 
national interest of the continuing UK’.19 
It adds: ‘The UK could not share secret intelligence with an independent 
Scottish state that had been passed to it by another country without the 
originator’s consent’.20
The Home Office paper continues: ‘It takes time to build this trust 
and confidence. Other states would only share with an independent 
Scottish state what it was in their own interests to share’.21
The paper went on to explain that automatic access to the Five Eyes 
group of allies would not be on the cards. The Home Office makes 
Scotland seem as though it is just coming out of the backwoods of an 
unknown continent.
The conclusion that might be cautiously drawn from the coverage was 
that, by and large, the English-based press in news, and news features, 
was sceptical, critical and sometimes outright hostile to the Scottish 
Government’s plans for security and intelligence. This was the case before 
and after the publication of the White Paper in November 2013. This could 
arguably be explained in editorial terms, by the fact that this policy was 
of key importance to the UK Government since an independent Scotland 
created, at the very least, a significant alteration to its existing defence 
profile. It was also an issue which might be regarded as a ‘hot button’ 
topic which could resonate with the reading public. More cynically, if 
editors were minded, it was also easily moulded into a scare story which 
cast Scotland as the ‘soft underbelly’ of a disunited Kingdom. 
The Scottish press were focused on the myriad other policy issues 
related to the referendum, but when it did turn its attention — which was 
not often — to the issues of security and intelligence plans, it registered 
a less critical tone. This may have been because it was examining 
issues that were perhaps seen as more relevant to the average reader, 
or because it was simply not editorially minded to commit resources 
19  Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Scotland: Playing Games with Britain’s Security’, 
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to reviewing the complex nature of intelligence and security matters, a 
subject that requires cultivation of sources and journalistic commitment.
Others may arrive at different conclusions, of course. For example, 
in Chapter 6 of this volume Sandy Hardie argues that a rigorous 
understanding of the intelligence landscape at UK level, including 
the complex weave of its partnership with Scotland at multiple levels, 
was cold-shouldered by the Scottish media as something too hot to 
handle. He might be correct in some ways. However, as someone with 
a long professional track record in the investigative field in Scotland 
and elsewhere, and as someone who engaged in a BBC project directly 
related to this matter in the same timeframe, I sensed a more multi-
layered series of challenges within the media when it came to covering 
security and intelligence issues. These were not easily explained and, 
even with the benefit of hindsight, remain infuriatingly complex and, 
at times, contradictory. However there were exceptions and I would 
argue that some individual case studies might be as helpful as a more 
sweeping approach, since they reveal how some journalists recognised 
that very same gap but did — within professional constraints — deliver 
engaging output nonetheless.
The Herald newspaper was a rare example of a newspaper regularly 
following this subject and reporting with detail, balance and perspective. 
In my view it was, with, perhaps, The Guardian, the exception that 
proved the rule. An article on 30 June 2013, for example, rebutted 
the widespread and more common claims that the SNP intelligence 
proposals were poorly planned. This piece argued that the plans were 
feasible and the existing institutional experience within the Scottish 
police ranks could adapt to the proposed new arrangements. Using 
their own source, an authority figure with a professional track record in 
this arena, they laid out an alternative view than that heavily featured 
in mostly London-based sources in previous articles:22
Allan Burnett insisted security services could be ‘readily created’ and 
traditional alliances easily maintained if Scots vote Yes next year.
His remarks come as figures close to the UK security establishment warn 
that SNP strategists have ‘naïvely’ underestimated how much time and 
money it will take to create a secret police service.
22  David Leask, ‘Spy Wars’, Herald, 30 June 2013, http://www.heraldscotland.com/
news/13111636.Spy_wars/
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Burnett was the old Strathclyde Police’s head of intelligence and 
Scotland’s counter-terrorism co-ordinator before retiring in 2010 with 
the rank of assistant chief constable, and endorsing the SNP.
He believes Scottish policing — with the biggest Special Branch outside 
London and substantial existing capacity to deal with terrorists and 
organised crime — already has the basis of a strong MI5-style domestic 
security service.
He has accused UK authorities of refusing to discuss post-independence 
intelligence sharing in order ‘to cut off debate’ on the issue.
Burnett said: ‘Their studied intention is to fill the discussion gap they 
have created with scurrilous scaremongering. “The Americans won’t 
share intelligence with you”, “you’re leaving yourselves open to terrorist 
attack”. The truth is that an independent Scotland would face less of 
a threat, intelligence institutions will be readily created, and allies will 
remain allies’.
The Herald followed this up with another news piece a month later at 
the end of July 2013, which lent another fresh perspective on the issue. 
This suggested that Scottish civil servants were exploring Scandinavian 
intelligence models which might be transplanted into a Scottish context 
in a future independent Scotland:
Scottish civil servants are investigating how to create Nordic-style 
intelligence services post-independence.
The Sunday Herald understands government officials have been 
sounding out international experts on security for more than a year.
Their focus, sources stress, is firmly on developing the kind of counter-
espionage and counter-terrorist capacity developed in NATO members 
Norway and Denmark and neutral Sweden.23
The report continued with details of how Scottish academics and 
members of the Scottish government had met to discuss Nordic models 
of a post-independence security and intelligence model. Unlike the 
consistently negative tones woven through earlier articles in London-
based newspapers, this article introduced new information (e.g. the 
Nordic model) into the debate, emphasising their relatively small 
intelligence operations while pointing out that they were still trusted 
23  David Leask, ‘Scottish Civil Servants Probe Plans for “Nordic” Intelligence Services 
after Independence’, Herald, 28 July 2013, http://www.heraldscotland.com/
news/13115795.Scottish_civil_servants_probe_plans_for__Nordic__intelligence_
services_after_independence/
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western partners. The piece still aimed for balance by continuing 
with comments from sceptical contributors whose backgrounds were 
mentioned for context:
Pro-UK politicians have cast doubts on the ability of any Nordic-style 
Scottish domestic security service to quickly become a trusted ally of 
MI6 and the CIA.
Former MI6 officer Meta Ramsay — a Labour peer — has called SNP 
rhetoric on the issue ‘extremely naive’.
However, Ramsay, who served in Finland and Sweden during the Cold 
War, is also an admirer of Nordic intelligence services.
But she also disagrees on how easy it would be to create a Nordic-style 
domestic security service, perhaps on the basis of existing police special 
branch capability.
Other intelligence experts contacted by the Sunday Herald acknowledge 
Scotland would take time to build up relationships — but stressed the 
country would have information that it could bargain for access to the 
intelligence services of western allies.24
The article then concluded with ‘official’ comment from the Scottish 
Government itself:
Asked about the civil servants investigation into creating a Nordic-style 
intelligence service a Scottish Government spokesperson said: ‘The 
Scottish Government is engaging with a wide range of experts and 
stakeholders in developing its proposals for independence.
This engagement includes informal discussions as well as consideration 
of proposals by leading experts in panels such as the Fiscal Commission 
Working Group, the Welfare Commission, and the Expert Commission 
on Energy Regulation announced earlier this month.25
This article conforms to a ‘new chapter’ or ‘follow-up’ news piece. It 
contains revelations on the basis of original reporting and aims at 
balance and to provide context throughout. Neither side in the debate 
is given favourable status. The tone of the piece is one of revelation 
and veracity. The official source — in this case the UK Government — is 
quoted only at the end and it is therefore not elevated to a status of 
higher-truth or authoritative knowledge.
Earlier in July 2014 The Herald ran a brief but significant opinion piece 
regarding the ‘pros and cons’ of an independent Scotland establishing 
24 Ibid.
25  Ibid.
 1937. Press Scrutiny, Security and Intelligence in an Independent Scotland
its own cyber-security strategy. This was written by Dr Neil Anderson, 
Security Director at the FarrPoint consultancy, and conformed to 
the model of being an ‘expert’ authored piece, written without any 
political view or agenda that the host newspaper might retain, aiming 
for verifiable factual accuracy and a degree of professional balance 
in his capacity as a consultant. The article introduced the ‘both sides’ 
approach, detailing the opportunities and potential pitfalls of an 
independent Scotland having to organise its own cyber defences. It 
listed the potential challenges and structural focus the new operation 
would potentially need to plan for:
Clearly, the move to an independent government would lead to a change 
in priorities for the security services, which could include:
•  Moving away from mass surveillance and a dragnet approach to 
intelligence gathering.
•  Concentrating cyber security defences on critical economic and 
commercial interests, building on the experience of other European 
countries such as Estonia. Estonia is considered to be the world leader 
in national cyber defence after a co-ordinated Russian cyber attack in 
2007.
•  Making domestic counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism work, 
such as that undertaken by GCHQ and MI5, less of a priority.
•  Supervision of the intelligence service becoming open and 
democratically accountable.26
There are significant caveats around a Scottish intelligence agency’s 
room for manoeuvre on some of these points. The physical network 
layout throughout Scotland and the UK means that very few 
connections from other countries land in Scotland, with most landing 
in Cornwall near GCHQ’s listening post at Bude. This means that, at 
least in the medium term, internet and corporate network traffic would 
be subject to UK Government surveillance, regardless of the wishes of 
the Scottish Government. It is likely that a condition of support from 
allied intelligence agencies would be cooperation in sharing signals 
intelligence with other agencies.27
26  Neil Anderson, ‘Agenda: Pros and Cons of an Independent Scotland’s Cyber Security 
Strategy’, Herald, 10 July 2014, http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/13169217.
Agenda__Pros_and_cons_of_an_independent_Scotland_s_cyber_security_strategy/ 
27 Ibid.
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The piece continues with an analysis of the situation should 
independence not be chosen in the referendum, suggesting that there 
is perhaps something to be said for Scotland having access to the 
UK’s intelligence services and their output, but also reflecting on the 
implications for Scotland’s own cyber-defence’s strategic priorities 
within a system that regards anti-terrorism as its own top priority. 
It concludes: ‘Whichever way the vote goes, it is clear that there are 
opportunities and risks for Scotland on both sides’.28
The article introduced a fresh and important perspective to the 
debate inasmuch as it moved away from the debate about how ‘safe’ 
an independent Scotland would be, towards another perspective which 
asks what should Scotland be defending which is different from the 
current UK-wide model? The information and detail published in the 
article answer that from a detached point of view, laying out facts and 
views which were not politically partial or partisan in language.
Part of the connective tissue of the independent Scotland and 
intelligence issue debate was the long-held belief in some quarters that 
the UK security services had covertly interfered in the political arena 
in the past, were currently interfering, and would interfere at some 
unspecified point in the future. As far back as 2007, for example, Scotland 
On Sunday reported that:
THE SNP was spied on by British secret service agents, previously 
classified Government files seen by Scotland on Sunday have finally 
proved.
Claims of surveillance of nationalist politicians by intelligence 
officers have circulated for years, but the new papers provide the first 
incontrovertible evidence that the state spied on the SNP in the 1950s.
Agents from MI5 and Special Branch infiltrated the party as part of a 
campaign to undermine support for Scottish independence, the papers 
show.
The revelations have put First Minister Alex Salmond — who in opposition 
complained about closed Government files on the SNP — under pressure 
to close a legal loophole that allows the secret services to intercept the 
calls of Scottish parliamentarians.
28  Ibid.; Gerry Braiden, ‘Inside Track: MI5 Input in the Independence Debate’, 
Herald, 7 July 2014, http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/13168760.INSIDE_ 
TRACK__MI5_input_in_the_independence_debate/
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The files, which have been opened and placed in the UK National 
Archives in Kew, show that throughout the 1950s Special Branch 
officers posed as Nationalist supporters and attended party meetings 
and rallies.
The dossiers contain first-hand accounts from numerous unnamed 
agents of party meetings, and also include names of SNP members 
and sympathisers. They also provided transcripts of speeches and give 
particular attention to members they believed were on the more radical 
and militant wing of the party.29
The same theme was updated in early June 2013 when The Herald ran 
an article about a letter sent by a leading high-profile Nationalist (a 
popular and influential MSP, but not a member of the governing SNP, 
it should be noted) to the then head of MI5 asking for assurance that 
the agency was not interfering in the referendum debate and process. 
The letter acted as the ‘peg’ for the article, thus allowing the topic to 
be aired without any hard evidence of the interference being a reality. 
The MSP, and the article itself, then referred back to the 1970s and the 
allegations surrounding the UK security services being complicit in 
undermining the Wilson government. The article aims to balance this 
approach towards the end when a source with security credentials is 
asked about the likelihood of MI5 interfering in the referendum process. 
His answer suggests any involvement would be benign, even helpful: 
Crispin Black, a former intelligence adviser to ex-prime minister Tony 
Blair and the Joint Intelligence Committee, said he believed MI5 would 
monitor the independence debate: ‘My guess is that MI5 would have 
the referendum on its radar, primarily to ensure its fairness. There’s 
definitely a national security angle to Scottish independence that the 
security services would be aware of, but my sense is that they would be 
stopping dirty tricks, rather than trying to initiate them’.30
In July 2014, an opinion column in The Herald returned briefly to the 
same issue, urging readers to take the issue seriously in light of some 
historical and recent developments in the intelligence world. This was 
29  [N.a.], ‘Files Prove That MI5 Spied on SNP’, Scotsman, 16 June 2007, http://www.
scotsman.com/news/politics/files-prove-that-mi5-spied-on-snp-1-1423283
30  Paul Hutcheon, ‘MI5 Spies Told: Stay out of Referendum’, Herald, 9 June 2013, 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13108551.MI5_spies_told__stay_out_of_ 
referendum/
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a piece that was rightly labelled as ‘opinion’ since, although timely and 
thought-provoking, it did not deliver fresh revelations to support its 
thesis.31
The same newspaper ran another piece reporting on another news 
organisation’s opinion poll which stated that 25% of the 1084 individuals 
polled by YouGov in previous weeks thought that MI5 would try 
to ‘prevent’ a Yes vote or ‘rig’ the outcome.32 It was a headline that 
could have gone in several directions, since the statistics suggested an 
overwhelming majority of people were sceptical of the thesis that MI5 
was carrying out ‘skullduggery’ in the ten days before the referendum 
vote, and indeed the poll was split when the additional question of 
UK concealment of oil fields was asked.33 Read another way, the poll 
results could have produced very different headlines. Moreover, the 
response to the proposition, without any special knowledge or insight 
on either the pollsters’ or the participants’ parts rendered the results 
merely indicative of a vague belief without any verifiable information 
with which to work.34 This piece, which broadly conforms to the ‘news 
feature’ model was constrained by the reporting of a separate news 
organisation’s poll findings, and had no control over the questions 
asked and played no role in the design of the study. This perhaps 
accounted for the timing of the article and its inherent limitations of 
meaning, resonance and depth. 
On a freelance basis, during 2014, and against the press background 
examined in this chapter, I began researching the issues surrounding this 
debate for a BBC Radio Scotland documentary. Initially this was aimed 
at being a pre-referendum production but eventually it was strongly 
suggested that it would work better after the referendum. BBC Scotland 
at that time, and indeed since, came under criticism for their coverage 
of the referendum, mostly from pro-independence campaigners. In 
recent times the BBC’s own Audience Council in Scotland also levelled 
31  Braiden, Herald, 7 July 2014.
32  David Leask, ‘One-Quarter Fear MI5 Will Try to Prevent Yes Vote’, Herald, 8 
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criticism at the broadcaster for being too ‘anglicised’ in its coverage.35 
In this atmosphere a project looking at ‘Spying in the 21st Century’ 
was potentially a difficult one to undertake. The usual worries about 
producer’s guidelines, balance, and impartiality were aired. Little 
additional investigative work of this type on this topic was undertaken 
by colleagues. This was probably due to the normal budgetary concerns 
(i.e. investigative projects are usually more expensive and require 
specialisation, editorially and sometimes legally) and the news-value 
judgement that other topics related to, for example, the economy, health, 
and currency, might be more important to audiences. Due to the fact 
that some sources I consulted were retired ex-intelligence officers, I also 
had to consult the BBC’s own lawyers in case security was breached 
during interviews. 
One key area, which everyone was sensitive to, was the matter of 
reviewing the Scottish Government’s White Paper in a way which might, 
as one producer put it, be seen, ‘after the fact’. Producers felt it was 
unfair and potentially damaging to scrutinise the issue a few months 
after the referendum result — No — had been delivered by the Scottish 
electorate on 18 September 2014. I therefore had to focus on the history 
of Scots in the security services; the role of the intelligence community 
in Scotland; and briefly, the implications for security if Scotland had 
become — or were to become — an independent nation. Former Special 
Branch, MI5 and MI6 officers, as well as security experts and academics 
in security research, were consulted. This was my attempt to bring 
an investigative slant to the debate, utilise some of the primary and 
secondary material available as an academic, access the press reporting 
mentioned throughout this chapter, and deliver a project which might 
be, at least, thought-provoking around the wider theme. It was never 
designed to be definitive or the last word on the issue — rather it aimed 
to be part of the discussion. What was significant, however, was the 
availability of sources willing to shed light on all aspects of the debate 
under discussion. This suggests that if other journalists and editors had 
chosen to look at this issue in a committed and consistent form before 
35  [N.a.], ‘BBC Urged to Review Scottish Coverage in Wake of Independence 
Row BBC Urged to Review Scottish Coverage in Wake of Independence Row’, 
Guardian, 14 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/14/bbc- 
scottish-coverage-independence-row-referendum
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the independence referendum then it could have been achievable. This 
assumes both editorial and financial support and, for the journalist, a 
realistic amount of time to investigate the matter and, where applicable, 
the resources to scrutinise it in depth across the UK. Specialised security 
experience and contacts within the sector would have helped focus and 
refine this undertaking and assisted in the quality of the final report. 
Conclusions
The majority of the journalism looking at the issue of the referendum 
and the implications for Scotland’s intelligence capabilities fell into the 
categories of news, features, opinion and contributing commentary. 
There was little, if any at all, investigative journalism pre-referendum 
as commonly defined within the industry or indeed the academy’s 
definitions. Even under the constraints mentioned, this was enormously 
regrettable, since it would have probably widened, deepened and added 
illumination to this debate within the public sphere.
London-based publications by and large produced articles which 
sounded concern and even alarm for the perceived wider negative 
implications for UK security of the prospect of Scottish independence. 
Some Scottish publications implicitly followed this line. Most were 
predicated upon press releases, briefings and interviews from London-
based sources, although some did use Scotland-based sources too. 
The quality of these in terms of balance, research, verifiable fact and 
impartiality varied. Scotland-based publications’ interest in the issue 
also varied. The Herald consistently added new information to the 
debate, whilst making a genuine attempt to bring fresh voices and wider 
understanding to the topic. Their output looking at MI5 involvement, 
and the late poll supporting this notion, was not developed. For the most 
part, critical voices challenging their ‘top line’ themes were not avoided 
and their readers may have benefitted from this work. Amongst all the 
publishers they were potentially best placed to deliver a significant 
investigative contribution to the mix had they been so minded. 
My own contribution was undertaken against a post-referendum 
landscape where, arguably, appetite for anything related to the process 
was diminished. Its contents were refined during the editorial process 
to reflect a wider historical and cultural context with less emphasis on 
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investigating the contents of the Scottish Government’s security and 
intelligence plans. Instead, the discussion of these issues was explored 
in the last quarter of the programme. It is for others to judge how 
successful this was at analysing the contents of the plans laid out for the 
Scottish people and as an attempt at looking at the matter through the 
approach of investigative journalism.36
36  [N.a.], ‘Spying in the 21st Century: How Safe Are You?’, BBC Radio Scotland, 13 
January 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04xrv6c
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8. To Speak Security or Not to Speak 
Security? Responsibility and Deference 
in the Scottish Independence Debate
Andrew W. Neal
This chapter is about how and why security was debated and not 
debated in the Scottish independence referendum campaigns. It 
begins with a summary of the security content of the campaigns 
in the run up to the vote, arguing that ‘security’ was not entirely 
absent but not prominent either. The main focus is to discuss 
the political implications of speaking security, using the lens 
of securitisation theory. It argues that more security talk is 
not necessarily a good thing, because it may ramp up fear and 
mobilise security apparatuses. The chapter then considers the 
implications of staying silent on security, which are not innocent 
either. This is because historically, the power and authority of 
the state to declare and define security threats depended on the 
silent deference of the wider political class. By demonstration, 
the chapter compares the quietude of security politics in Scotland 
with the history and transformation of security politics at 
Westminster. 
© 2017 Andrew W. Neal, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.08
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Security was not absent from the independence debate, but nor was it 
prominent.1 In Scotland, the highest profile security issue was Trident, 
although in policy and academic parlance this is a matter of ‘defence’ 
rather than ‘security’.2 The 670 page Scottish Government White Paper 
offered a chapter on international relations and defence and another 
containing six pages on security and intelligence. The latter offered 
proposals for an independent Scotland to work closely with current 
allies, create stronger constitutional limitations on war powers, and 
establish a single Scottish intelligence agency that would operate within 
a strong human rights framework.3 
Measured by volume of material, the UK Government and UK 
Parliament produced more. This included the UK Government’s 
‘Scotland Analysis’ papers on defence and security. The latter is 
particularly interesting, representing an unprecedented accounting 
of every possible security-related agency in the UK, drawn very 
widely, from the intelligence services and their offshoots to specialised 
police agencies such as the Financial Intelligence Unit.4 At the same 
time, parliament conducted inquiries into the defence, foreign policy, 
security, and intelligence implications of Scottish independence via its 
select committees.5 The Foreign Affairs Committee evidence session 
1 For more forensic examinations of the debate, see Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume.
2  For the Nationalists, demanding the removal of Trident from Scotland seemed 
more a matter of principle than national security as such. The SNP policy to remain 
in NATO — a nuclear defence alliance — suggested they did not wish to abandon 
the principle of nuclear deterrence entirely, or at least that their internal policy-
making process had produced an ambiguity.
3  Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/00 
439021.pdf, pp. 232–51, 61–67. 
4  HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Cm. 8741: Security (London: HMSO, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/253500/Scotland_analysis_security.pdf
5  Scottish Affairs Committee, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force 
for Scotland-a Conspiracy of Optimism? (London: House of Commons, 2012); Scottish 
Affairs Committee, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How Would Separation 
Affect Jobs in the Scottish Defence Industry?, Eighth Report of Session 2012–13, Report, 
Together with Formal Minutes (London: HMSO, 2013); Defence Committee, The 
Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence. Sixth Report of Session 2013–14, 
Volume 1: Report, Together with an Appendix, Formal Minutes and Oral Evidence (London: 
HMSO, 2013), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Ck76yDPw1r8C; Foreign 
Affairs Committee, ‘Inquiry into Foreign Policy Implications of and for a Separate 
Scotland’ (2012), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/
commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2010/scotland/; 
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held in Edinburgh in January 2013 was significant because it seems to 
have changed SNP policy.6 Nicola Sturgeon told the committee that 
her colleagues were consulting on the feasibility of a Scottish foreign 
intelligence service, a Scottish MI6 in effect. Committee member 
Rory Stewart MP made this look unrealistic through his questioning, 
pointing out the costs and the fact that only a handful of larger states 
had the capacity to maintain dedicated foreign intelligence services. 
The subsequent White Paper proposed that an independent Scotland 
would have only a single combined intelligence agency. 
These documents and inquiries were discussed in the press by 
various protagonists and analysts, but they were not a feature of the 
headline public debate. More general security discussion was not 
extensive when compared with contentious issues such as the currency 
of an independent Scotland or the longevity of North Sea oil. In the 
televised debates, few questions asked were about national security 
or related issues such as terrorism. In one exception early on, Home 
Secretary Theresa May and Defence Secretary Philip Hammond made 
speeches claiming that an independent Scotland would be at greater 
risk of terrorist attack if it was deprived of the security umbrella and 
border controls of the UK.7 Yet despite claims that the private name 
for the ‘Better Together’ campaign was ‘Project Fear’,8 pro-Union 
campaigners did not repeat this type of security argument, which was 
easily dismissed by Nationalists as scaremongering. 
Neither side made security a prominent feature of their campaigns. 
Instead, they repeated predictable and relatively uncontroversial lines. 
For the Nationalist, an independent Scotland would be secure outside 
Foreign Affairs Committee (2013); Scottish Affairs Committee, The Referendum on 
Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident — Days or Decades?, Fourth Report of 
Session 2012–13, Report, Together with Formal Minutes (London: HMSO, 2012).
6  N. Sturgeon evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Considerations 
for the UK and Scotland in the Event of Scotland Becoming an Independent Country, 
Sixth Report of Session 2012–2013 (London: HMSO, 2013), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf, Ev 62. 
7 [N.a.], ‘Home Secretary Theresa May in Scots Immigration Warning’, BBC News, 24 
March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-17498681; 
[N.a.], ‘Scottish Independence: Warning over “Weakened Military”’, BBC News, 2 
June 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21776602 
8  Tom Gordon, ‘I Admit It: The Man Who Coined the Project Fear Label’, Herald 
Scotland, 21 December 2014, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13194407. 
I_admit_it__the_man_who_coined_Project_Fear_label/
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the UK, and an independent Scottish government would act responsibly 
to make that so; for the Unionist, Scotland would be more secure within 
the UK, where it would continue to enjoy the protections of an extensive 
and well-established security and intelligence apparatus. Seen through 
the simplest interest-based political lens, Nationalists had an obvious 
stake in reassuring the public that Scotland did not face threats it 
could not manage alone or through anticipated partnerships with 
allies. Unionists had an obvious stake in stressing that an independent 
Scotland faced an uncertain world, and could no longer depend upon 
the UK security umbrella. 
Arguably, there was an element of disingenuousness in both these 
positions, not because of their contestable assessment of threat, but 
because the future security partnerships of an independent Scotland 
were difficult to foresee. They would depend on the future goodwill of 
other states, particularly the remaining UK and US. The Nationalist and 
Unionist positions could be seen as performative, in that they attempted 
to describe a certain future in order to shape the politics of the present, 
and to ‘perform’ a particular reality. Neither side displayed an appetite 
to push security issues further. As such, security did not become as 
politicized as other issues. 
Away from the campaigns, there were several attempts to provide 
independent expert assessments of the threats an independent Scotland 
might face. Examples included papers by the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI) and Chatham House, although these organisations are 
closely associated with the UK defence and intelligence community.9 The 
reports of our ESRC seminar series, ‘Security in Scotland, with or without 
Constitutional Change’, offered a different perspective.10 In particular, 
they pointed out that many important security-related questions that 
9  Rebecca Johnson and others, No Need to Be Afraid: An Assessment of Possible 
Threats to Scotland’s Security and How They Should Be Addressed (Biggar: The 
Jimmy Reid Foundation, 2012); Malcolm Chalmers, ‘The End of an “Auld 
Sang”: Defence in an Independent Scotland’, RUSI Briefing Paper (2012); 
Chatham House, ‘Scotland’s Independence Referendum’, Chatham House 
(London 2013), https://www.chathamhouse.org/research/regions/europe/UK/
scotlands-independence-referendum
10  Andrew W. Neal, Julie Kaarbo, and Charles Raab, ‘ESRC Seminar Series: “Security 
in Scotland, with or without Constitutional Change”’, Centre on Constitutional 
Change (Edinburgh 2013–2015), http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/
tags/security-defence
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a newly independent Scotland would face had not been discussed in 
public. These neglected issues included the democratic accountability 
of the UK security services in Scotland during the transition to 
independence and beyond, and the constitutional implications of any 
future security cooperation and intelligence sharing between Scotland 
and the remaining UK.11 These expert reports received media coverage, 
but were not widely debated or politicised.12 
With this summary in mind, the aim of this chapter is to consider 
the political implications of the security debate, or lack of. How should 
we judge the fact that security was not widely discussed? How much 
public debate on security would have been enough? To take the 
democratic position that more public debate is always better does not 
adequately consider the risks posed by security talk (see, for example, 
Chapter 7 in this volume). On the other hand, to take the ‘securitarian’ 
position that the threat always needs to be taken more seriously does 
not consider the extent to which security is a matter of intersubjective 
and manipulable collective fears, rather than merely cold hard realities 
(see, for example, Chapter 6 in this book). This chapter will argue that 
both security speech and security silence are implicated in the processes 
that shape and construct insecurities. This must be considered in light 
of the historic role that deference and recognition have played in the 
reproduction of state-based security authority.
The dilemma of speaking security
The idea that there is no simple way to ‘measure’ the reality of security 
threats has long been a cornerstone of the academic study of security.13 
This is because there is no neutral and objective Archimedean point 
from which to judge. Security threats are in the eye of the beholder. 
It is not that they are not real, but their perception and meaning is as 
much a part of their social and political ‘reality’ as any ‘objective’ aspect. 
11  Andrew W. Neal, ‘Fourth Report: Intelligence and Security Oversight in an 
Independent Scotland’ (2014), http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/
sites/default/files/papers/Intelligence and security oversight in an independent 
scotland 4th REPORT FINAL.pdf
12  Although see the ‘clash’ prompted by our first report: [N.a.] (2013).
13  Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 24.
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This is to say nothing about the physical destructiveness or likelihood 
of explosions, storms, floods, etc. Rather, it is to highlight the role that 
fear, judgment, and subjectivity play in how governments and publics 
perceive threats. 
Securitisation theory starts from this position. Its contribution is to 
offer an explanation of how insecurities are socially constructed through 
speech, and specifically through securitising speech acts that follow an 
established ‘grammar’ of threat, urgency, and exception.14 This makes 
‘security’ not a question of ‘realities out there’, but of political choices 
and responsibilities. Its founder Ole Waever argues: 
The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of 
any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at 
the feet of analysts, decision-makers and activists alike: why do you call 
this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this — or of not 
doing it?15 
Speaking security thus has constitutive effects on insecurities, and 
potentially in turn on security policy and practice. To talk about an issue 
in terms of ‘security’ — rather than in alternative terms such as ‘social 
problem’, ‘political challenge’ or ‘economic opportunity’  — adds to the 
security inflection of that issue. Such talk may help to justify draconian 
policies, make certain communities ‘suspect’, or persuade governments 
to remove issues from open deliberation in favour of closed executive 
decisions or other security ‘black boxes’ within the state. It may 
encourage a permissive atmosphere for violence and contribute to 
a general politics of fear. Whoever speaks security in public must be 
careful about the consequences. These concerns about responsibility 
have long been at the heart of securitisation theory. 
The idea of a dilemma of speaking security comes from Jef 
Huysmans.16 Huysmans teases out elements of securitisation theory 
to stress that processes of securitisation through speech do not occur 
14  Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), p. 32.
15  Ole Wæver, ‘Securitizing Sectors?: Reply to Eriksson’, Cooperation and Conflict, 34, 3 
(1999), 334–40 (p. 334).
16  Jef Huysmans, ‘Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative 
Dilemma of Writing Security’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27, suppl. 1 (2002), 
41–62. Huysmans (p. 62) uses the term ‘writing security’, in reference to David 
Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Policies of Identity 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
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in a vacuum. ‘Security’ is historically and conceptually associated 
with an institutionalised set of security structures, expectations, and 
prerogatives, such as sovereign war powers and the military.17 To 
talk about an issue in security terms may mean not only constructing 
it as a security issue, but mobilising existing security institutions and 
pathways.18 
According to this view, the implications of security speech concern 
more than the immediate and instrumental political choice to construct a 
security issue or not. Security speech can tend towards extremes because 
‘security’ is already historically structured as a discourse and practice of 
extremes. The legacy of ‘security’ is one of existential threats, operational 
secrecy, and exceptional security powers.19 In any discussion of security 
there are already certain historical and institutionalised pathways that 
may end up being followed. Security speech — by potentially waking 
this sleeping giant of ‘security’ — can bring about consequences that 
reach ‘beyond the intentions and control of the individual’s practices 
of definition’.20 Huysmans writes, ‘speaking and writing about security 
is never innocent […]. Security writings participate in a political field 
where social questions are already contested in terms of crisis, threats, 
and dangers’.21 
To consider security and Scottish independence in terms of a 
dilemma of speaking security is to highlight the role of security speech 
in constituting insecurities and the perceived landscape of security 
threats faced by a country. In this light, the protagonists in the debate 
about Scottish independence did not simply face a political choice about 
how seriously to take ‘real’ security threats. Rather they faced a choice 
about how to speak about security in a volatile political situation that 
risked mobilising the historical grammar and institutional pathways of 
security. In the event, there was in fact little security talk in the Scottish 
independence debate, which largely avoided the risks of speaking 
17  Huysmans (2002), pp. 42–43.
18  Ibid.
19  One problem with securitisation theory is that it, ‘note[s] the sedimentation of a 
certain meaning of security, but transform[s] this observation into a conceptual 
axiom’, as Felix Çiuta puts it in his ‘Security and the Problem of Context: A 
Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35, 
02 (2009), 301–26 (p. 321).
20  Huysmans (2002), p. 42.
21  Ibid., p. 43.
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security. Nevertheless, this relative silence should not be considered 
innocent.
The dilemma of not speaking security
What did the referendum protagonists do by not speaking security? 
Waever implies in his quote above that there are implications and 
responsibilities in the choice not to securitise.22 There is always the 
choice to talk down a perceived threat, to de-escalate a relationship of 
enmity, or to find alternative, non-securitarian terms of debate. This is 
to desecuritise an issue.23 
Waever’s ideas about securitisation and desecuritisation were 
inspired by the peace initiatives and East-West détente of the late 1980s. 
His theory established the idea that speech could construct issues as 
security issues, but that, in turn, speech could deconstruct them back into 
‘merely political’ issues through desecuritisation.24 Michael C. Williams 
argues that this two-way process offers hope from a democratic point 
of view: because securitisation is part of the discursive realm, ‘security 
practices are thus susceptible to criticism and transformation’.25 But this 
begs the question of security and silence: what if there is little security 
discourse in the first place? 
Writing from a feminist perspective, Lene Hansen once mooted 
the possibility of a ‘silent security dilemma’.26 She pointed out the 
difficulty vulnerable individuals and groups may have in vocalising 
their insecurity. Examples include women facing domestic violence, 
or minorities persecuted in a repressive society. Hansen argued that 
this dilemma, ‘occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising 
something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate 
22  Wæver (1999), p. 334.
23  Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in On Security, ed. by Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86.
24  Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), pp. 4–5; See also Lene Hansen, ‘Reconstructing 
Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions 
for How to Apply It’, Review of International Studies, 38, 03 (2012), 525–46.
25  Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47, 4 (2003), 511–31 (p. 512).
26  Lene Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of 
Gender in the Copenhagen School’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 29, 2 
(2000), 285–306. 
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the threat being faced’.27 Hansen is concerned about the occasions when 
the subject cannot speak, when they cannot vocalise what threatens 
them. 
However, silence may not only be a sign of marginalisation or 
exclusion. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argued that silence may 
function as a form of power. It may confer legitimacy and recognition 
on those who do speak. Silence from a group, and ‘the absence of any 
refutation’, may imply that the one who is speaking speaks for them.28 
Silence may signify acquiescence, deference, or recognition. For 
Bourdieu, power depends on the conscious and unconscious choices 
of actors to go along with received wisdom and not to challenge 
recognised authorities. Such deference may be freely willed, but also 
coincide with subordinate positions in hierarchical power relationships, 
such as backbenchers toeing the party line. It may also reflect agreement, 
consensus, and shared outlooks on, for example, the nature of security 
threats and what should be done about them. As a former member of 
the Intelligence Security Committee explained to me on the committee’s 
lack of internal divisions: ‘It’s not that it’s not political, but that we all 
agree’.29
This calls for an extension of Huysmans’ dilemma of speaking security. 
I argue that there is a political dilemma posed not only by the choice to 
speak security, but also by the choice not to speak security. Silence on 
security is not simply the absence of speech. In the context of security, 
silence has meanings and effects. In the simplest terms borrowed from 
securitisation theory, silence may denote ‘audience acceptance’ of an 
instance of securitisation.30 Staying silent may be a responsible choice in 
some circumstances. It may be an irresponsible choice in others. It may 
mean abstaining from talking up threats and insecurities. It may mean 
not drawing attention to potential security risks, thereby encouraging 
complacency and leaving the public exposed to danger.31 There are 
more subtle political implications too, as Hansen and Bourdieu suggest. 
27  Hansen (2000), p. 287.
28  Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 190.
29  Anonymised interview with former ISC member.
30  Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), p. 33.
31  On the distinction between threat and risk see M. V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society 
at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1–2. 
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These do not relate to the judgment of specific instances of securitisation, 
but are structural and historically institutionalised. Silence may be 
the result of marginalisation and a lack of choice. And it may confer 
legitimacy on those who do speak security, especially if that means not 
challenging what they say or their authority to say it. As we will see, 
these points resonate with the history of British security politics and its 
structures of power, authority, and legitimacy. 
Elite security discourse and silence
Discussion of security was not entirely absent in the Scottish 
independence debate. In expert circles there was extensive activity. 
Some of this was behind closed doors, but it led to the publication of 
several reports. This milieu of security expertise is a good representation 
of the exclusionary structure of security discourse. Chatham House, for 
example, has given the world its famous ‘Chatham House rule’, which 
allows sensitive matters to be discussed by people who hold sensitive 
positions under the agreement that it will not be attributed to them in 
public. 
Expertise itself can be exclusionary, but particularly so on security 
when matters of secrecy and access are so important. The researchers 
at Chatham House and others such as RUSI often have the expertise, 
familiarity, access, and resources to offer authoritative analysis. One 
example is the RUSI report on the costs of relocating Trident.32 These 
researchers can be considered security insiders, or at least close to 
security insiders. No such organisations exist in Scotland. Our ESRC 
seminar series partly fulfilled this role from a different perspective, but 
we too followed the exclusionary ‘Chatham House rule’, for it is often 
the only basis on which current and former members of the intelligence 
community, police, military, and civil service can and will speak. 
In the context of the independence referendum, should security 
debate have extended further beyond this milieu of security experts? 
While their reports were met with media comment, and while there 
were private interactions between experts and government, there was 
32  Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: Could 
the UK’s Nuclear Force Be Moved after Scottish Independence?’, RUSI Occasional 
Paper (2014). 
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little interaction between this expert discourse and what might be called 
the ‘political class’ in Scotland. MSPs, for example, stayed well clear of 
security matters. 
These circumstances call for a qualification of the meaning of 
security silence. The de facto alternative to public debate on security is 
not complete silence, but a relatively exclusive expert discourse, limited 
to closed seminars, specialist committees, insiders, and government 
officials. Not debating security in public means leaving it to the experts. 
What does public and political silence on security mean in this 
context? Based on a reading of Bourdieu and an analysis of the history of 
British security politics, I argue that security silence confers recognition 
and legitimacy on those already authorised to speak security. As 
discussed, the security field is already structured to privilege certain 
actors: mainly the state, its representatives, and those close to them. 
Indeed, it is a fundamental feature of modern state sovereignty that the 
state claims the right and representative power to declare, define, and 
tackle security threats. 
Silence, deference, and recognition in the 
history of British security politics
The historical conventions of British security politics show how this 
representative power has been reproduced through practices of 
exclusion, deference, and recognition. For example, historically, British 
MPs were actively prevented from asking parliamentary questions of 
the security services. The standing orders of Parliament ruled all such 
questions out of order.33 Until the late 1980s, this exclusion was also 
manifest in the convention that that the intelligence services did not 
officially exist, and that by extension they would not subject be to 
parliamentary oversight as the rest of the executive was.34 
There are different reasons that explain this tradition, and it still 
exerts a powerful legacy. It is not only that the state needs to keep hold 
of intelligence and operational secrets for fear of endangering agents, 
33  H. Bochel, A. Defty, and J. Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the 
Intelligence Services (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 30.
34  Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 2012).
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giving away a tactical advantage to enemies, and sometimes hiding 
wrongdoing and preventing embarrassment. There has also been a 
general sense that national security is too important for grubby partisan 
politics. Politicians often repeat the principle that security is the first 
responsibility of the government. Many MPs remain silent on security, 
choosing not to speak. Historically, they rarely challenged the security 
prerogatives of the state (although this is changing). This deference, 
combined with exclusion through official secrecy and parliamentary 
rules and conventions, was the basis of the informal constitutional 
settlement on which the British security state rested, and to a large 
extent it remains so. 
Generally speaking, one reason why MPs do not raise certain topics 
is a lack of expertise. Intelligence expertise is especially difficult to 
acquire unless one has been a security ‘insider’, such as a minister or 
ISC member. Such expertise cannot be gained overnight. Andrew Defty 
argues that once the first handful of parliamentarians started engaging 
in intelligence oversight through their ISC membership in 1994, it took 
many years of ISC member turnover for even a small number of MPs 
to feel qualified to speak on such matters.35 Parliamentary debates on 
ISC reports remain sparsely attended to this day, with most speakers 
being current or former members of the ISC itself.36 Not speaking 
because of a lack of expertise is not simply exclusion but self-exclusion. 
It is an extension and internalisation of silence; another aspect of the 
reproduction of existing structures of security authority. 
Christopher Andrew, the official historian of MI5, considers that these 
conventions were recognised, supported, and upheld by Parliament.37 
In contrast, Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick show that there were many 
MPs who rejected this system of silence and tried to undermine it, 
particularly on the political left, but they were the exception rather than 
the norm.38 Either way, these conventions and structures began to give 
way towards the end of the Cold War, beginning with the ‘legalisation’ 
of MI5 through the 1989 Security Service Act, and the creation of a 
35  Andrew Defty, ‘Educating Parliamentarians About Intelligence: The Role of the 
British Intelligence and Security Committee’, Parliamentary Affairs, 61, 4 (2008), pp. 
621–41 (p. 630). 
36  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014), pp. 93–97.
37  Andrew (2012), p. 753.
38  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014), p. 33.
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modicum of democratic intelligence oversight through the Intelligence 
and Security Committee in 1994. 
The politics of intelligence oversight is only slowly changing, even 
after the Snowden revelations and recent ISC reform. But there have 
been challenges to the wider parliamentary convention of deference to 
security authorities since the 2003 Iraq war. Two broad developments 
are under way. First, fewer MPs are willing to trust the executive on 
security matters. Many current and former MPs now seriously regret 
the trust they placed in Tony Blair and the intelligence apparatus 
in 2003.39 The repercussions of this are still playing out. The UK 
parliamentary vote against intervention in Syria in August 2013 was 
instructive not only because the Government lost (which can partly 
be explained by bad parliamentary timing and planning), but because 
of the type of questions and demands made by many MPs in the 
debate. The ghosts of Iraq haunted the chamber. Some MPs refused 
to accept the government’s assessment of the intelligence on chemical 
weapons use in Syria. Some demanded to see raw intelligence material 
themselves in order to make their own assessments. This may also 
be an effect of greater availability of information and the rise of open 
source intelligence, which featured prominently in the debate. Amanda 
Gookins argues that this ‘has led many policymakers to believe they 
can be their own analysts, rendering them sceptical of the value of 
intelligence products’.40 This represents either a misunderstanding 
or a rejection of the way the intelligence assessment system — and 
specifically the Joint Intelligence Committee — works through caveats 
and not facts.41
The second development is that the meaning and scope of ‘security’ 
has expanded far beyond what it was in 1980s and 1990s. It is no longer 
limited to defence and intelligence, and hence no longer limited to defence 
and intelligence oversight. One effect is that it is no longer necessary for 
parliamentarians to engage directly with secretive intelligence policy in 
order to deal with ‘security’. For example, parliamentary committees 
39  Paul Flynn, How to Be an MP (London: Biteback, 2012), p. 211.
40  Amanda J. Gookins, ‘The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making’, SAIS Review of 
International Affairs, 28, 1 (2008), 65–74 (p. 68).
41  Lord Butler of Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(London: HMSO, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_
butler.pdf
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have in the last decade conducted inquiries into food security, energy 
security, cybersecurity, the meaning of national strategy, border control, 
surveillance, and communications data retention, to name a few. As a 
result, there is quantifiably more security speech at Westminster than 
in previous decades. Most of it does not follow the classic securitising 
‘grammar’ of existential threat and exception.42 It follows a general trend 
of security becoming less of an elite discourse, less exceptional and more 
normal. Parliament, the media, civil society, and the public are more 
willing to ask difficult questions and less willing to confer legitimacy on 
security authorities through silence.43 
Security politics in Scotland by comparison
Holyrood seems isolated from these trends in British security politics. In 
addition to the general absence of security issues in the independence 
debate, there has been a lack of activity on anything security-related 
in the Scottish parliament and its committees. Neither have there been 
policy statements from the Scottish government or any of the Scottish 
political parties on contemporaneous scandals such as Snowden’s 
revelations about GCHQ and NSA’s surveillance capabilities. It is also 
difficult to find MSPs who have demonstrated an interest in security 
matters (one exception is former senior police officer and Labour MSP 
Graeme Pearson). This is strange given the long-standing politicisation 
of Trident in Scotland, the depth of anti-Iraq war feeling among 
the Scottish public (which may be a factor in the collapse of Scottish 
support for the Labour Party), and the security activism of SNP MPs at 
Westminster such as Angus Robertson. 
The quietude of Holyrood on security might be explained by the fact 
that security is a ‘reserved’ matter: MSPs have not needed to engage 
with security. But it must also be remembered that if Scotland had voted 
Yes to independence, the Scottish Parliament would quickly have had 
42  Ole Wæver, ‘Politics, Security, Theory’, Security Dialogue, 42, 4–5 (2011), 465–80 (p. 
478).
43  See for example Andrew W. Neal, ‘Normalization and Legislative Exceptionalism: 
Counterterrorist Lawmaking and the Changing Times of Security Emergencies’, 
International Political Sociology, 6, 3 (2012), 260–76.
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to engage with all hitherto ‘reserved’ matters, including security and 
intelligence oversight. 
The implications of the silent security dilemma are significant in 
assessing the politics of security in the Scottish independence debate. 
The relative silence on the part of the protagonists could be judged as a 
responsible choice not to politicise security. But it is also an expression 
and reproduction of existing structures of power, expertise, and 
authority on security. Silence could reflect a form of marginalisation, 
specifically a lack of expertise on security amongst the Scottish political 
class. It is also possible that party leaders silenced discussion of security 
by their members because it was viewed as too politically risky. Yet 
although under devolution the Scottish political system has been 
structurally excluded from security matters, the decline of security 
deference at Westminster shows that these exclusionary structures are 
not set in stone. Their legitimacy and reproduction can be undermined 
by withdrawing the silence and passive deference on which they depend. 
Scottish independence would not necessarily mean an end to a 
deferential security relationship with Whitehall. There would be a 
complicated and no doubt difficult transition. The Scottish Government 
White Paper all but accepted that it would take some time to build up 
independent intelligence and security capabilities, certainly longer than 
the 18 months between a Yes vote and the proposed independence day 
of 24 March 2016. It argued that there were precedents for the British 
state offering security assistance to newly independent states such as 
its former colonies.44 The White Paper also suggested that it would be 
in the security interests of no one for a newly independent Scotland 
to be immediately ejected from the UK security umbrella and left to 
its own devices.45 Instead, it proposed that an independent Scotland 
would continue to work closely with UK security agencies.46 Between 
independence, transition, and continued UK assistance and cooperation, 
it is difficult to say whether this would have meant a withdrawal of 
UK intelligence and security capabilities from Scottish territory, such 
as MI5 field offices (of which are there are apparently two) and GCHQ 
surveillance capabilities, and what the timetable would have been.
44  Scottish Government (2013), p. 263. 
45 Ibid., pp. 264–65.
46 Ibid., p. 263.
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Conclusion
This chapter has explored the security content of the Scottish 
independence debate through the idea of a twin dilemma of speaking 
or not speaking security. It has argued that neither option can be seen 
as innocent. It has long been argued by the securitisation literature that 
security speech is constitutive of insecurities and, in turn, constitutive 
of security policies and practices. Security speech is not only a question 
of political choice, but also of unintended consequences, because 
speakers are not necessarily free to construct the meaning of security 
issues as they wish. They are always in danger of mobilising the legacy 
of security institutions, pathways, expectations, and meanings. In this 
sense, following Waever and Huysmans, the choice to speak security 
is political and comes with responsibilities. This is a good reason for 
political actors to exercise caution and stay quiet on security, as has 
been the case for much of the history of security politics in the UK.
The second part of the chapter argued that although security speech 
poses a dilemma, security silence does also. It not an innocent choice. 
Silence on security reinforces the authority of the state and to a lesser 
extent the associated milieu of security experts. Silence translates as 
deference. Deference confers recognition. Again, this has been the case 
in much of British political history. Today, despite signs of change at 
Westminster, security remains an elite discourse. Silence is central to the 
institutional authority and power of ‘security’. 
From this perspective, there are two ways to judge the lack of security 
debate in the Scottish independence campaigns. On the one hand, the lack 
of debate could be judged positively if it avoided the risk of escalating 
security talk towards an extreme politics of securitisation. In this sense, 
protagonists in the independence debate could be judged as acting 
responsibly. On the other hand, silence on security is not politically 
neutral. It works as a silent recognition of existing structures of security 
authority, which reside predominantly with the UK Government. More 
generally, a lack of public debate on any subject goes against democratic 
instincts. This symbolic power imbalance on security is something for 
both sides to consider from the point of view of political strategy should 
any second Scottish independence referendum arise. 
Explaining the reasons for the relative silence of the Scottish political 
class on security in the independence debate, particularly on the 
 2198. To Speak Security or Not to Speak Security?
pro-independence side, would require further research. It may have 
been born out of political calculation and an attempt to triangulate with 
a cautious electorate. This could be explored in research interviews 
with referendum campaign strategists, if they were willing to pull back 
the curtain. The relative silence may also have been a function of the 
Holyrood’s structural marginalisation on security in the devolution 
settlement and a lack of security expertise among the Scottish political 
class. The latter is already evident from the CVs of MSPs, almost none 
of whom have security-related experience. Given existing research 
on the attitudes of Westminster MPs towards security engagement, it 
would not be a surprise if research interviews with MSPs revealed a 
reluctance to engage with security topics.47 However, this should be 
offset against the demonstrable security and defence activism of SNP 
MPs Angus Robertson and Alex Salmond at Westminster (which was 
true for Robertson even before he became a ‘security insider’ by joining 
the ISC in 2015). 
The historical example of Westminster illustrates how difficult it is 
for parliaments to engage with security issues, due to barriers of secrecy, 
lack of expertise, and conventions of responsibility and caution. Even 
when parliament has gained new avenues for security scrutiny and 
oversight, such as the creation and then recent reform of the ISC, it has 
taken decades for parliament to accrue security expertise, which does 
not seem to proliferate effectively beyond those directly involved.48 
Yet recent developments show that these hindrances may not be 
permanent obstacles to greater democratic engagement with security. 
Westminster offers a lesson, or perhaps an uncertain experiment, on 
what it means to challenge the historical and constitutional settlement 
between democracy and security. Parliament has won concessions from 
the Government by pressing for more intelligence oversight, tabling 
difficult questions, launching committee inquiries in emerging new 
areas of security, and staging rebellious votes. Change has happened 
piecemeal and is largely uncoordinated. As a process it is by no means 
complete. Its final destination and constitutional implications remain 
unclear. Increased parliamentary engagement with security is more 
democratic than silence, but can also be unpredictable, as the 2013 vote 
47  See Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014).
48  See Defty (2008).
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on Syria showed. There is a delicate political path to tread between, on 
the one hand, speaking out and damaging the conventions of caution 
and responsibility than can restrain the escalation of security discourse, 
and, on the other, remaining silent and reinforcing the existing structures 
of security power and authority. 
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Concluding Remarks: The Narrative of 
Security and Pathways of Transition
Thierry Balzacq
This contribution stands as a conclusion to the book, arguing that 
both the tone and the content of debates over security during the 
Scottish referendum were mainly underwritten by narratives 
which sought to harness the ambiguity of security. It postulates 
that ambiguity yields different outcomes and empowers 
different actors. In a context of deep uncertainty, such as that of a 
referendum over independence, the ambiguous nature of security 
would tend to impose exacting commitments on the revisionist 
side, since it has to show that the devil we don’t know is better 
than the devil we know. Hence, perhaps, the hesitancy of the Yes 
side to prioritise security topics.
© 2017 Thierry Balzacq, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.09
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If nothing else, debates over independence share one ineradicable trait: 
they are set in oppositional terms, as a struggle between the status 
quo and change. But the exact contents and contours of the discussion 
are often disrupted by the confusion — deliberate or not — between 
diagnosis and conviction. That is, a referendum over independence is 
as much about describing the situation now and after (depending of 
course on the outcome) as it is about defending firmly held beliefs. The 
reason, I argue, is that any discourse that attempts to make sense of the 
stakes brought about by the prospects of independence is primarily a 
‘narrative’. Contributors to this volume show that within the context of 
a referendum, politics is primarily about the competing narratives that 
describe a nation’s future, vying for prominence. However, because 
narratives often need to accommodate various demands, they are 
communicated using ambiguous terms. The result is a blurring effect 
on the message, which may or may not be desirable but is certainly not 
without consequences for how people weigh opposing arguments.
Narratives, we know, are designed, not natural, entities. According 
to Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, a narrative is a 
‘sequence of events arranged around a problem and designed to restore 
equilibrium’.1 Such narratives draw on different ‘facts’, and, when the 
facts seem to be the same, they endow them with different meanings, as 
if meaning depended on how the ‘facts’ are interpreted. Above all, the 
primary concern is how best to sideline the opposing argument. Further, 
while a referendum on independence seeks closure over the destiny of 
a country, the inherent ambiguity of ‘security’ does not easily lend itself 
to serene discussions.2 This explains, at least partly, why, in times of 
transition, security discussion often stretches between two heightened 
narratives: continuity or change. 
In this conclusion, my aim is to chart the importance of narratives 
in understanding the twists and turns undergone by ‘security’ during 
the Scottish referendum. I argue that the relatively low profile of this 
issue during the campaign might have had less to do with its lack of 
1  Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, ‘Narrative in Political Science’, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 1 (1998), 315–31 (p. 324); see also S. R. Shenhav, 
‘Political Narratives and Political Reality’, International Political Science Review / 
Revue internationale de science politique, 27, 3 (2006), 245–62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.polisci.1.1.315
2  Arnold Wolfers, ‘“National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science 
Quarterly, 67, 4 (1952), 481–502, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2145138
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political clout than with the difficulty of acknowledging and handling 
its ambiguous nature. This made it difficult for a single side to 
enter, let alone dominate, the technicalities of the security field. This 
conclusion therefore explores three interrelated themes raised by the 
Scottish referendum as they relate to security: narratives, politics, and 
ambiguity. In a sense, security expresses a way in which a community 
weaves different aspects of the present reality into a narrative in order 
to give meaning to its life. 
Narratives
Referenda are always directed toward a goal. That goal divides; its nature 
varies. Stakeholders can speculate endlessly about the implications of 
their favourite outcome, but they seldom question the reality of their 
perspective. In a referendum, opposite sides must put forward their 
own accounts of what is at stake, what their preferred outcome would be 
and, more importantly, why it matters. Indeed, ‘the chief characteristic 
of a narrative is that it renders understanding only by connecting 
(however unstably) parts of a constructed configuration or a social 
network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, 
institutional, and material practices’.3 Typically, such narratives order 
events by situating the community in the plot.4 They are not a mere 
reporting of facts, though narrators pretend to draw on what is; rather, 
narratives aim to explain and justify why events should be assembled 
and organised in a particular way. It is in this sense that Patterson and 
Monroe argue that ‘all narratives are essentially normative’.5 
The chapters brought together in this book feature one main 
narrative, that is, ‘smallness’. From this narrative, two heated dualities 
arise: first, strong versus weak Scotland; second, isolated versus 
integrated Scotland. There is not enough evidence to weigh the power 
of each component of these two pairs of dualities, but Juliet Kaarbo 
3  M. R. Somers and G. D. Gibson, ‘Reclaiming the Epistemological “Other”: Narrative 
and the Social Constitution of Identity’, in Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. 
by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Wiley, 1994), pp. 37–99.
4  See Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1986); Robert Coles, The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral 
Imagination (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the 
Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
5  Patterson and Monroe (1998), p. 321.
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and Daniel Keneally, on the one hand, and Baldur Thorhallsson and 
Alysson J. K. Bailes, on the other, consistently document the invocation 
of smallness during the Scottish referendum. The Yes and the No wings 
saw in smallness two radically different types of future for Scotland. In 
particular, the Yes side interpreted independence as an opportunity to 
build a state that would be more sensitive to international rules, while 
pursuing an ethical diplomacy of sorts. The No side, by contrast, saw 
in smallness a vital vulnerability for Scotland. Overall, the discussion 
boiled down to whether smallness was a strength, a risk, or a natural 
weakness. For instance, Sandy Hardie’s chapter holds that Scottish 
independence would have diminished Scotland’s ability to protect 
its citizens, in particular abroad. It is not feasible here to bring all the 
different aspects of this argument into sharper relief, but I can sketch 
a possible counter-approach that may diminish its force. Part of 
the difficulty with this view is that it depends upon an independent 
Scotland pursuing the same goals and foreign policies as the UK, which 
make UK citizens one of the prized targets for some violent groups the 
world over. But Hardie implicitly captures an important element that 
undergirds any debate over a referendum, namely the issue of time. In 
fact, referenda show in a particularly acute form how it is tricky to know 
what will happen once a state is independent. It might be that all really 
rests with the capacity of the political elite to adapt swiftly to the new 
environment, but adaptation is harder when the elite lacks expertise 
in the domain at stake or is unprepared. Matters might even be worse 
if the former ‘shelter’ decides to punish the newly independent entity. 
That said, given the range of shared interests, it remains uncertain as to 
whether the UK would have taken an aggressive stance with a newly 
independent Scotland. In times of global interdependence, resentment 
does not necessarily result in revenge.
Debates on small states have waxed and waned, but they generally 
involve matters of resources, visibility, and influence. The now 
voluminous literature on small states teaches us, among other things, that 
the success or failure of small states in the international arena depends 
on a host of factors for which size alone cannot account.6 Perhaps this 
6  For a start, see inter alia, C. Clarke and T. Payne, Politics. Security and Development in 
Small States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Tom Crowards, ‘Defining the Category 
of “Small States”’, Journal of International Development, 14, 2 (2002), 143–79, http://
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is why, as Thorhallsson and Bailes argue, in addition to interesting 
similarities with Nordic states, Scotland’s case stirred up challenges 
which had less to do with its smallness than with the newness of the 
situation its independence would have created both for itself and for 
the international system. A dominant feature of international systems 
is that they abhor uncertainty. In this sense, the primary challenge that 
a narrative which supports independence confronts is to relieve the 
uncertainty that any change of such a magnitude creates. So whereas 
the No side could safely draw on the uncertainty sparked by what an 
independent Scotland would have to struggle against, the Yes side 
could only emphasise the view that the No wing occluded the long-
term benefits of independence. This involves different ways — with 
respect to security — of: defining the problem, characterising choices, 
prioritising options, justifying strategies, assessing capacities (e.g., 
expertise and institutional robustness), and outlining solutions. The 
struggles around these challenges contribute to defining the politics of 
the referendum. 
Politics
A second conversation that the book opens concerns the — relatively 
little — space afforded to security during the campaign. Though some 
chapters dig into the reasons for this marginalisation, they also note 
that the referendum did not entirely confirm the theoretical tendency 
within security studies to draw a line between normal politics and 
security politics.7 This does not mean security and politics always enter 
dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.860; Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Small States and Small States 
Revisited’, New Political Economy, 8, 1 (2003), 9–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/1356
346032000078705; Olav F. Knudsen, ‘Small States, Latent and Extant: Towards a 
General Perspective’, Journal of International relations and Development, 5, 2 (2002), 
182–98, http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Small_States_Latent_Extant.
pdf; Keohane (1969).
7  This can mainly be found in the Copenhagen School’s version of securitisation 
theory. See, inter alia, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998). For an extensive 
review of the different strands of securitisation theory and their treatment of the 
relations between security and politics, see: T. Balzacq and others, ‘What Kind of 
Theory — If Any — Is Securitization?’, International Relations, 29, 1 (2014), 96–136, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606; T. Balzacq, S. Leonard, and J. Ruzicka, 
‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases’, International Relations, 30, 4 (2015), 
pp. 494–531, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590
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into each other’s orbit. Instead, it points to the view that the referendum 
was an intriguing case to study, as it challenged some of the premises 
students and scholars have about security. Andrew Neal, for instance, 
‘compares the quietude of security politics in Scotland with the history 
and transformation of politics at Westminster’. He points out that, of 
the 670 pages of the Scottish Government’s White Paper, only 6 were 
devoted to security and intelligence. Of course, quantity is hardly the 
only reliable testimony of importance or priority, but it provides us 
with clues as to why security was not as widely debated as could have 
been expected. Perhaps the referendum sheds light on the undefined 
work of security rather than on the politics of security as such. It may 
in fact be argued that security’s powerful ability to alter the mood and 
terms of the debate was profitably mobilised neither by the Yes nor by 
the No wing. Instead, security rode the tension between Yes and No, but 
did not tilt the balance in favour of either of the two sides. 
Neal assesses the lack of security discourse in two ways. One is an 
apparently responsible silence, which prevented the debate veering 
into securitisation as an exceptional kind of politics. The second, he 
says, might have been a strategy of avoiding discussions of security 
at length, because they would have potentially disclosed the superior 
expertise of Westminster on the issue. In my view, the second part of 
the argument has more leverage. In many ways, this is confirmed by 
Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris’ analysis of the Scottish 
Government’s proposals on intelligence accountability.8 But what are 
we to conclude from the apparently insufficient expertise of the Scottish 
political elite? Not that it could not live up to the challenges brought 
by potential security issues. Even those countries most learned about 
security do not always perform at the level expected. Nor that Scotland 
would have been more insecure out of the UK. The truth is, nobody 
knows. Pathways either to security or insecurity are numerous and 
not always predictable. Yet, what we know is that the Yes proposals 
on security exhibited several shortcomings. For instance, they did 
not sufficiently depart from the existing mechanisms of the current 
UK political settlement. This means, in other words, that the Yes side 
8  See also Chapter 6 of this volume.
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proclaimed the demise of processes to which it aimed to contribute. It 
wanted to sever ties with one specific shelter, but could only do so by 
acknowledging that a shelter was needed, the nature of which was to be 
negotiated after the referendum. The No side, on the other hand, relied 
on mechanisms over which it had little control. It wanted to remain 
inside the UK, but had to acknowledge that this meant a lack of security 
agency on the Scottish side, that is, a position of security dependence 
vis-à-vis London. Between the Yes and the No sides, then, sit different 
possibilities of how Scottish agency could have operated on security. 
A notable benefit of this book is to help us understand in what ways 
specific security narratives are able to produce Scotland as either an 
object or a subject of security. 
Ambiguity
In general, parties involved in referendum campaigns need to display 
sureness regarding the most uncertain of events. The problem, however, 
is that security discussions only happen when there are questions about 
the current state of a polity, that is, when there is a form of uncertainty. 
Moreover, in the context of a referendum regarding a nation’s 
independence, security might quickly become a point of contention 
for the different stakeholders. Because of its emotional weight, most 
actors would presumably make whatever effort they could to tap into 
security’s power to catch people’s attention. Be that as it may, in the 
Scottish case, the Yes side had to bear most of the burden of proof, 
because it had to convince people that Scotland would be better off 
without what the No side described as the ‘UK shelter’.9 The problem, 
however, is that it is difficult to assess the extent to which the future 
will be better than the present, under contingent circumstances.10 In 
this light, the familiar security discourse maintained by the No side 
appeared more comforting, if not reassuring, than the leap into the 
unknown demanded by the Yes campaign. A referendum does not only 
happen in a given cultural and historical context, but it also creates its 
own context, in particular by betting on the future of the nation. In 
9  See Chapter 2 in this volume.
10  A point well made by Hugh Bochel and Andrew Defty in Chapter 4 of this book.
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this light, recourse to security talk appears a risky strategy, because of 
the evolving conditions of the discussion. While the Yes side required 
people to be open to a different, new, and unpredictable order, the No 
campaign held that order and security derived from remaining under 
an institutional blanket whose strengths (and flaws) had been tested. 
This is to say, the Yes side was unable to cut short the ambiguities 
inherent in security and close the gaps.11
Whether we like it or not, security arguments with a higher chance 
to succeed are usually those which offer a predetermined course, 
disqualify ‘abstract principles‘, and privilege ‘finite relations’.12 The 
most important point is that securitisation, to this way of thinking, 
serves to close options and minimise political contingency. During 
the debates surrounding the Scottish referendum, for instance, the No 
side began with the presumptive reliability of the UK polity and drew 
upon uncertainty in order to securitise independence, whereas the 
Yes campaign, by proposing to revise previously established relations, 
had the indirect effect of opening the Scottish political community 
to unpredictability, making it harder to stimulate a broader public 
commitment. 
The politics of independence, then, through which the Yes and the 
No sides represented their views, may be looked upon as a politics of 
dealing with ambiguity in security. In any case, the debate between Yes 
and No was a matter of degree. The more uncertainty was portrayed 
as a problem, the more a position leaned towards No. The greater the 
predominance of new, though indeterminate relations, the more the 
approach leaned towards Yes. Thus, in trying to intuit why security was 
dealt with or not addressed in the way it was, we need explicitly to 
engage the management of ambiguity by each side, since the difficulty 
of ‘speaking security’ owes something to the ambiguity that always 
looms in the background of security talks. 
11  See Charles Raab’s contribution in Chapter 3 of this volume.
12  Willem de Lint and Sirpa Virta, ‘Security in Ambiguity Towards a Radical 
Security Politics’, Theoretical Criminology, 8, 4 (2004), 465–89 (p. 474), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1362480604046660
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Conclusion
My focus in these concluding remarks has been to identify the main 
lines that might enable us to connect the dots between the chapters 
assembled in this book. I would now like to raise a point which I 
think could constitute a next step in the discussion, because it matters 
beyond the Scottish case: the ethics of independence. I know the issue is 
slippery, but would it not be productive to ask: under what conditions is 
independence ethically defensible? Or, put differently, are all the claims 
made about or against secession ‘right’? Is there a just secession, of 
sorts? What does secession teach us about the moral standing of group 
agents? These are not the same as whether independence from a polity 
in order to set up a new state is materially warranted or not. Though 
they are separate questions, the second — i.e. whether secession is 
practically feasible — is somewhat nested in the first group of questions. 
With various entities across Europe aspiring to independence, scholars 
would be well advised to develop more robust works on the ethics 
of independence.13 This is even more urgent for those who claim to 
be working within critical approaches to security, wherein issues of 
emancipation and agency are so central. In this sense, the chapters 
brought together here constitute a viable first step towards such a task, 
for without a fine grained analysis of the meaning of different arguments, 
it is much more difficult to assess the ethical issues they generate.
13  A nice introduction can be found here: Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality 
of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991). Some advanced works are: Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Constitutionalism 
and Secession’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 58, 2 (1991), 633–70, http://
dx.doi.org/10.2307/1599969; Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National 
Self-Determination’, The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 9 (1990), 439–61, http://
dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026968; Daniel Weinstock, ‘Constitutionalizing the Right 
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